Chris Augustine, et al v. Police Jury of Avoyelles, et al

Filing

Chris Augustine, et al v. Police Jury of Avoyelles, et al

Doc. 0

Case: 09-30523

Document: 00511185560

Page: 1

Date Filed: 07/26/2010

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS United States Court of Appeals FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT Fifth Circuit FILED
July 26, 2010 N o . 09-30523 Lyle W. Cayce Clerk

C H R I S AUGUSTINE; VERNON SIMON; CHARLES E. GUILLORY, P la in t iffs - Appellants v. P O L I C E JURY OF AVOYELLES PARISH; HENRY HINES; ELZIE R. B R Y A N T ; KIRBY ROY, III; MARK A. BORRELL; DALE LABORDE; A N T H O N Y DESSELLE; MCKINLEY KELLER; TYRONE DUFOR; KEITH W . LACOMBE, D e fe n d a n t s - Appellees

A p p e a l from the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana U S D C No. 1:06-CV-1662

B e fo r e REAVLEY, WIENER, and SOUTHWICK, Circuit Judges. P E R CURIAM:* S e v e r a l minority residents of Avoyelles Parish, Louisiana seek to be d eclared prevailing parties and awarded attorney's fees in their reapportionment a c t io n against the parish police jury. The district court determined that

p la in t iffs were not prevailing parties, and were therefore not entitled to an a w a r d of attorney's fees. We AFFIRM.
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
*

Dockets.Justia.com

Case: 09-30523

Document: 00511185560

Page: 2

Date Filed: 07/26/2010

No. 09-30523 T h e Supreme Court outlined the legal framework for identifying " p r e v a ilin g parties" in fee-shifting cases. Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W . Va. Dep't of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 602 (2001). We have i n t e r p r e t e d that decision to require a plaintiff to "(1) obtain actual relief, such a s an enforceable judgment or a consent decree; (2) that materially alters the le g a l relationship between the parties; and (3) modifies the defendant's behavior in a way that directly benefits the plaintiff at the time of the judgment or s e t t le m e n t ." Dearmore v. City of Garland, 519 F.3d 517, 521 (5th Cir. 2008) (c it a t io n omitted). T h e district court here determined that the order disposing of the p la in t iffs ' claims did not bear sufficient judicial imprimatur to constitute a c o n s e n t decree under Buckhannon. In order to be a consent decree, the court o b s e r v e d , an order must direct the parties to do something and provide relief on t h e merits. See Aronov v. Napolitano, 562 F.3d 84 (1st Cir. 2009) (en banc). Because the decree in this case merely ordered the parties to comply with s t a t u t o r y procedures and did not reach the merits of the claim, the district court d e n ie d plaintiffs' request for attorney's fees. W e agree with the district court that the order in question does not contain s u ffic ie n t judicial force to be termed a "consent decree." There is no indication t h a t the court considered the merits of plaintiffs' arguments, nor is there any in d e p e n d e n t court-ordered relief. Accordingly, we AFFIRM.

2