Lilian Onoh v. Northwest Airlines, Inc.

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Lilian Onoh v. Northwest Airlines, Inc.

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Case: 09-10971

Document: 00511192120

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Date Filed: 08/02/2010

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS United States Court of Appeals FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT Fifth Circuit FILED
August 2, 2010 N o . 09-10971 Lyle W. Cayce Clerk

L IL IA N ONOH, P la in t iff - Appellant v. N O R T H W E S T AIRLINES, INC., D e fe n d a n t - Appellee

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas

B e fo r e DAVIS, SMITH, and HAYNES, Circuit Judges. H A Y N E S , Circuit Judge: A p p e lla n t Lilian Onoh ("Onoh") appeals the district court's grant of s u m m a r y judgment on her state-law breach-of-contract and intentionalin flic t io n -o f-e m o tio n a l-d is t r e s s ("IIED") claims against Appellee Northwest A ir lin e s ("Northwest"). The district court found that Onoh's claims were

p r e e m p t e d by the Airline Deregulation Act ("ADA"). We AFFIRM. I . FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND O n o h , a Nigerian national and diplomat, purchased a round-trip ticket fr o m Northwest and its partner, KLM "Royal Dutch" Airlines, from Nigeria to D a lla s -F o r t Worth International Airport ("DFW") by way of the Netherlands.

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Date Filed: 08/02/2010

No. 09-10971 O n o h carries both a personal and a diplomatic passport, but her trip was u n r e la t e d to diplomatic business. O n o h 's return itinerary also included a stopover in Amsterdam. The N e th e r la n d s , pursuant to international agreements referred to by the parties as "th e Schengen Agreements," requires certain air passengers passing through the c o u n t r y to acquire an airport transit visa ("ATV"). Passengers must possess a v a lid ATV at the time of entry or they will not be permitted to continue on to t h e ir final destinations from the Netherlands. Carriers are responsible for v e r ify in g that international passengers have the correct travel documents under t h e Schengen Agreements, and they face penalties for failing to do so. When Onoh tried to check in for her flight at DFW on December 5, 2007, a n automated program informed the Northwest ticketing agent that Onoh, as a N ig e r ia n national, needed an ATV in order to travel through Amsterdam. Because her trip was for personal reasons, Onoh presented the Northwest agent h e r personal passport. Her personal passport contained an ATV that was valid t h r o u g h December 5, 2007. But Onoh was scheduled to arrive in Amsterdam on D e c e m b e r 6. As a result, the agent informed Onoh that she could not board the p la n e because she did not have an ATV that would be valid on the date she w o u ld arrive in Amsterdam. Onoh then presented her diplomatic passport and e x p la in e d that, as a diplomat, she did not need an ATV. As Onoh had already s t a t e d that she was traveling for personal, rather than official, reasons, the N o r t h w e s t agent declined to accept Onoh's diplomatic passport. After speaking w it h several additional Northwest employees, each of whom told Onoh that she c o u ld not travel without an ATV that was valid on December 6, Onoh left the a ir p o r t. O v e r the next several days, Onoh alleges that she spoke with a r e p r e s e n t a t iv e of the Dutch consulate who informed her that she did not need a n ATV to travel through the Netherlands because she was a diplomat. She 2

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No. 09-10971 fu r t h e r alleges that both a Northwest customer service agent and a KLM r e p r e s e n t a t iv e also told Onoh that she did not need an ATV because of her d ip lo m a t ic status. On December 6 and 9, Onoh again tried to board flights from D F W traveling through Amsterdam using her diplomatic passport. She was r e fu s e d on both occasions by Northwest staff because she did not have a valid A T V . A few days later, another Northwest employee allegedly told Onoh that t h e United States Department of State would not allow her to fly. Onoh

e v e n t u a lly returned to Nigeria on February 10, 2008, after securing a new ATV. O n o h sued Northwest for discrimination under 49 U.S.C. § 40127 and for b r e a c h -o f-c o n t r a c t and IIED under state law. Northwest filed a motion to

d is m is s and an alternative motion for summary judgment. Northwest claimed t h a t Onoh had failed to state a discrimination claim and that her state-law c la im s were preempted by the ADA. Onoh agreed to dismiss her discrimination c la im but opposed Northwest's motion on the state-law claims. The district court g r a n t e d Northwest's motion for summary judgment, finding that Onoh's breacho f-c o n t r a c t and IIED claims were preempted by the ADA. Onoh timely appealed. II. STANDARD OF REVIEW A grant of summary judgment is reviewed de novo, applying the same s t a n d a r d as the district court. Bolton v. City of Dallas, 472 F.3d 261, 263 (5th C ir . 2006). Our inquiry "is limited to the summary judgment record before the t r ia l court." Martco Ltd. P'ship v. Wellons, Inc., 588 F.3d 864, 871 (5th Cir. 2 0 0 9 ). We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving p a r ty , Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1 9 8 6 ), and the movant has the burden of showing this court that summary ju d g m e n t is appropriate. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Summary judgment is appropriate where the competent summary judgment e v id e n c e demonstrates that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the m o v in g party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Bolton, 472 F.3d at 263; 3

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No. 09-10971 s e e Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). A genuine issue of material fact exists if a reasonable ju r y could enter a verdict for the non-moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, I n c ., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986). III. DISCUSSION T h e only issues before the court are: (1) whether the ADA preempts Onoh's s t a t e -la w IIED claim; and (2) whether the ADA preempts Onoh's state-law b r e a c h -o f-c o n t r a c t claim. We address each claim in turn. A . IIED Claim O n o h first claims that the district court erred when it concluded that her I I E D claim was preempted under the ADA. Her claim arises from a

c o n v e r s a t io n she had with a Northwest agent, in which the agent allegedly s t a t e d that "the U.S. State Department would not permit [her] to travel . . . ." Onoh contends that the district court incorrectly held that this conversation and t h e resultant claim were sufficiently related to Northwest's provision of " s e r v ic e s " to trigger preemption. The preemption provision of the ADA provides that a state "may not enact o r enforce a law, regulation, or other provision having the force and effect of law r e la t e d to a price, route, or service of an air carrier . . . ." 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1) (2 0 0 6 ). The Supreme Court has interpreted the preemptive effect of the ADA b r o a d ly . Any state law, including state common law, "having a connection with o r reference to" airline prices, routes, or services is preempted unless the c o n n e c t io n or reference is "too tenuous, remote, or peripheral." Morales v. Trans W o r ld Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 384, 390 (1992). In applying Morales, we have had occasion to specifically address the scope o f the term "service" as used in the ADA preemption provision. In Hodges v. D e lta Airlines, 44 F.3d 334 (5th Cir. 1995) (en banc), we held that: Elements of the air carrier service bargain include items such as t ic k e t in g , boarding procedures, provision of food and drink, and 4

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No. 09-10971 b a g g a g e handling, in addition to the transportation itself. These m a t t e r s are all appurtenant and necessarily included with the c o n t r a c t of carriage between the passenger or shipper and the a ir lin e . It is these [contractual] features of air transportation that w e believe Congress intended to de-regulate as "services" and b r o a d ly to protect from state regulation. Id. at 336 (alteration in original). The question of whether Onoh suffered an I I E D when a Northwest agent prohibited her from boarding a flight on the g r o u n d s that the State Department would not permit Onoh to travel clearly falls w it h in this definition of airline "services." Moreover, we reject Onoh's contention t h a t her claim is "tenuous, remote, or peripheral" with respect to Northwest's p r o v is io n of "service" because it only addresses the manner in which she was r e fu s e d service rather than the fact that service was refused. Northwest's d e c is io n to deny Onoh boarding cannot be divorced from its stated reasons for d en y in g her boarding. Accordingly, Onoh's IIED claim is preempted by the ADA. B. Breach-of-Contract Claim O n o h next claims that the district court erred in concluding that her b r e a c h -o f-c o n t r a c t claim is preempted by the ADA. More precisely, Onoh

c o n t e n d s that, while her claim clearly falls within the scope of preemption d is c u s s e d in Morales, she is excluded from the application of the ADA p r e e m p t io n provisions by the so-called "Wolens exception." A s Onoh contends, ADA preemption is not absolute in certain cases that w o u ld otherwise fall outside the preemptive boundaries described in Morales. Specifically, the Supreme Court has held that the ADA's preemption clause does n o t extend so far as to "to shelter airlines from suits . . . seeking recovery solely f o r the airline's alleged breach of its own, self-imposed undertakings." Am. A ir lin e s , Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219, 228 (1995). "[S]tate-law-based court a d ju d ic a t io n of routine breach-of-contract claims" is permissible so long as a c o u r t makes "no enlargement or enhancement [of the contract] based on . . . state

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No. 09-10971 la w s or policies external to the agreement." Id. at 232-33. Thus, an otherwise p r e e m p t e d claim may remain viable under the ADA if it falls within the twop r o n g s of the Wolens exception: 1) the claim alleged only concerns a self-imposed o b lig a t io n ; and 2) no enlargement or enhancement of the contract occurs based o n state laws or policies external to the agreement. Id.; see also Lyn-Lea Travel C o r p . v. Am. Airlines, 283 F.3d 282, 287 (5th Cir. 2002). O noh contends Northwest incorrectly interpreted the Schengen

A g r e e m e n t s when it concluded she required an ATV and refused to grant her a c c e s s to her flight as a result. The first step in deciding a Wolens-exception case is determining whether the airline breached its own, self-imposed undertaking. Because we conclude that this case does not involve the airline's "self-imposed" u n d e r t a k in g , we need not reach the second prong of the Wolens analysis c o n c e r n in g state regulation. Here, the only way to assess whether the airline breached its duty is to d e t e r m in e whether it refused to transport a passenger who was fit for travel. To m a k e that determination, the court would be required to reach beyond the c o n t r a c t and interpret a variety of external laws that were not expressly in c o r p o r a t e d in the contract. Calling the Schengen Agreements "self-imposed" o b lig a t io n s of Northwest and Onoh is a large stretch from the simple references t o the need to comply with all applicable law addressed in the limited portions o f the contract contained in the record. Whether or not Northwest advised its p a s s e n g e r s of the need to comply with international law, such law would apply. T h e r e fo r e , the airline's (and Onoh's1 ) obligations under the Schengen A g r e e m e n t s are not "self-imposed," and the first prong of the Wolens exception

Onoh's counsel stated at oral argument that Onoh's obligation to have the documentation necessary under the Schengen Agreement was a "condition precedent" to her right to contractual relief; this argument further demonstrates the "outside the contract" nature of this claim.

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No. 09-10971 is not met. See Sanchez v. Aerovias De Mex., S.A. de C.V., 590 F.3d 1027, 10303 1 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding no contractual commitment where the only alleged in c o r p o r a t io n occurred with respect to a passenger duty rather than airline d u t y ).2 As Onoh's counsel conceded, Onoh's claim is preempted if the

W o l e n s exception does not apply, and, as we so find, her state law claim is b a r r e d .3 I V . CONCLUSION F o r the reasons set forth above, we AFFIRM the district court's grant of s u m m a r y judgment.

We also note that Texas courts have already addressed this question in a very similar context. In Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Black, 116 S.W.3d 745, 756 (Tex. 2003), the Texas Supreme Court held that breach-of-contract actions flowing from an airline's boarding policies are preempted under the ADA. Thus, even if we were to apply Texas law here, Texas would find these claims preempted. We also question Onoh's suggestion that the function of ADA preemption in these circumstances would be to leave passengers without remedy if airlines breach their contractual obligations. The applicable statutory provisions and regulations in this area explicitly create a number of remedial avenues for injured passengers. See, e.g., 49 U.S.C. § 41712 (2010) (providing remedial process for unfair and deceptive practices by airlines); 14 C.F.R. § 253.7 (2010) (remedy for failure to provide adequate notice of price-related contractual terms);14 C.F.R. § 250.1-.9 (2010) (remedy for denied boarding due to overselling of flights); 14 C.F.R. § 254.4 (2010) (remedy for mishandling of domestic baggage). The fact that certain, more advantageous forms of relief are not available merely reflects Congress's preemptive desire to carefully control the way in which regulation is imposed on the airlines.
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