Rick Jackson v. Craig Watkins, et al

Filing

PUBLISHED OPINION FILED. [09-10635 Affirmed ] Judge: HRD , Judge: JWE , Judge: CH Mandate pull date is 10/04/2010 [09-10635]

Rick Jackson v. Craig Watkins, et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS United States Court of Appeals FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT Fifth Circuit FILED
September 13, 2010 N o . 09-10635 Lyle W. Cayce Clerk

R I C K JACKSON, P la in t if f -A p p e lla n t , v. C R A I G WATKINS, in his individual and official capacities; DALLAS COU N TY, D e fe n d a n t s -A p p e lle e s .

A p p e a l from the United States District Court fo r the Northern District of Texas, Dallas Div.

B e fo r e DeMOSS, ELROD, and HAYNES, Circuit Judges. P E R CURIAM: P la in t iff-A p p e lla n t Rick Jackson appeals the district court's grant of s u m m a r y judgment in favor of defendants-appellees on his claims that he was d is c h a r g e d on account of his race in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act o f 1964 (Title VII), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e; 42 U.S.C. § 1981; and § 21.051 of the Texas C o m m is s io n on Human Rights Act, Tex. Labor Code Ann. § 21.001 et seq. (V e r n o n 2006). For the following reasons, we AFFIRM. I. P r io r to his termination, Rick Jackson, who is Caucasian, served in the D a lla s County District Attorney's office for nearly seventeen years. He began

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No. 09-10635 h is career at that office as a misdemeanor prosecutor in 1990, and he was p r o m o t e d in 1996 to the position of chief prosecutor of a felony court, where he a m a s s e d over 330 jury trials and a conviction rate of ninety-four percent. In 2 0 0 6 , he was promoted to the position of division chief of the Organized Crime D iv is i o n ("OCD"). Throughout his career in the OCD, Jackson worked on a n u m b e r of high-level drug cases and drug-related murder cases, and he was g i v e n responsibility for training and supervising dozens of new prosecutors. Jackson received commendations from various community members, and he o b ta in e d high marks in employment reviews for ethics and professionalism. His e m p lo y m e n t records also reflect that he received strong evaluations in such a r e a s as fostering teamwork, creating a productive and positive work e n v ir o n m e n t , and fostering open communication. Jackson's career at the

D is t r ic t Attorney's Office ended in December 2006 when newly elected Dallas C o u n ty District Attorney Craig Watkins terminated him. It is undisputed that W a t k in s , who is African-American, initially replaced Jackson with an AfricanA m e r ic a n . After exhausting his administrative remedies, Jackson sued Dallas County a n d Watkins, in his personal and official capacities, for terminating him based o n race in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, a n d § 21.051 of the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act, Tex. Labor Code A n n . § 21.001. Defendants denied all claims, and Watkins asserted qualified im m u n it y as to those claims filed against him in his individual capacity. In N o v e m b e r 2008, defendants filed a motion for summary judgment alleging that (1 ) Jackson could not recover under Title VII because he was a member of W a t k in s 's personal staff, not an "employee" entitled to the protections of Title

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No. 09-10635 V I I ; (2) the evidence in the summary-judgment record was legally and factually in s u ffic ie n t to overcome Watkins's legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for t e r m in a t i n g Jackson's employment; (3) Watkins was entitled to qualified im m u n it y for claims asserted against him in his individual capacity; and (4) J a c k s o n 's state-law claim should be dismissed without prejudice. Jackson filed a response disputing all of Watkins's contentions, and he also filed a motion p u r s u a n t to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f) seeking a continuance for a d d it io n a l discovery. I n May 2009, the district court denied Jackson's motion for a continuance a n d granted defendants' motion for summary judgment. The court found that, b e c a u s e Jackson had submitted sufficient evidence to show that he was an e m p lo y e e within the meaning of Title VII and was not a member of the District A t to r n e y 's personal staff, a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether h e was entitled to the protections of Title VII. Nevertheless, the court granted s u m m a r y judgment in favor of defendants on Jackson's Title VII claim because W a t k in s had failed to provide summary-judgment evidence to rebut any of W a tk in s's four proffered "legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons" for terminating J a c k s o n . The court did not reach the question whether Watkins was entitled to q u a lifie d immunity, and it dismissed Jackson's state-law claims without p r e ju d ic e . See McClelland v. Gronwaldt, 155 F.3d 507, 519 (5th Cir. 1998) (" [W ]h e n all federal claims are dismissed or otherwise eliminated from a case p r i o r to trial, we have stated that our `general rule' is to decline to exercise ju r is d ic t io n over the pendent state law claims." (citation omitted)), overruled in p a r t on other grounds by Arana v. Ochsner Health Plan, 338 F.3d 433, 440 (5th C ir . 2003) (en banc). This appeal followed.

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II. We review the district court's grant of summary judgment de novo. LeMaire v. La. Dep't of Transp. & Dev., 480 F.3d 383, 386 (5th Cir. 2007). Summary judgment is appropriate when "the discovery and disclosure materials o n file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fa c t and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Breaux v. Halliburton Energy Servs., 562 F.3d 358, 364 (5th Cir. 2 0 0 9 ). This court must take all the facts and evidence in the light most

fa v o r a b le to Jackson, the non-moving party. See Kemp v. Holder, 610 F.3d 231, 2 3 4 (5th Cir. 2010). III. Because claims brought pursuant to Title VII and § 1981 are "governed by t h e same evidentiary framework," such that the analyses under both statutes a r e substantively the same, we analyze Jackson's Title VII and § 1981 claims t o g e t h e r . Pegram v. Honeywell, Inc., 361 F.3d 272, 281 n.7 (5th Cir. 2004). Pursuant to Title VII, it is a violation of federal law for an employer to discharge a n employee because of race. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). Title VII affords e m p lo y e e s the option of proving a violation through either direct or c ir c u m s t a n t ia l evidence. Because Jackson's claim is based on circumstantial e v id e n c e , we analyze it under the three-step, burden-shifting analysis embodied in the "modified McDonnell Douglas approach." Burrell v. Dr. Pepper/Seven Up B o ttlin g Grp., Inc., 482 F.3d 408, 411 (5th Cir. 2007). Pursuant to this

fr a m e w o r k , Jackson must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination. See id. at 411-12. Second, once Jackson establishes a prima facie case, Watkins

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No. 09-10635 m u s t then articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for terminating h im . See id. at 412. Third, assuming that Watkins meets this burden, Jackson m u s t then show that Watkins's legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons were p r e t e x t s for discrimination.1 See Rachid v. Jack In The Box, Inc., 376 F.3d 305, 3 1 2 (5th Cir. 2004). A s the first two steps of the modified McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting a n a ly s is are satisfied,2 the only question on appeal is whether Jackson has met h is burden of producing evidence sufficient to show pretext with respect to W a t k in s 's four proffered reasons for terminating Jackson: (1) it was important to Watkins to bring a new image and sense of p u r p o s e to the OCD following the "fake drug scandal" that occurred in that division under the previous administration; (2) he believed h e could not trust Jackson to follow his policies and practices; (3) W a t k in s ' own experience with Jackson was overwhelmingly n e g a t iv e ; and (4) Jackson's reputation within the District Attorney's O ffic e and within the legal community practicing in the felony c o u r t s in Dallas was that Jackson was disrespectful, unnecessarily c o n fr o n t a t io n a l, and uncooperative. The district court found that Watkins was entitled to summary judgment b e c a u s e Jackson failed to address, much less rebut, each of Watkins's proffered

Jackson conceded at oral argument that this is solely a pretext case, not a mixedmotive case, so we consider any mixed-motive arguments to be waived. See Saavedra v. Murphy Oil U.S.A., Inc., 930 F.2d 1104, 1109 (5th Cir. 1991). Watkins originally conceded that Jackson could show the prima facie discrimination case. On appeal, Watkins contends for the first time that, since September of 2007, nine months after Jackson's termination, another Caucasian attorney held his position. Because Jackson was initially replaced by an African-American and Watkins conceded in the district court that Jackson had established his prima facie case, we proceed to the third step of the analysis.
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No. 09-10635 r e a s o n s for terminating Jackson. It also found that Jackson's summary-

ju d g m e n t evidence was insufficient to rebut two of Watkins's proffered reasons. O n appeal, Jackson asserts that (1) Fifth Circuit precedent does not r e q u ir e him to rebut all of Watkins's proffered reasons to preclude summary ju d g m e n t and (2) even if he were required to rebut all of Watkins's reasons, he s u b m it t e d sufficient evidence to do so. We address these arguments in turn. Because our precedent is clear that a plaintiff asserting a Title VII claim m u s t rebut each of the defendant's nondiscriminatory reasons in order to survive s u m m a r y judgment, Jackson's contention that he is required to rebut only some o f Watkins's reasons is without merit. We have long recognized that to satisfy s t e p three of the McDonnell Douglas framework, a plaintiff "must put forward e v id e n c e rebutting each of the nondiscriminatory reasons the employer a r t ic u la t e s ." Wallace v. Methodist Hosp. Sys., 271 F.3d 212, 220 (5th Cir. 2001); s e e Laxton v. Gap, Inc., 333 F.3d 572, 578 (5th Cir. 2003). Where a plaintiff " fa lls short of [his] burden of presenting evidence rebutting each of the legitimate n o n d is c r im in a t o r y reasons produced by [the employer]," summary judgment is a p p r o p r ia te . Wallace, 271 F.3d at 222 (emphasis in original); see also Rutherford v . Harris Cnty., Tex., 197 F.3d 173, 184 (5th Cir. 1999); accord Rubinstein v. A d m in s . of Tulane Edu. Fund, 218 F.3d 392, 400-01 (5th Cir. 2000) (affirming g r a n t of summary judgment on behalf of the employer where the plaintiff p r o d u c e d evidence of pretext as to some, but not all, of the employer's n o n d is c r im in a t o r y reasons). Accordingly, Jackson cannot withstand summary ju d g m e n t without providing sufficient evidence to rebut each of Watkins's n o n d is c r im in a t o r y reasons. He has not done so.

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No. 09-10635 J a c k s o n failed to bring forth summary-judgment evidence to rebut W a t k in s 's contention that his own experience with Jackson was overwhelmingly n e g a t iv e . Therefore, we find that the district court did not err in granting s u m m a r y judgment on behalf of defendants.3 B e fo r e the district court, Jackson did not respond specifically to Watkins's c o n t e n t io n that he had experienced negative personal interactions with him, but i n s t e a d argued generally that "[t]he reasons given by Defendant Watkins for fir in g Mr. Jackson are nothing more than a pretext for discrimination." He then s o u g h t to rebut all four reasons with statistical evidence of Watkins's alleged r e p la c e m e n t of Caucasian division chiefs with African-Americans. The district c o u r t rejected Jackson's statistical evidence as unreliable because it was not " a s s e m b le d or compiled so as to present any statistically significant or m e a n in g fu l information about Watkins's employment decisions." But even a s s u m in g arguendo that his statistics were reliable, we agree with the district c o u r t that such evidence is not sufficient here to raise a genuine issue of m a t e r ia l fact in the absence of evidence tailored to rebut Watkins's specific r e a s o n of terminating Jackson--negative personal interactions.4 See E.E.O.C. v.

We note, however, that the district court applied the incorrect analysis in evaluating the sufficiency of Jackson's proffered evidence presented to rebut two of Watkins's other proffered reasons--that Watkins believed Jackson had a bad reputation in the District Attorney's office, and that Jackson would refuse to follow his policies and procedures. The district court should have followed Laxton v. Gap, Inc., 333 F.3d 572, 580 (5th Cir. 2003), which provides that an employee's burden of demonstrating pretext is satisfied where he brings evidence "challenging the substance" of the employer's reason together with "evidence that undermines the overall credibility of [the employer's] proffered justification." Laxton, 333 F.3d at 580.
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Jackson faults Watkins for failing to provide any "examples, experiences, or facts" to support his reason that his interactions with Jackson were negative. Watkins was not required

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No. 09-10635 T e x . Instruments, Inc., 100 F.3d 1173, 1184 (5th Cir. 1996) ("[S]tatistical e v id e n c e usually cannot rebut the employer's articulated nondiscriminatory r e a s o n s ." ); accord Deloach v. Delchamps, Inc., 897 F.2d 815, 820 (5th Cir. 1990) (e x p la in in g that, although statistical data may occasionally establish pretext w h e r e it is combined with additional evidence, it is generally insufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact in cases where a plaintiff puts forward no a d d it io n a l evidence that a specific nondiscriminatory reason is pretextual). O u r review of the record confirms that Jackson put forward no additional e v id e n c e sufficient to refute this specific nondiscriminatory reason articulated b y Watkins. Jackson contends that his numerous positive reviews, performance e v a lu a tio n s , and letters from community members prove that he was well r e s p e c t e d in the community, but this evidence in no way undercuts Watkins's cla im to have experienced negative interactions with Jackson such that he would n o t wish to retain Jackson as an employee. Jackson could have deposed Watkins in an effort to obtain contradictory testimony that could raise a genuine issue of m a t e r ia l fact, but Jackson conceded at oral argument that the district court d e n ie d his Rule 56(f) motion for continuance to depose Watkins, and he has not a p p e a l e d that ruling. Without additional evidence, Jackson cannot rebut

W a t k in s 's contention that he terminated Jackson not because of race, but b e c a u s e they had a history of negative personal interactions.5

to produce such evidence at this stage; rather, he "need only produce admissible evidence which would allow the trier of fact rationally to conclude that the employment decision had not been motivated by racial animus" to avoid summary judgment. Tex. Dept. of Comm. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 257 (1981). Our holding that Jackson has not met his summary-judgment burden is not an endorsement of Watkins's decision to terminate Jackson, a veteran prosecutor with seventeen years of experience. But it is not our place to second-guess the business decisions of an employer, so long as those decisions are not the result of discrimination. See Walton v. Bisco Indus., Inc., 119 F.3d 368, 372 (5th Cir. 1997)
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No. 09-10635 B e c a u s e we find that Jackson has failed to rebut one of Watkins's four p r o ffe r e d nondiscriminatory reasons for firing him, we need not address W a t k in s 's remaining reasons for terminating Jackson,6 nor do we reach the a r g u m e n t that Watkins is entitled to qualified immunity for those claims filed a g a in s t him in his personal capacity. We therefore AFFIRM the district court's g r a n t of summary judgment on Jackson's Title VII and § 1981 claims.

Watkins proffered, as his first nondiscriminatory reason, his desire to create a "new image" for the District Attorney's Office. We do not address the difficult question whether a stated desire to create a "new image" could ever be a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for termination.

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