USA v. Salwillel Fields

Filing 511131825

USA v. Salwillel Fields

Doc. 511131825

Case: 09-40436

Document: 00511131825

Page: 1

Date Filed: 06/03/2010

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS United States Court of Appeals FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT Fifth Circuit FILED
N o . 09-40436 June 3, 2010 Lyle W. Cayce Clerk U N IT E D STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee v. S A L W IL L E L THOMAS FIELDS, Defendant - Appellant

A p p e a l from the United States District Court fo r the Eastern District of Texas U S D C No. 5:06-CR-27-1

B e fo r e JONES, Chief Judge, and HIGGINBOTHAM and ELROD, Circuit Ju dges. P E R CURIAM:* E x e c u t in g a search warrant, police officers raided Salwillel Fields's home, fin d i n g drugs, cash, and guns. After securing written consent, the police

s e a rc h e d Fields's two off-site storage lockers, discovering drugs in one. Fields p le a d e d guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm 1 and to possession with

Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
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18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

Dockets.Justia.com

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No. 09-40436 in t e n t to distribute crack cocaine 2 ­ but reserved his right to appeal the district c o u r t 's denial of his motion to suppress. He urges that the search warrant so la ck e d indicia of probable cause as to render reliance upon it unreasonable and t h a t police officers doctored the consent form allowing them to search the storage lo c k e r s . Unpersuaded, we conclude that the district court committed no

r e v e r s ib le error.

I. T e x a s Ranger Jay Womack informed Bowie County Sheriff's Officer C a p ta in Lance Hall that a drug-selling fugitive ­ Salwillel Fields ­ was living in Wake Village, Texas. Hall learned that the State of Tennessee had issued six w a r r a n ts for Fields's arrest, that he had been indicted for: conspiracy to sell c o c a in e ; possession with intent to distribute cocaine and marijuana; m a n u fa ctu rin g cocaine; possession of prohibited weapons (including an AK-47); b e in g a convicted felon in possession of firearms (a Ruger 9mm, a Llama .45, and a Ruger .357); and money laundering. Hall began surveilling Fields's home, w h e r e he saw Fields, confirming his identity by photograph and verifying the a d d r e s s by motor vehicle records. H a ll sought a search warrant for the premises, signing a seven-page a f fid a v it averring that Fields is a drug-selling Tennessee fugitive, that based on h is two decades of experience, he is of the opinion that drug offenders typically k e e p controlled substances and other evidence of crime in their residences. Hall m e n tio n e d Fields's recent drug- and gun-related indictments and attached to the

2

21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).

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No. 09-40436 a ffid a v it Fields's criminal history.3 The affidavit noted that Fields lived with his w ife . Tennessee also had recently indicted her for gun and drug offenses. Hall in te n d e d with the search warrant to seize evidence of drug sales ­ including p a p e r s and currency ­ as well as the guns and ammunition Fields possessed. The search warrant issued, which Ranger Womack and Captain Hall e x e c u te d at 6:43 am on February 28, 2005. They kicked down the door and s e c u r e d Fields, who had been asleep in the bedroom. They Mirandized him and to ld him they had a search warrant. The officers then asked if he wanted to tell t h e m anything before they began searching the house. Fields responded that he w o u ld cooperate and told the officers he had a shotgun in the bathroom and d r u g s in the bedroom and car. The officers searched those locations, finding the co n tra ba n d. D o w n at the station, Ranger Womack drew up a consent form to search F i e ld s 's off-site storage lockers. Fields signed the release (witnessed by a

T e n n e s s e e police officer), and the police searched Fields's two lockers. In the s e c o n d locker they found drugs. T h e Texas police sent Fields back to Tennessee, but, a year later, a federal g r a n d jury in Texas returned an indictment against him charging: (1) felon in p o s s e s s io n of a firearm;4 (2) possession with intent to distribute cocaine and c r a c k -c o c a in e ;5 and (3) possession of a firearm while trafficking drugs.6

During the 1990s, Fields was convicted in Tennessee of selling a controlled substance and of attempt to sell cocaine.
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3

18 U.S.C. §§ 921(g)(1) & 924 (e)(1). 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1).

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No. 09-40436 F i e ld s twice moved to suppress the fruits of the searches. He claimed that t h e warrant was insufficient, that it was "bare bones" and full of conclusory a l l e g a tio n s . Fields testified at the second hearing that the police never

M ir a n d iz e d him. He admits to signing the consent form, but he said it only had o n e of his storage lockers listed. He accuses the police of subsequently adding t h e second locker's number, the locker in which the officers found drugs. C a p t a in Hall testified that Ranger Womack immediately Mirandized F ie ld s , and Fields cooperated, disclosing the locations of drugs and a gun. R a n g e r Womack testified that he Mirandized Fields with Hall present, obviating t h e need for a Miranda waiver. Womack advised Fields that they had a search w a r r a n t , and asked if Fields wanted to tell them where the contraband was lo c a te d . Fields then told the officers where to find the shotgun and drugs in the h o m e and car. Womack personally prepared the consent form to search the s t o r a g e units, specifying two lockers numbered "I-7, K-2." He read the consent f o r m to Fields, and Fields read it himself. Fields signed the form with both lo c k e r s listed as locations to be searched. Womack testified that he did not s u b s e q u e n t ly alter the consent form. T h e district court, through a magistrate judge's recommendation, denied th e suppression motions, addressing three issues ­ whether the officers could r e ly in good faith on the warrant, whether Fields consented to the search of his h o m e and car, and whether Fields consented to the search of his second storage lo c k e r . The court held that the affidavit in support of the warrant was not c o n c lu s o r y and the police were entitled to rely on the warrant in good faith. On th e consent issues, the court found Fields had "effectively and voluntarily c o o p e r a te d with the police and consented to the searches." The court expounded:

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N o t only is Defendant asking the Court to believe, contrary to the c o n s is te n t testimony of Hall and Womack, that he never consented t o the search of his home and vehicle, but Defendant also asks the C o u r t to believe Womack . . . filled out the storage unit consent form w it h only the I-7 storage unit and then doctored the form by adding t h e K-2 unit. The Court is unwilling to accept Defendant's t e s t im o n y and instead accepts Hall and Womack's versions of the fa c t s as true. F ie l d s agreed to plead guilty to two of the charges,7 but reserved his right to a p p e a l the denial of his suppression motion.

II. A. W e begin with the search of Fields's home and car. The government s u g g e s t s that we can affirm because Fields consented to a search by pointing out t h e location of his shotgun and drugs. But consent will not do. The district court fo u n d that Fields consented to the search only after the police officers told him t h e y had a search warrant. The Supreme Court has long held that a search c a n n o t "be justified as lawful on the basis of consent when that `consent' has b e e n given only after the official conducting the search has asserted that he p o s s e s s e s a warrant."8 Admissibility here rises and falls with the warrant.9 T h e pull of the exclusionary rule is not so strong as to suppress evidence

7

18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). The government dropped the rest. Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548 (1968).

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See id. at 549 ("A search conducted in reliance upon a warrant cannot later be justified on the basis of consent if it turns out that the warrant was invalid.").

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No. 09-40436 o b ta in e d when officers act in good-faith reliance on a warrant.1 0 But this goodfa it h exception to the exclusionary rule will not apply in cases where an officer r e lie s "on a warrant based on an affidavit so lacking in indicia of probable cause a s to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable." 1 1 Fields urges t h a t the warrant here lacks the necessary indicia, that it is bare bones. "T h is court reviews conclusions of law regarding the sufficiency of a w a r r a n t de novo. Our review involves a two-step process, whereby we must first d e t e r m in e whether the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies. O n ly if a novel legal question is presented or the good-faith exception does not a p p l y must we then ensure that the magistrate had a substantial basis for c o n c lu d i n g that probable cause existed."1 2 Whether (1) knowledge of where a d r u g -d e a le r resides plus (2) an officer's experience that such people hide drugs in their homes can support reliance on a warrant is not a novel question in this C ir c u it , so we engage only in the good-faith analysis.1 3 " `B a r e bones' affidavits contain wholly conclusory statements, which lack th e facts and circumstances from which a magistrate can independently d e t e r m in e probable cause."1 4 "Generally, examples of `bare bones' affidavits

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See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922 (1984). Id. at 923 (quotation marks omitted). United States v. Shugart, 117 F.3d 838, 843 (5th Cir. 1997) (quotation marks omitted).

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See United States v. Craig, 861 F.2d 818, 820­21 (5th Cir. 1988) ("The only instances in which th[e] maxim [that the court should rely strictly on the good-faith exception] should not be followed are those in which the resolution of a `novel question of law . . . is necessary to guide future action by law enforcement officers and magistrates.'" (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 264 (White, J., concurring in the judgment)) (omission in original)).
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United States v. Satterwhite, 980 F.2d 317, 321 (5th Cir. 1992).

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No. 09-40436 in c lu d e those that merely state that the affiant `has cause to suspect and does b e lie v e ' or `has received reliable information from a credible person and does b e lie v e ' that contraband is located on the premises." 1 5 "Although certainly not a thing of beauty," 1 6 the affidavit here passes the threshold. T h is court has often found good-faith reliance on a warrant to search a d e fe n d a n t's home where the affiant alleged (1) the defendant's involvement in d r u g trafficking and (2) that ­ based on the affiant's law enforcement experience ­ such criminals keep drug paraphernalia at their homes.1 7 The affidavit here r e c it e d that Tennessee had recently indicted Fields on various drugs and w e a p o n s charges 1 8 ­ reasonably leading Hall to believe probable cause existed t h a t Fields continues to be a drug dealer 1 9 ­ and that, in Hall's extensive e x p e r ie n c e , jurisdiction-fleeing, gun-toting drug dealers keep evidence of crime in their homes. Hall did not offer first-hand observation of drug crime, but that

15

United States v. Pope, 467 F.3d 912, 920 (5th Cir. 2006) (alterations omitted). Craig, 861 F.2d at 823.

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See, e.g., United States v. Pofahl, 990 F.2d 1456, 1477 (5th Cir. 1993); United States v. Kleinebreil, 966 F.2d 945, 949 (5th Cir. 1992); United States v. Webster, 960 F.2d 1301, 1307 (5th Cir. 1992) ("The fact that some of these sales took place at locations other than Webster's residence is not determinative. The affidavit alleged that, based on the officer's experience, drug dealers and traffickers commonly keep caches of drugs, as well as paraphernalia and records of drug transactions, in their residences. In other words, the basis for searching Webster's residence was his overall drug trafficking and sales activity, not just those sales that actually took place at his residence."). Fields does not question the validity of these indictments, and "[a]n indictment is a conclusive finding that there is probable cause to believe that the allegations in the indictment took place." United States v. Byrd, 898 F.2d 450, 453 (5th Cir. 1990); see also Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 117 n.19 (1975).
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Hall also referred to Fields's drug-selling convictions.

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No. 09-40436 F ie ld s was a fugitive 2 0 wanted on drug and gun charges created an inference of o n g o in g criminal activity sufficient to withstand the bare bones allegation. T h e officers in good faith relied on a warrant to search Fields's home.2 1 B e c a u s e the warrant allowed the police to search the "premises," the police could c o m b - t h r o u g h Fields's car parked on the property.2 2 The district court did not e r r in allowing fruits of the home and car searches to come in evidence based on t h e good-faith exception, emphasizing again that we do not pass on whether p r o b a b le cause existed. B. M o v in g to the search of Fields's storage lockers, "[a] consensual search is a [] well-established exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement. O n ly free and voluntary consent justifies a warrantless search. In reviewing a fin d in g that consent was voluntarily given, this court employs a clearly e r r o n e o u s standard. This standard is particularly strong when the district judge b a s e d his findings on oral testimony at the suppression hearing, as is this case h e r e ."2 3

Fields contends that he was not a fugitive, but it is undisputed that he was in Texas and wanted on crimes committed in Tennessee. "In the ordinary case, an officer cannot be expected to question the magistrate's probable-cause determination or his judgment that the form of the warrant is technically sufficient. Once the warrant issues, there is literally nothing more the policeman can do in seeking to comply with the law." United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 921 (1984) (quotation marks and alterations omitted). United States v. Singer, 970 F.2d 1414, 1418 (5th Cir. 1992) ("This court has consistently held that a warrant authorizing a search of `the premises' includes vehicles parked on the premises.").
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United States v. Mata, 517 F.3d 279, 290 (5th Cir. 2008) (footnotes omitted).

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No. 09-40436 T h e police did not have a search warrant for Fields's off-site storage lo c k e r s , so they asked for consent. He obliged, signing a consent waiver after the p o lic e Mirandized him. Fields admits to allowing the police into locker "I-7," but n o t into locker "K-2" ­ the locker with the drugs. To get around his signed w a iv e r for both lockers, Fields speculated that a police officer doctored his w r it t e n consent by later adding-in locker "K-2." The police officers deny doing s o . The district court credited the officers' testimony and not the defendant's. T h e clear error standard does not allow reversal in this credibility battle, and t h e r e is no other evidence to suggest that the police acted nefariously.2 4 A F F IR M E D .

"A finding of consent to search may be overturned on appeal only if found to be clearly erroneous. We will reject the trial court's finding only if, after giving due regard to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses, we are left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. . . . We will not second guess the district court's credibility judgment." United States v. Botello, 991 F.2d 189, 194 (5th Cir. 1993) (citations, quotation marks, and alterations omitted).

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