USA v. Henry Billingsley, et al

Filing

Case: 09-40734

Document: 00511205108

Page: 1

Date Filed: 08/16/2010

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit

FILED
August 16, 2010 Lyle W. Cayce Clerk

N o . 09-40734

U N IT E D STATES OF AMERICA,

P la in t if f -A p p e lle e

v.

H E N R Y BILLINGSLEY, et al.,

D e fe n d a n t -A p p e lla n t

A p p e a l from the United States District Court fo r the Eastern District of Texas

B e fo r e SMITH, WIENER, and ELROD, Circuit Judges. W I E N E R , Circuit Judge: T h is case involves a dispute between, on the one hand, a married couple w h o own and occupy a home in Air Park subdivision ("the Picks") and, on the o t h e r hand, that subdivision's zoning and covenants compliance authority, viz.,

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t h e Air Park ­ Dallas Zoning Committee, as well as its four members, Air Park G P , L.L.C., and Crow-Billingsley Air Park, Ltd. (collectively, "the Committee") o v e r a footbridge that the Picks installed on their property in violation of r e s t r ic t iv e covenants. The Committee sought to enforce the covenants in state c o u r t, and the Picks filed a Fair Housing Act ("FHA") counterclaim. The parties s e t t le d the lawsuit, but subsequently disagreed whether the settlement a g r e e m e n t required the Picks to remove the footbridge. The Committee sought t o enforce the settlement agreement in the state court proceedings. After

in t e r p r e t in g the settlement agreement in favor of the Committee, the state court m a n d a t e d that the Picks remove the footbridge, which they have continually r e fu s e d to do. The Department of Justice ("the government") then brought an action in fe d e r a l court on behalf of the Picks, and against the Committee, for violation of t h e FHA, and quickly moved for a preliminary injunction to restrain the C o m m it t e e from removing the footbridge. The Committee raised two defenses: F ir s t , the Committee claimed that the allegedly offending conduct was protected b y the First Amendment's guarantee of the right to "petition the Government for a redress of grievances,"1 as defined by the Supreme Court through the NoerrP e n n in g to n Doctrine.2 Second, the Committee claimed that a federal court could n o t enjoin the Committee or the state court from litigation under the settlement a g r e e m e n t without violating the Anti-Injunction Act ("the Act").3 The district c o u r t declined to rule that either of these defenses was applicable and granted t h e government's preliminary injunction. As we hold that the Anti-Injunction A c t applies, we vacate the district court's grant of the preliminary injunction.

1

U.S. Const. amend. I.

See generally E. R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961); United Mine Workers of Am. v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
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28 U.S.C. § 2283.

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C o n s e q u e n t ly , we need not, and therefore do not, address the Committee's NoerrP e n n in g to n argument. I . FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS A lfr e d and Sheryl Pick reside in the Air Park Estates subdivision in Plano, T ex a s. Mrs. Pick suffers from adrenomyeloneuropathy, a progressive

n e u r o lo g ic a l disorder that affects the spinal cord and causes difficulty in walking a n d balance. In 2002, the Picks installed a two-foot wide, arched footbridge with h a n d r a ils in front of their home, so that Mrs. Pick could safely cross the drainage d it c h that lies between their home and the street. The footbridge extended b e y o n d the Picks' property line and into the right-of-way of the contiguous r o a d w a y , in technical violation of restrictive covenants that required the C o m m it t e e 's permission to make these types of installations. I n 2004, the Committee resolved to require the Picks to remove the fo o t b r id g e because it extended into the right-of-way. The Committee sent the P ic k s two letters instructing them either to remove the footbridge or face legal a c t io n . The Picks responded, emphasizing that the footbridge was necessary for M r s . Pick to reach the street safely. The Committee continued its insistence that t h e Picks remove the footbridge, but they did not comply. After the passage of close to a year, the Committee renewed its demands, b u t the Picks continued to refuse to remove the footbridge. The Committee filed s u it against Mr. Pick in Collin County, Texas state court. In the state court suit, t h e Committee alleged that Mr. Pick had violated restrictive covenants to which h e was bound by installing the footbridge without authorization and by refusing t o remove it following receipt of the Committee's demands to do so. One of the C o m m it t e e 's prayers for relief was for an injunction mandating that Mr. Pick r e m o v e the footbridge. Mr. Pick filed a counterclaim in the state court, asserting t h a t the Committee had discriminated against the Picks in violation of the FHA. The FHA requires the Committee to make reasonable accommodations and p e r m it reasonable modifications for qualifying disabilities. 3

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D u r in g the state court litigation, Mrs. Pick contacted the Committee and e m p h a s iz e d that she suffered from a disability that required her to retain the fo o t b r id g e in its current form and location. The Committee refused Mrs. Pick's r e q u e s t, but suggested an alternative, viz., an at-grade footbridge without h a n d r a ils . Mrs. Pick wrote back to the Committee nearly a month later,

in d ic a tin g that she was willing to accept an alternative footbridge ­ so as to end t h e lawsuit ­ although she emphasized that the alternative would not be ideal. The Committee accepted Mrs. Pick's alternative design. The lawsuit then went to mediation, and the parties reached a settlement. Following the settlement, the parties disagreed whether that agreement r e q u ir e d the Picks to remove the footbridge. The Committee sought to enforce t h e settlement agreement in state court. After the Committee filed a motion for s u m m a r y judgment, the state court ruled in its favor. The judgment of the state c o u r t dealt only with the meaning of the settlement agreement, which it in t e r p r e t e d to require that the Picks remove the footbridge after the Committee a p p r o v e d an alternative design. The Committee approved an alternative design, a lt h o u g h there is some dispute as to whether the design it approved was the one p r o p o s e d by Mrs. Pick. The Picks continued to refuse to remove the footbridge. While the state court lawsuit was pending, the Picks filed a complaint with t h e Department of Housing and Urban Development ("HUD"), claiming that the C o m m it t e e was violating the FHA by failing to accommodate their footbridge. After investigating the complaint, HUD issued a Charge of Discrimination p u r s u a n t to 42 U.S.C. § 3610(g)(2)(A), asserting that the Committee was v io la t in g the FHA. The Committee chose to have the claims heard in federal c o u r t, as is permitted in 42 U.S.C. § 3612(a). HUD referred this case to the D e p a r t m e n t of Justice, which brought the claim by filing the instant action in d is t r ic t court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 3612(o). In its complaint, the government a s s e r t s that the Committee violated the FHA by failing to make reasonable

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a c c o m m o d a tio n s or modifications for Mrs. Pick's disability, and not treating her o n equal terms. T h e government quickly moved for a preliminary injunction to bar the C o m m it t e e from removing the footbridge while the federal court action was p e n d in g . The Committee opposed the preliminary injunction on two theories. First, it claimed that all the actions at issue were protected by the NoerrP e n n in g to n Doctrine. The Committee asserted that if the district court could not a d d r e s s these actions, there would be no likelihood of success on the merits at t r ia l, and thus the preliminary injunction could not be issued. Second, the C o m m it t e e claimed that the Anti-Injunction Act prohibited the district court fr o m issuing an injunction that would conflict with the yet-to-be-enforced m a n d a t e of the state court, which requires the Picks to remove the footbridge. The district court rejected both contentions and granted the preliminary in ju n c t io n after applying the well known four-factor test.4 t im e ly filed a notice of appeal. II. Analysis A . Standard of Review W e review a grant or denial of a preliminary injunction under an abuse-ofd is c r e t io n standard.5 We review de novo a district court's legal determination of t h e applicability of the Anti-Injunction Act.6 B . The Anti-Injunction Act The Committee

The test requires the court to determine whether there exist: "(1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits, (2) a substantial threat of irreparable injury if the injunction is not issued, (3) that the threatened injury if the injunction is denied outweighs any harm that will result if the injunction is granted, and (4) that the grant of an injunction will not disserve the public interest." Byrum v. Landreth, 566 F.3d 442, 445 (5th Cir. 2009).
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4

See Lakedreams v. Taylor, 932 F.2d 1103, 1107 (5th Cir. 1991). See United Offshore Co. v. S. Deepwater Pipeline Co., 899 F.2d 405, 407 (5th Cir.

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1994).

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The Act states that "[a] court of the United States may not grant an in ju n c t io n to stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized by A c t of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or e ffe c t u a t e its judgments."7 The Act is "designed to prevent conflict between fe d e r a l and state courts."8 The Act does not prohibit only injunctions directed a t state courts themselves, but also injunctions directed at private parties when t h e injunction would prohibit using the results of a state court proceeding.9 As h e r e the federal court is issuing an injunction that would invalidate the e n fo r c e m e n t of a state court judgment, the only issue in this case is whether the g o v e r n m e n t can avail itself of one of the limited exceptions to the Act.1 0 One of t h e s e exceptions ­ the one acutely at issue in this case1 1 ­ allows for the United S t a te s to bypass the strictures of the Act when it seeks an injunction in a federal s u it .1 2 We perceive that Congress intended to invalidate this exception in the

7

28 U.S.C. § 2283. Leiter Minerals, Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 220, 225 (1957). Atl. Coast Line R.R. v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng'rs, 398 U.S. 281, 287 (1970).

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The government argues that the Anti-Injunction Act does not apply because the state court trial has ended. Because the judgment has yet to be enforced, however, the Act clearly applies. Justice Brandeis noted that the "term [`proceedings'] is comprehensive. It includes all steps taken or which may be taken in the state court or by its officers from the institution to the close of the final process . . . . [It] applies not only to an execution issued on a judgment, but to any proceeding supplemental or ancillary taken with a view to making the suit or judgment effective." Hill v. Martin, 296 U.S. 393, 403 (1935) (footnotes omitted). The government has not briefed or raised the exception for a stranger to the state court proceeding, see Chezem v. Beverly Enterprises-Texas, Inc., 66 F.3d 741, 742 (5th Cir. 1995) (noting that the Anti-Injunction Act does not apply to one who was neither a party nor a privity of a party in a state court action), so this argument is waived. Even if it were not waived, however, the government could not prevail on this argument because it cannot show ­ as it must ­ that it was not in privity with the Picks. See Vines v. Univ. of La. at Monroe, 398 F.3d 700, 708 (5th Cir. 2005) (noting that the government was in privity with the private individuals because the EEOC sought "private benefits for individuals."). See Leiter Minerals, 352 U.S. at 225-26 (noting that the United States should not be barred by the Anti-Injunction Act when it seeks an injunction because "[t]he frustration of superior federal interests that would ensue from precluding the Federal government from
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s t a t u t o r y provision at issue in this case, so we conclude that the United States c a n n o t bypass the Act. Our conclusion is strengthened by the Supreme Court's a d v ic e regarding the Act: "Any doubts as to the propriety of a federal injunction a g a in s t state court proceedings should be resolved in favor of permitting the s t a t e courts to proceed . . . the fundamental principle of a dual system of courts le a d s inevitably to that conclusion." 1 3 H e r e , the government sued the Defendants-Appellants under 42 U.S.C. § 3612, the statute that allows the Attorney General to commence "a civil action o n behalf of the aggrieved person." 14 I n a civil action under this subsection, if the court finds that a d is c r im in a t o r y housing practice has occurred or is about to occur, t h e court may grant as relief1 5 any relief which a court could grant w it h respect to such discriminatory housing practice in a civil action u n d e r section 3613 of this title.1 6 S e c tio n 3613 of the relevant title is the one that allows private parties to enforce t h e FHA on their own behalf. An individual suing under § 3613 would not enjoy t h e exception to the Act that the United States claims here; he would thereby not b e entitled to the relief sought in this case, i.e., a preliminary injunction to p r e v e n t the enforcement of the state court's ruling. A plain reading of § 3612 c o n v in c e s us that the government cannot obtain a preliminary injunction in this c a s e because a private plaintiff could not have done so under § 3613.

obtaining a stay of state court proceedings . . . would be so great that we cannot reasonably impute such a purpose to Congress from the general language of [the Act].").
13

Atl. Coast Line, 398 U.S. at 297. 42 U.S.C. § 3612(o)(1).

14

In the absence of any limiting phrases, we interpret "relief" to include any type of relief a district court could grant ­ such as the preliminary injunction here ­ not just finaljudgment relief.
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15

42 U.S.C. § 3612(o)(2).

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A fte r analyzing the rest of the FHA, we are satisfied that Congress firmly in t e n d e d to limit the remedies available to the government when it sues on b e h a lf of an individual under § 3612. In juxtaposition is § 3614, which allows t h e Attorney General to bring a case in federal court to remedy a "pattern or p r a c t ic e of resistance to the full enjoyment of any rights granted by this s u b c h a p t e r , or that any group of persons has been denied any of the rights g r a n t e d by this subchapter and such denial raises an issue of general public im p o r t a n c e ."1 7 Section 3614 itself does not limit the remedies available to the g o v e r n m e n t ; in fact, § 3614 lists the specific types of relief available to the g o v e r n m e n t , "including a permanent or temporary injunction, restraining order, o r other order against the person responsible for a violation of this subchapter a s is necessary to assure the full enjoyment of the rights granted by this s u b c h a p t e r ."1 8 Congress could not have been unaware of this difference between § § 3612 and 3614. We conclude that Congress intended only limited remedies u n d e r § 3612, viz., those that a private plaintiff would receive under § 3613. The government's counterarguments are unavailing. Even though the U n ifo r m e d Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 is s im ila r to § 3612 in allowing the Attorney General to "appear on behalf of, and a c t as attorney for, the person on whose behalf the complaint is submitted," 1 9 t h a t statute does not limit its remedies. Rather, it specifically outlines a number o f remedies that are available to the government, including both monetary d a m a g e s and injunctions.2 0 Further, this statute provides that these remedies a r e not to diminish the other rights and benefits provided under the chapter.21

17

42 U.S.C. § 3614(a). 42 U.S.C. § 3614(d)(1)(A). 38 U.S.C. § 4323(a)(1). 38 U.S.C. § 4323(d)(1), (e). 38 U.S.C. § 4323(d)(2)(A).

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T h is statute strengthens our interpretation of § 3612 by showing that Congress a ffir m a t iv e ly granted remedial powers in 38 U.S.C. § 4323, but expressly limited t h e remedial powers available under § 3612. The government also cites to Title V I I ,2 2 but its argument thereunder fails for the same reasons. N e it h e r does the government persuade us of the correctness of its in t e r p r e t a t io n of § 3612 when it points to § 3612's statement that "[a]ny relief so g r a n t e d that would accrue to an aggrieved person in a civil action commenced b y that aggrieved person under section 3613 of this title shall also accrue to that a g g r ie v e d person in a civil action under this subsection."2 3 The government c o n t e n d s that this language would be meaningless unless the United States c o u ld secure relief that is not available to the private party. We disagree. A m o r e reasonable interpretation of this language is the one which accepts that w h a t e v e r relief the United States receives ­ which would be limited to the relief t h a t a private plaintiff could receive if he sued successfully under § 3613 ­ would a c c r u e to the private party. The government also asserts that it would be illogical for § 3612 to allow fo r the issuance of injunctions when an administrative law judge finds there is im m in e n t discriminatory housing practice ­ as the statute allows in § 3612(g)(3) ­ but to disallow injunctive relief when the government brings the action in fe d e r a l court. This argument only bolsters our holding: Congress explicitly g r a n t e d remedial powers to the administrative law judge, demonstrating that it knows how to do so, but did not grant such powers to the federal courts. This m a y appear to be anomalous on the part of Congress, but we do not inquire into t h e reasons for its decisions. Lastly, the government insists that the exception should apply here b e c a u s e there is a superior federal interest in the enforcement of the FHA.

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42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f). 42 U.S.C. § 3612(o)(3).

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A lt h o u g h we agree with the government that there is a superior federal interest a t play in this case,2 4 we disagree with the government's argument that this in t e r e s t should overcome the limitations in § 3612. Perhaps the absence of a s u p e r io r federal interest may preclude the application of the exception, but the p r e s e n c e of such an interest is not enough to overcome the specific limitations in § 3612. III. CONCLUSION W e hold that the Anti-Injunction Act is applicable in this case and that the g o v e r n m e n t cannot avail itself of the exception for the United States when it s e e k s an injunction because of § 3612's explicit limitations on the remedial p o w e r s of the federal courts. As we decide this appeal under the Anti-Injunction A c t , we need not, and therefore do not, address the Committee's alternative c o n t e n t io n that the ever-expanding Noerr-Pennington Doctrine protects their b e h a v io r . Accordingly, we VACATE the district court's grant of a preliminary in ju n c t io n and REMAND this case to that court for further proceedings c o n s is t e n t with this opinion.

While the government has not identified a pattern or practice, the government is acting in the public interest when it directly enforces the FHA. The Supreme Court has said as much in the Title VII context, see General Tel. Co. of the Northwest v. E.E.O.C., 446 U.S. 318, 326 (1980), and we conclude that this rationale applies equally here.

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