William Holifield v. Michael Astrue

Filing

UNPUBLISHED OPINION FILED. [09-31125 Affirmed] Judge: EHJ , Judge: TMR , Judge: CH. Mandate pull date is 01/03/2011 [09-31125]

William Holifield v. Michael:Astrue Case 09-31125

Document: 00511290616 Page: 1 Date Filed: 11/10/2010

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IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS United States Court of Appeals FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT Fifth Circuit FILED
November 10, 2010 N o . 09-31125 Lyle W. Cayce Clerk

W I L L I A M A. HOLIFIELD, P la in t iff - Appellant v. M I C H A E L J. ASTRUE, COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, D e fe n d a n t - Appellee

A p p e a l from the United States District Court fo r the Eastern District of Louisiana U S D C No. 2:07-CV-7702

B e fo r e JONES, Chief Judge, and REAVLEY and HAYNES, Circuit Judges. P E R CURIAM:* W illia m A. Holifield appeals from the district court's judgment affirming t h e denial of his application for social security disability benefits under Titles II & XVI of the Social Security Act. We affirm. I. A. O n July 10, 2002, William A. Holifield filed for disability benefits under T it le s II and XVI of the Social Security Act ("SSA"). In both applications,
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
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Case: 09-31125 Document: 00511290616 Page: 2 Date Filed: 11/10/2010

No. 09-31125 H o lifie ld alleged disability since April 30, 2002, citing back and leg problems, leg a n d shoulder numbness, and left leg weakness. After the claims were initially d e n ie d , a hearing was held before an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ"), who d e n ie d Holifield's application on December 18, 2003. After the case was

r e m a n d e d by the district court based upon an unopposed motion by the Agency, t h e case was reheard by a different ALJ on February 12, 2007. The ALJ denied t h e application at step 4 of the disability evaluation process. The ALJ's decision b e c a m e the final decision of the Commissioner. Holifield then sought review in the district court, which affirmed the C o m m is s io n e r 's decision. Holifield now appeals. B. O n appeal, Holifield raises five issues, all of which relate to the ALJ's e v a lu a ti o n of the medical opinions of Dr. Thomas Purser, Holifield's treating p h y s ic ia n . Dr. Purser completed two attorney-generated lists of questions that t r a c k e d the statutory language of disability. He marked the forms with a series o f check-marks indicating that Holifield bore the symptoms of nerve root c o m p r e s s io n and was not capable of a full range of sedentary work.1 A t the 2003 hearing, a medical expert, Dr. Leon Weisberg, testified that h e found no objective evidence of nerve root compression in the medical record. Another treating physician, Dr. Brian Fong, indicated that Holifield had n e g a t iv e straight-leg raising, intact strength, and intact reflexes­all of which w e r e contrary to the conclusions of Dr. Purser. Two MRIs similarly failed to

Sedentary work involves sitting for about six hours out of an eight hour work day and occasionally lifting items weighing no more than 10 pounds. Ripley v. Chater, 67 F.3d 552, 557 n.25 (5th Cir. 1995). Dr. Purser indicated, among other things, that Holifield was incapable of sitting for six hours in an eight hour day.

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No. 09-31125 d is c lo s e the presence of nerve root compression. Consequently, the ALJ declined t o give Dr. Purser's opinions controlling weight, and instead found that while H o lifie ld did suffer from back and shoulder disorders, he was still capable of p e r fo r m in g past relevant work as a truck driver and thus not disabled within the m e a n in g of the SSA. II. I n reviewing the Secretary's eligibility determination, the court considers o n ly whether the Secretary applied the proper legal standards and whether s u b s t a n t ia l evidence in the record supports his decision. Greenspan v. Shalala, 3 8 F.3d 232, 236 (5th Cir. 1994). Substantial evidence is "more than a mere

s c in t illa . It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept a s adequate to support a conclusion." Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1 9 7 1 ). The court may not reweigh the evidence or substitute its own judgment fo r that of the Secretary. Hollis v. Bowen, 837 F.2d 1378, 1383 (5th Cir. 1988). III. I n order to receive disability benefits, claimant must prove he is disabled w it h in the meaning of the Social Security Act ("SSA"). Selders v. Sullivan,

9 1 4 F.2d 614, 618 (5th Cir. 1990). In evaluating a claim of disability, the S e c r e t a r y conducts a five-step sequential analysis to determine whether: (1) the c la im a n t is presently working; (2) the claimant has a severe impairment; (3) the im p a ir m e n t meets or equals an impairment listed in appendix 1 of the social s e c u r it y regulations; (4) the impairment prevents the claimant from doing past r e le v a n t work; and (5) the impairment prevents the claimant from doing any o t h e r substantial gainful activity. Audler v. Astrue, 501 F.3d 446, 447-48 (5th C ir . 2007). The claimant bears the burden of showing he is disabled through the

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No. 09-31125 fir s t four steps of analysis; the burden shifts to the Secretary for the fifth step. Id. at 448. If the Secretary can determine whether the claimant is disabled at a n y step, the inquiry is terminated. Perez v. Barnhart, 415 F.3d 457, 461 (5th C ir . 2005). Prior to determining at steps 4 and 5 whether claimant can do other work, t h e Secretary must determine claimant's residual functional capacity ("RFC"). Id.; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a). An RFC determination is essentially a conclusion a b o u t what a claimant may still do despite his impairments. Perez, 415 F.3d at 4 6 2 ; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1). Here, the ALJ determined that Holifield's RFC w a s such that he remained able "to lift and/or carry 50 pounds occasionally and 2 5 pounds frequently; to sit for 6 hours in an 8-hour workday; and to stand a n d /o r walk for 6 hours in an 8-hour workday." Based on this determination, the A L J found that Holifield could perform his past duties as a truck driver and thus w a s not disabled under step 4. A. H o lifie ld argues on appeal that, in arriving at this RFC determination, the A L J erroneously substituted his own medical opinion for that of Dr. Purser, who in d ic a te d Holifield was incapable of a full range of sedentary work. c h a lle n g e is meritless. T h is court has indicated that the opinion of a treating physician who is fa m ilia r with a claimant's medical condition should generally be accorded c o n s id e r a b le weight in determining disability. Perez, 415 F.3d at 465-66. In fa c t , a treating physician opinion may even be given controlling weight if it is " w e l l-s u p p o r t e d by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic t e c h n iq u e s and is not inconsistent with . . . other substantial evidence." Newton This

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No. 09-31125 v . Apfel, 209 F.3d 448, 455 (5th Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). Simply identifying a treating physician as the source of a medical opinion will n o t, however, automatically entitle that opinion to such weight. Rather, the ALJ is free to assign little or no weight to the opinion of any physician for good cause. Id. at 455-56. Good cause arises where statements are brief and conclusory, not s u p p o r t e d by medically acceptable clinical laboratory diagnostic techniques, or o t h e r w i s e unsupported by the evidence. Perez, 415 F.3d at 466; Newton,

2 0 9 F.3d at 456. Consequently, treating physicians' opinions are not only not c o n c lu s iv e in these proceedings, Perez, 415 F.3d at 466, but may be rejected w h e n the evidence supports a contrary conclusion. Martinez v. Chater, 64 F.3d 1 7 2 , 176 (5th Cir. 1995). In this case, the ALJ did not err in discounting the probative value of D r . Purser's medical opinions, which, as noted above, were not only conclusory a n d unsubstantiated, but actually contradicted by objective medical evidence in t h e record. Moreover, Dr. Fong, a treating physician, made findings inconsistent w it h Dr. Purser's conclusions following a physical examination of Holifield. And s in c e Holifield provided no other reliable evidence proving he was limited to less t h a n a full range of sedentary work, the ALJ did not err by declining to give D r . Purser's opinions controlling weight. Of course, RFC findings must be supported by substantial evidence in the r e c o r d . See Ripley v. Chater, 67 F.3d 552, 557 (5th Cir. 1995). In fact, the ALJ h a s a duty to develop the record before determining that a claimant is not d is a b le d . Id.; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(3). This duty, however, must be balanced a g a in s t the fact that claimants bear the burden of proof up through step 4 of the e v a lu a tio n process, Audler, 501 F.3d at 448.

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No. 09-31125 I n this case, the record is devoid of reliable medical evidence supporting D r . Purser's conclusion concerning Holifield's ability to work. In fact, the first A L J to hear Holifield's case in 2003 explicitly called into doubt the reliability of D r . Purser's conclusions, since they were contradicted by objective medical e v id e n c e on record. Holifield had ample opportunity to supplement the record w it h any additional evidence available but failed to do so at the second hearing fo u r years later. So even if we assume arguendo that the ALJ erred in not fu r t h e r developing the record, Holifield cannot show prejudice, which would be n e c e s s a r y for reversal. Ripley, 67 F.3d at 557. Consequently, since Holifield had a fair opportunity to supplement Dr. Purser's conclusions with additional r e lia b le evidence­but failed to do so­he failed to meet his burden of showing he w a s unable to return to his past relevant work.2 The ALJ did not err in finding H o lifie ld capable of his past relevant work, and this conclusion was supported b y substantial evidence in the record. B. H o lifie ld 's second argument on appeal­that the ALJ improperly rejected D r . Purser's finding that Holifield met Listing 1.04A at step 3­is similarly u n a v a ilin g . As noted above, the ALJ acted within his discretion in declining to g iv e controlling weight to Dr. Purser's opinion because it was not only u n s u p p o r t e d , but actually contradicted, by the objective evidence of record.

Without specifying the date, Holifield noted in his brief that Dr. Purser passed away sometime during these proceedings. But even if Holifield could not have obtained any additional evidence relied upon by Dr. Purser, Holifield was not prevented from seeking reliable medical evidence elsewhere to support Dr. Purser's conclusions.

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No. 09-31125 C. H o lifie ld next contends that the ALJ committed reversible error by not rec o n t a c t in g Dr. Purser to obtain additional information as allegedly required by 2 0 C.F.R. § 404.1512(e)(1). This court has stated that "if the ALJ determines t h a t the treating physician's records are inconclusive or otherwise inadequate t o receive controlling weight, absent other medical opinion evidence based on p e r s o n a l examination or treatment of the claimant, the ALJ must seek c la r ifi c a t io n or additional evidence from the treating physician in accordance w it h 20 C.F.R. § 404.1512(e)." Newton, 209 F.3d at 453 (emphasis added). Because the record in this case contains medical opinion evidence from treating p h y s ic ia n s ­ n a m e ly , treatment records from Drs. Fong and Culasso­the ALJ had n o duty to recontact Dr. Purser. D. H o l i fie ld argues that the ALJ erred by rejecting Dr. Purser's opinions w it h o u t performing "a detailed analysis of the treating physician's views under t h e criteria set forth in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2)." This court has interpreted 2 0 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2) to mean that, "absent reliable medical evidence from a treating or examining physician controverting the claimant's treating specialist, a n ALJ may reject the opinion of the treating physician only if the ALJ performs a detailed analysis of the treating physician's views under the criteria set forth in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2)." Newton, 209 F.3d at 453 (emphasis added). Since t h e record is replete with reliable medical evidence controverting Dr. Purser's o p in io n s , the ALJ had no obligation to perform a detailed analysis before r e je c t in g his opinions.

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No. 09-31125 E. F in a lly , Holifield contends that the ALJ failed to afford Dr. Purser's o p in io n any weight and that this constitutes reversible error. This issue is easily d is m is s e d . Since ALJs are free "to reject the opinion of any physician when the e v id e n c e supports a contrary conclusion," Martinez, 64 F.3d at 176 (internal q u o t a t io n marks omitted), the ALJ did not err in stating that he would give " lit t le weight" to Dr. Purser's opinions. IV. F o r these reasons, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

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