Arnold Estrada v. City of San Benito, Texas, et al

Filing 920100927

Opinion

Case: 09-41079

Document: 00511244077

Page: 1

Date Filed: 09/24/2010

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit

FILED
N o . 09-41079 S u m m a r y Calendar September 24, 2010 Lyle W. Cayce Clerk

A R N O L D ESTRADA, Plaintiff - Appellant v. C I T Y OF SAN BENITO, TEXAS; MARTIN ARELLANO, An Officer of the U .S . Marshal Service; UNITED STATES MARSHAL SERVICE, D e fe n d a n t s - Appellees

A p p e a l from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas U S D C No. 1:08-CV-116

B e fo r e SMITH, CLEMENT, and SOUTHWICK, Circuit Judges. P E R CURIAM:* A r n o ld Estrada brought a Section 1983 suit claiming that excessive force w a s used against him by a San Benito, Texas police officer. The district court g r a n t e d summary judgment for the defendants. On appeal, Estrada argues that d is p u t e s of fact precluded summary judgment. We disagree and AFFIRM.

Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

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Case: 09-41079

Document: 00511244077

Page: 2

Date Filed: 09/24/2010

No. 09-41079 A t approximately 9:00 p.m. on March 20, 2006, Arnold Estrada was a p a s s e n g e r in a van that was stopped by San Benito police officer Guadalupe A y a la . While Officer Ayala questioned the driver, Estrada got out of the vehicle a n d ran from the scene. He was quickly stopped by federal and state law e n f o r c e m e n t officers. A United States Border Patrol agent tackled Estrada, a lle g e d ly causing Estrada's shoulder to "pop." Estrada claims he was beaten and h a n d c u ffe d while on the ground, then picked up by the handcuffs in such a way a s to worsen his shoulder injury. The identity of the officer who picked up E s t r a d a is in dispute. San Benito asserts federal agents handcuffed Estrada, p ic k e d him up, and then released him to San Benito officials. Estrada suffered a severe shoulder injury that requires long-term physical rehabilitation. O n March 19, 2008, Estrada filed suit against numerous defendants. At v a r io u s point in the proceedings, the number of parties and the claims have been r e d u c e d . Because the only issues on appeal concern the judgment entered for S a n Benito, only those claims are discussed. The complaint alleged San Benito had municipal liability under Section 1 9 8 3 for the actions of its officers. To prove municipal liability under Section 1 9 8 3 , a plaintiff must demonstrate his injury resulted from a city's official c u s t o m or policy. See Monell v. Dep't. of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 6 5 8 , 690-91 (1978). In its motion for summary judgment, San Benito argued t h a t Estrada failed to establish he was injured due to, or as a result of, an official c it y policy. The district court granted the motion for summary judgment, finding in s u ffic ie n t evidence for any claim against San Benito. Estrada appealed. S a n Benito argues the notice of appeal was not timely. We thus examine t h e relevant chronology. Four weeks after the district court granted summary ju d g m e n t in favor of San Benito and also for officer Ayala, the court entered an o r d e r that claims against the remaining defendants would be dismissed for fa ilu r e to prosecute unless good cause was timely shown. Two days after that 2

Case: 09-41079

Document: 00511244077

Page: 3

Date Filed: 09/24/2010

No. 09-41079 o r d e r , Estrada filed his appeal. Three days later, the district court entered an o r d e r of dismissal and closed the case. S a n Benito insists that because the only notice of appeal was filed before t h e district court's judgment became final, there has not been a valid appeal. That is incorrect. When a notice of appeal is filed after the district court

a n n o u n c e s its decision but before the entry of judgment, there are occasions w h e n it will become effective on the date of the entry. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(2). A "notice of appeal from a nonfinal decision [will] operate as a notice of appeal fr o m the final judgment only when a district court announces a decision that w o u ld be appealable if immediately followed by the entry of judgment." FirsTier M o r tg . Co. v. Investors Mortg. Ins. Co., 498 U.S. 269, 276 (1991). Among other e x a m p le s , the Supreme Court discussed an appeal from an order dismissing a c o m p la in t after the plaintiff had been given an opportunity to amend. Id. (citing R u b y v. Secretary of Navy, 365 F.2d 385, 387-89 (9th Cir. 1966)). The plaintiff's r e fu s a l to amend was effectively announced by his notice of appeal, which the S u p r e m e Court said became effective on the date of the district court's later e n tr y of judgment. Id. at 277. T h e r e is no meaningful distinction between Ruby and the present case. In both, the district court announced its decision that the case as it then existed w a s fatally defective, yet granted the plaintiff a right to correct the deficiencies. A premature appeal from such a ruling will become effective under Rule 4(a)(2) o n the date of the final judgment. Estrada makes a narrow argument on appeal. He alleges San Benito acted in bad faith in destroying or concealing evidence relating to his arrest. He a r g u e s such behavior raises an unfavorable inference inconsistent with San B e n it o 's exculpatory theory ­ that the city was not in control of the person who in ju r e d Estrada. Estrada maintains this raises a question of fact defeating s u m m a r y judgment as to the excessive force claim. 3

Case: 09-41079

Document: 00511244077

Page: 4

Date Filed: 09/24/2010

No. 09-41079 W e review the district court's grant of summary judgment de novo. Berquist v. Washington Mut. Bank, 500 F.3d 344, 348 (5th Cir. 2007). "Summary ju d g m en t is appropriate if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, a n d admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no g e n u in e issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a ju d g m e n t as a matter of law." United Fire and Cas. Co. v. Hixson Bros. Inc., 453 F .3 d 283, 285 (5th Cir. 2006) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)). I n it ia lly , Estrada argues San Benito's deliberate failure to produce e v id e n c e from the traffic stop raises a negative inference that, in concert with E s t r a d a 's allegations, demonstrate a question of fact to defeat summary ju d g m e n t . This argument fails. Estrada's allegation that the arresting officer p u r p o s e ly failed to record information at the time of the traffic stop is not s u p p o r t e d by the record. An "adverse inference against the destroyer of

e v id e n c e " may arise "only upon a showing of bad faith or bad conduct." Condrey v . SunTrust Bank of Georgia, 431 F.3d 191, 203 (5th Cir. 2005) (internal citation a n d quotations omitted). The district court did not err in denying Estrada the b e n e fit of a negative inference against San Benito. Second, Estrada argues there was a question of fact concerning the use of e x c e s s iv e force that should have barred summary judgment. The question of fact w a s whether the person who committed the act injuring Estrada worked for San B e n it o or the federal government. Even if a city employee injured Estrada, t h o u g h , there has been no showing that a city policy led to excessive force being u s e d . Without some evidence being offered to support the existence of a policy, t h e r e cannot be municipal liability on this sort of claim under Section 1983. See B r o w n v. Lyford, 243 F.3d 185, 191 (5th Cir. 2001). The district court properly found no evidence that any excessive force was t h e result of a San Benito policy. Summary judgment was proper. We AFFIRM.

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