USA v. Geechie Templeton

Filing

PUBLISHED OPINION FILED. [09-50589 Affirmed] Judge: TMR , Judge: ECP , Judge: PRO. Mandate pull date is 11/05/2010 for Appellant Geechie De Vain Templeton [09-50589]

USA v. Geechie Templeton

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IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS United States Court of Appeals FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT Fifth Circuit FILED
October 15, 2010 N o . 09-50589 Lyle W. Cayce Clerk

U N IT E D STATES OF AMERICA, P la in t if f ­ A p p e lle e , v. G E E C H I E DEVAIN TEMPLETON, D e fe n d a n t ­ A p p e lla n t .

A p p e a l from the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas

B e fo r e REAVLEY, PRADO, and OWEN, Circuit Judges. P R I S C I L L A R. OWEN, Circuit Judge: G e e c h ie Devain Templeton challenges his convictions for using a firearm a n d committing murder during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime and fo r possession with the intent to distribute cocaine. We affirm. I T h is case stems from the murder of Gabriel Rodriguez in Odessa, Texas. Templeton arranged to purchase drugs from Rodriguez, and the two met in an a lle y adjacent to a house rented by Templeton's sister, Tanisha Lewis (Tanisha), a n d her then-boyfriend, Terrell Lewis (Lewis). Rodriguez arrived in a red pickup t r u c k , and shortly thereafter, Templeton knocked on the door of his sister's h o u s e . Lewis admitted him, and Templeton asked Lewis for $5,000 so that they

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No. 09-50589 c o u l d "go half on a brick" of cocaine. Lewis replied that he did not have the m on ey. T e m p le t o n returned to talk to Rodriguez, who was still sitting in his truck. As Tanisha watched, Templeton pulled a gun, and Rodriguez put his hand up to p r o t e c t himself. Templeton shot Rodriguez twice, fatally wounding him. After the shooting, Templeton signaled to his sister and Lewis that they n e e d e d to leave. Carrying a gun and what his sister identified as"two bricks" of c o c a in e , Templeton rode with Tanisha and Lewis to Templeton's mother's a p a r t m e n t , where Templeton went inside. Tanisha and Lewis returned to their h o u s e and removed a stash of drugs, which they delivered to the house of L a c r is h a Franklin, Tanisha's cousin. Tanisha and Lewis then drove to a fire s t a t io n . Lewis entered and reported to a firefighter that "something bad" had h a p p e n e d to a man in a truck outside of his house. The firemen went to the alley a n d found Rodriguez dead in the truck. M e a n w h ile , when Templeton arrived at his mother's apartment, he asked h is girlfriend, Montoya Sprague, who was also there, to wash his clothes. He t h e n left, but called to ask Sprague to take his gun to Franklin's apartment. Sprague wrapped the gun in a T-shirt and complied. She washed Templeton's c l o t h e s , but when she could not remove a brown stain, she burned them. At s o m e point after the incident, a friend drove Templeton from his mother's a p a r t m e n t to Hobbs, New Mexico, where he lived. Templeton had only a plain s h o e box in his possession. W h e n Tanisha, Lewis, and a family friend discovered that Templeton's gun w a s at Franklin's apartment, they became concerned because Franklin was on p a r o le . This concern prompted the friend to remove the gun from Franklin's a p a r t m e n t and return it to Templeton's mother's apartment. About ten days a ft e r the murder, an attorney representing Tanisha and Lewis contacted the p o lic e and indicated that the pair wanted to meet with them, which was 2

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No. 09-50589 a r r a n g e d . They explained to the police what they witnessed the night of the m u r d e r . A few days later, officers searched Templeton's mother's apartment and fo u n d a loaded Desert Eagle pistol wrapped in a T-shirt. A p p ro x im a t e ly a month after the murder, Templeton and Sprague met and t r a v e le d together, first to Lubbock, Texas, and ultimately to Topeka, Kansas. Templeton occupied a Topeka motel room under an assumed name, paying cash, fo r about a month and half before U.S. Marshals and local law enforcement o ffic e r s raided the motel room and arrested Templeton. a r r e s t e d , Templeton said, "I'm glad this shit is over." T e m p le t o n was indicted and charged in Count One with possession with in t e n t to distribute 500 grams or more of a mixture or substance containing c o c a in e , in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(B), and in Count Two w it h using a firearm and committing murder during and in relation to the drugt r a ffic k in g crime described in Count One, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c)(1) a n d 924(j). A jury convicted him on both counts, and the district court sentenced h im to 120-months' imprisonment on Count One and life imprisonment on Count T w o , to be served consecutively. This appeal followed. II T e m p le t o n contends that there was insufficient evidence for the jury to c o n v ic t him on either count since there was no evidence that the substance he a lle g e d ly possessed was a mixture or substance containing cocaine. We consider " w h e t h e r a reasonable jury could conclude that the relevant evidence, direct or c ir c u m s t a n t ia l, established all of the essential elements of the crime beyond a r e a s o n a b le doubt when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict." 1 As he was being

United States v. Stalnaker, 571 F.3d 428, 436 (5th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

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No. 09-50589 B e c a u s e law enforcement officers never recovered the substance T e m p le to n possessed on the night of the murder, the Government relied on the t e s t im o n y of Tanisha and Lewis to establish that it was cocaine. Both witnesses w e r e experienced in drug trafficking, and Tanisha had previously been convicted fo r possession of crack cocaine. Tanisha testified that Templeton was carrying " t w o bricks or two kilos of cocaine" when he got into the car with her after the m u r d e r . She stated that the bricks were wrapped in cellophane, explaining that s h e had previously seen bricks packaged similarly to those Templeton carried. She further testified that the bricks were powder cocaine, noting that she had n e v e r seen a brick of crack cocaine. Lewis, moreover, testified that Templeton a s k e d him for $5,000 to "go half on a brick" before the murder. He explained t h a t "brick" was a reference to one kilo of cocaine. Lewis also stated that when T e m p le to n got into the car after the murder, he was carrying two bricks of "dope" w r a p p e d in brown packaging and tape. Lewis testified that he knew the

p a c k a g e s contained cocaine since he had seen similarly wrapped bricks in the c o u r s e of his own drug deals. I n addition to this testimony, the jury heard evidence concerning T e m p le to n 's behavior after the shooting that suggests he sold something for la r g e sums of cash. After the murder, Templeton went to Hobbs, New Mexico, c a r r y in g only a shoe box. He later carried this shoe box with him when his fr ie n d transported him to another house in Hobbs, where he visited with the o c c u p a n t for ten to fifteen minutes. Templeton purchased a new television in H o b b s , paying over one thousand dollars in cash, and he similarly paid cash for h is motel room in Topeka. When he was apprehended by law enforcement in t h a t motel room, he possessed a digital hand scale with white residue on it. Though there was insufficient residue for chemical testing, the law enforcement o ffic e r who found this item of evidence testified that such scales are typically u s e d to weigh illegal drugs when packaging them for sale. From this evidence, 4

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No. 09-50589 t h e jury could infer that, after the murder, Templeton generated large sums of c a s h through cocaine sales. G iv e n the eyewitnesses' testimony that Templeton was carrying two k ilo g r a m s of cocaine, the circumstances surrounding the murder of Rodriguez, a n d Templeton's behavior after the incident, the jury could reasonably conclude t h a t Templeton possessed 500 grams or more of a mixture or substance c o n t a in in g cocaine on the night in question.2 T e m p le t o n argues that we should look to the Tenth Circuit's decision in U n ite d States v. Baggett3 in considering whether the evidence sufficiently s h o w e d he possessed cocaine. In Baggett, the Tenth Circuit determined that e v id e n c e of three telephone calls arranging for the purchase of heroin and the d e fe n d a n t 's confession that she had used some heroin each day of the month was in s u ffic ie n t to show that the defendant possessed heroin on the day in question.4 T h e court explained, however, that in some cases circumstantial evidence could b e sufficient to show that a defendant possessed illegal drugs. Such evidence m a y include "evidence of the physical appearance of the substance in v o lv e d in the transaction, evidence that the substance produced t h e expected effects when sampled by someone familiar with the illic it drug, evidence that the substance was used in the same m a n n e r as the illicit drug, testimony that a high price was paid in c a s h for the substance, evidence that transactions involving the s u b s t a n c e were carried on with secrecy or deviousness, and evidence t h a t the substance was called by the name of the illegal narcotic by t h e defendant or others in [her] presence." 5

Cf. United States v. Restrepo, 994 F.2d 173, 183 (5th Cir. 1993) (similarly concluding that witness testimony and other circumstantial evidence was sufficient to allow a reasonable jury to conclude that the defendant had trafficked in cocaine).
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890 F.2d 1095 (10th Cir. 1989). Id. at 1096-97. Id. at 1096 (quoting United States v. Dolan, 544 F.2d 1219, 1221 (4th Cir. 1976)).

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No. 09-50589 I n Baggett, the Government presented no such evidence, leading the court to c o n c lu d e that the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction. But in this c a s e , there is much more evidence, direct and circumstantial. There was

t e s t im o n y regarding the "physical appearance" of the packages, testimony that T e m p le to n intended to pay "a high price" for the substance, testimony that T e m p le to n had an abundance of cash in the days and weeks after he had taken t h e two packages, and testimony that the packages contained cocaine. Thus u n lik e Baggett, the evidence here was more than sufficient to establish that the p a c k a g e s contained cocaine. T e m p le t o n 's other sufficiency arguments do not require reversal of his c o n v ic t i o n . He argues that Lewis's testimony that Templeton asked him for $ 5 ,0 0 0 to pay for half a brick of cocaine cannot be reconciled with Agent Dean C o o k 's testimony that a kilogram of cocaine sells for $18,000 to $20,000, and that L e w is 's testimony is therefore not credible. But we "accept the jury's credibility d e t e r m in a t io n s unless a witness's testimony is incredible or patently u n b e lie v a b le ."6 Templeton also contends that the Government presented no e v id e n c e that he possessed either a large amount of cocaine or money at the time o f his arrest, three months after the murder. While true, the jury could have d e t e r m in e d that the three-month lapse gave Templeton sufficient time to sell the c o c a in e and either spend or hide the money. A c c o r d in g ly , we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support both c o n v ic tio n s . III T e m p le t o n argues that the district court abused its discretion when it a d m it t e d evidence of his prior cocaine trafficking and his 2004 arrest for cocaine p o s session . We review the admission of evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence
United States v. Miller, 588 F.3d 897, 907 (5th Cir. 2009) (internal brackets, quotation marks and citation omitted).
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No. 09-50589 4 0 4 (b ) under a "heightened" abuse of discretion standard.7 "Evidence in criminal t r ia ls must be strictly relevant to the particular offense charged."8 However, we d o not reverse for erroneous admissions under Rule 404(b) if the error was h a r m le s s .9 B e fo r e trial, the Government filed notice that it would offer evidence under R u le 404(b). The Government asked the district court to admit testimony from t w o witnesses who were prepared to testify that Templeton frequently sold them la r g e amounts of crack cocaine. The Government also asked the court to admit e v id e n c e of Templeton's 2004 arrest for possessing nine ounces of cocaine. The d is t r ic t court determined that Templeton's not guilty plea put his state of mind a t issue; the court therefore allowed the evidence of his prior crack cocaine t r a ffic k in g to prove intent, knowledge, and motive. The court similarly allowed t h e evidence of Templeton's arrest to show intent, knowledge, and motive. The c o u r t determined in each instance that the probative value of the evidence o u tw e ig h e d any prejudice to Templeton. O n the second day of trial, Templeton renewed his objections. His counsel e x p la in e d that the defense's theory of the case was that "Geechie Templeton was n o t there, didn't commit the murder, didn't retrieve any cocaine from Gabriel R o d r ig u e z ." Accordingly, defense counsel offered to stipulate to Templeton's in t e n t to distribute cocaine, but only if the Government proved both presence at t h e crime scene and possession of cocaine. Due to Templeton's refusal to

s t ip u la t e to presence and possession, the district court declined to exclude the e v id e n c e .

United States v. McCall, 553 F.3d 821, 827 (5th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2018 (2009). United States v. Jackson, 339 F.3d 349, 354 (5th Cir. 2003) (internal brackets, quotation marks, and citation omitted).
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Id.

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No. 09-50589 U n d e r Rule 404(b), evidence of other crimes or bad acts is inadmissible "to p r o v e the character of a person in order to show action in conformity t h e r e w i t h ."1 0 But such evidence may be admissible to prove motive, intent, or k n o w le d g e , among other things.1 1 We analyze Rule 404(b) admissions under the t w o -p r o n g test outlined in United States v. Beechum.1 2 First, we must consider w h e t h e r , applying Rule 401, "the extrinsic offense evidence is relevant to an is s u e other than the defendant's character."1 3 Second, we must determine

w h e t h e r the probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by its u n d u e prejudice.1 4 This prong involves a "commonsense assessment of all the c ir c u m s t a n c e s surrounding the extrinsic offense." 1 5 We consider the

" in c r e m e n t a l probity" of the evidence "with regard to the extent to which the d e fe n d a n t 's unlawful intent is established by other evidence, stipulation, or in fe r e n c e ." 16 P o in t in g to United States v. Yeagin,1 7 Templeton argues that the district c o u r t abused its discretion when it admitted the extrinsic evidence even after he o ffe r e d to stipulate to his intent to distribute if the Government proved p o s s e s s io n . In Yeagin, we overturned a defendant's convictions for possession o f methamphetamine with intent to distribute, use of a firearm in connection

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FED. R. EVID. 404(b). Id.

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See United States v. Cockrell, 587 F.3d 674, 678 (5th Cir. 2009) (citing United States v. Beechum, 582 F.2d 898, 911 (5th Cir. 1978)).
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Beechum, 582 F.2d at 911. Cockrell, 587 F.3d at 678. Id. (quoting Beechum, 582 F.2d at 914). Beechum, 582 F.2d at 914. 927 F.2d 798 (5th Cir. 1991).

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No. 09-50589 w it h a drug trafficking offense, and possession of a firearm as a convicted felon b e c a u s e the district court admitted evidence of the defendant's nine prior felony c o n v ic t io n s despite the defendant's offer to stipulate to the intent-to-distribute e le m e n t of the drug charge and the convicted-felon element of one of the firearm c h a r g e s .1 8 As in this case, the defendant offered to stipulate to intent to

d is t r ib u t e if the Government proved possession.1 9 In ruling that the district c o u r t abused its discretion, we acknowledged the "general rule" that "a party m a y not preclude his adversary's proof by an admission or offer to stipulate," 20 b u t explained that the "nine prior felonies were unrelated to the factual c ir c u m s t a n c e s of the charged offense" and would have an "extremely prejudicial e ffe c t " on the defendant.21 T h e circumstances here are distinguishable from those in Yeagin. The e v id e n c e in Yeagin was proffered to show intent only. Here, the court admitted t h e evidence to show intent, knowledge, and motive for the murder of Rodriguez. Even if the proposed stipulation weakened the evidence's probative value as to T e m p le to n 's intent, the evidence still had significant probative value as to T e m p le to n 's motive. The evidence showed that Templeton had previously

t r a ffic k e d crack cocaine, and the jury could infer that access to more cocaine m o t iv a t e d Templeton to murder Rodriguez. Moreover, the evidence was not as p r e ju d ic ia l as that in Yeagin, where the district court admitted the defendant's c o n v ic t io n s for five drug crimes and four unrelated crimes with little relevance t o the drug charge against the defendant. In contrast, no evidence was

p r e s e n t e d to the jury that Templeton was convicted of a drug crime. The witness

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Id. at 801-03. Id. at 801. Id. at 802 (quoting United States v. Spletzer, 535 F.2d 950, 955 (5th Cir. 1976)). Id. at 802-03.

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No. 09-50589 t e s t im o n y was less prejudicial than evidence of prior convictions, since the jury w a s free to disregard the testimony of the witnesses, who were both imprisoned o n drug charges and testified that they hoped for sentence reductions in e x c h a n g e for their cooperation. The judge was within his discretion to determine t h a t the probative value of this evidence with regard to intent, knowledge, and m o t iv e substantially outweighed its prejudicial effect. IV T e m p le t o n next contends that the district court committed reversible error b y preventing defense counsel from cross-examining Tanisha to establish that s h e was assaulted by Lewis. The defense intended to rely "on a theory that [L e w is ] pressured his wife into marrying him to ensure the husband-wife p r iv ile g e applied, and then used fear to make sure she testified against her b r o t h e r and not against him." The Government argues that the court properly limited the cross-examination in this regard since defense counsel provided no e v id e n c e that Lewis inflicted violence on his wife to influence her testimony or t h a t Tanisha altered her testimony out of fear. We review alleged Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause violations de n o v o , but any violations are subject to a harmless error analysis.2 2 If there is no C o n fr o n t a t io n Clause violation, we review the district court's limitation of crosse x a m in a t io n for abuse of discretion.2 3 T h e Confrontation Clause "provides that, `[i]n all criminal prosecutions, t h e accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against h im .'"2 4 "The main and essential purpose of confrontation is to secure for the

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United States v. Jimenez, 464 F.3d 555, 558 (5th Cir. 2006). Id. at 558-59. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 42 (2004) (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. VI).

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No. 09-50589 o p p o n e n t the opportunity of cross-examination." 2 5 The Supreme Court has

e x p la in e d that "the exposure of a witness'[s] motivation in testifying is a proper a n d important function of the constitutionally protected right of crosse x a m in a t io n ."2 6 The potential bias of a witness "is always relevant as

d is c r e d it in g the witness and affecting the weight of his testimony." 2 7 This court h a s further emphasized that "[t]he right to cross-examination `is particularly im p o r t a n t when the witness is critical to the prosecution's case.'"2 8 But the C o n fr o n t a t io n Clause does not prohibit the trial judge from putting some limits o n an inquiry into potential bias.2 9 Rather, "trial judges retain wide

la t itu d e . . . to impose reasonable limits on such cross-examination based on c o n c e r n s about, among other things, harassment, prejudice, confusion of the is s u e s , the witness'[s] safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or only m a r g in a lly relevant." 30 W e have explained that "the Confrontation Clause is generally satisfied w h e n the defendant has been `permitted to expose to the jury the facts from w h ic h jurors, as the sole triers of fact and credibility, could appropriately draw in fe r e n c e s relating to the reliability of the witness.'"3 1 "The relevant inquiry is w h e t h e r the jury had sufficient information to appraise the bias and motives of

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Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315-16 (1974) (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted).
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Id. at 316-17. Davis, 415 U.S. at 316 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Jimenez, 464 F.3d at 559 (quoting United States v. Mizell, 88 F.3d 288, 293 (5th Cir.

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1996)).
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Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 679. Id.

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United States v. Skelton, 514 F.3d 433, 439 (5th Cir. 2008) (quoting United States v. Restivo, 8 F.3d 274, 278 (5th Cir. 1993)).

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No. 09-50589 t h e witness."3 2 To establish a Confrontation Clause violation, the defendant n e e d not show that the jury would have rendered a different verdict.3 3 Instead, t h e defendant need only show that "a reasonable jury might have received a sig n ific a n t ly different impression of the witness's credibility had defense counsel b e e n permitted to pursue his proposed line of cross-examination." 3 4 T o determine whether Templeton's confrontation right was violated, we m u s t examine Tanisha Lewis's trial testimony and the line of cross-examination t h e district court prohibited. As an eyewitness to both the murder and

T e m p le to n 's cocaine possession, Tanisha was a particularly important witness fo r the Government. She testified that a man in a red pickup truck arrived in t h e alley outside her house and that Templeton knocked on her door shortly t h e r e a ft e r . She stated that Templeton briefly spoke with Lewis and then left t h r o u g h the front door. She explained that, through an open door, she saw T e m p le to n approach the red truck and shoot the man sitting inside. She further t e s t if i e d that after the shooting, Templeton told her and Lewis to get into her c a r , where Templeton joined them carrying the gun and two kilograms of c o c a in e . On cross-examination, defense counsel was able to elicit some information s h o w in g Tanisha's potential bias. He asked her questions about waiting to talk t o the police until eleven days after the murder, and she testified that she was w it h Lewis in the days before she talked to the police. Defense counsel also q u e s t io n e d her as to whether her decision to marry Lewis one month after the m u r d e r was an effort to obtain the spousal privilege, so that any subsequent

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United States v. Tansley, 986 F.2d 880, 886 (5th Cir. 1993). Skelton, 514 F.3d at 439. Id. (citing Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 680) (internal brackets and quotation marks

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No. 09-50589 c o n v e r s a t io n s concerning the murder could not be introduced in court. But d e fe n s e counsel did not otherwise question Tanisha in front of the jury regarding L e w is 's influence on her testimony. B e fo r e trial, defense counsel informed the court that Templeton's mother h a d told him that Lewis had "savagely beat up" Tanisha. In order to determine w h e t h e r further cross-examination on this line was appropriate, the court a llo w e d defense counsel to question Tanisha about Lewis's alleged abuse outside t h e presence of the jury. Tanisha explained that Lewis gave her a black eye in 2 0 0 8 during a fight about infidelity. When defense counsel asked how many t im e s Lewis had bruised her since the night of the murder, she replied that the b la c k eye was the only violent incident. She testified that Lewis had never in s t r u c t e d her on how to testify, that they had never fought about the case, and t h a t she was not afraid of Lewis. Defense counsel stated that Templeton's m o t h e r would also testify about the incident, but counsel could not locate her w h e n she was supposed to testify. The court prohibited cross-examination on t h e subject based on Tanisha's proffered testimony, but left open the possibility o f recalling her if defense counsel provided information that the abuse was r e la t e d to Tanisha's testimony or the murder. Defense counsel proffered no o t h e r testimony regarding the alleged abuse. Evidence that Tanisha was the victim of prolonged spousal abuse or that L e w is beat her in relation to her testimony could be probative of whether her t e s t im o n y was influenced by fear of further abuse. If there was such evidence, t h e jury could "appropriately draw inferences relating to" the reliability of T a n is h a 's damning evidence.3 5 But here, the proffered testimony showed only t h a t Lewis gave Tanisha a black eye once, in an altercation regarding infidelity. This testimony has only marginal, if any, relevance to Tanisha's credibility. The

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Skelton, 514 F.3d at 439.

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No. 09-50589 t r ia l judge gave the defense ample opportunity to present more evidence to show t h e relevance of the abusive incident, but the defense failed to do so. Accordingly, the trial judge's limitation on this line of questioning in crosse x a m in a t io n was well within his "wide latitude" to impose such limits.3 6 V F in a lly , Templeton argues that the district court abused its discretion by in s t r u c t in g the jury that evidence of flight could reflect a consciousness of guilt. He asserts that the evidence shows that he went to Topeka, Kansas, on vacation a t the behest of his girlfriend and that no evidence shows that he was aware that h e was a criminal suspect. We review jury instructions for abuse of discretion37 and consider "whether t h e court's charge, as a whole, correctly states the law and clearly instructs ju r o r s as to the principles of law applicable to the factual issues confronting t h e m ."3 8 In determining whether the jury instructions are factually supportable b y the evidence, "we evaluate that evidence in the light most favorable to the g o v e r n m e n t ." 3 9 E v id e n c e of a defendant's flight is generally admissible as tending to show g u ilt .4 0 We have explained that a flight instruction is proper when the evidence s u p p o r t s four inferences: "1) the defendant's conduct constituted flight; 2) the d e fe n d a n t 's flight was the result of consciousness of guilt; 3) the defendant's

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Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679 (1986). United States v. Clark, 582 F.3d 607, 615 (5th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1306

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(2010).
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United States v. Martinez, 190 F.3d 673, 678 (5th Cir. 1999). Clark, 582 F.3d at 615. Martinez, 190 F.3d at 678.

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No. 09-50589 g u ilt related to the crime with which he was charged; and, 4) the defendant felt g u ilt y about the crime charged because he, in fact, committed the crime." 4 1 T h e evidence here supports each of the four inferences. The record reflects t h a t Templeton traveled to Topeka before Christmas, about a month after the m u r d e r , and stayed in an extended stay hotel room under an assumed name, p a y in g cash for the room. We have previously found that similar evidence s u p p o r t s an inference of flight,4 2 and the fact that Templeton did not flee until a p p r o x im a t e ly one month after the crime does not undermine this inference.43 T e m p le to n 's statement to law enforcement upon his arrest that "I'm glad this s h it is over" further supports the inference that he in fact fled and demonstrates h is awareness that he was wanted for Rodriguez's murder, drug trafficking, or b o th , as the record reveals no other crime from which Templeton could have been fle e in g .4 4 His statement similarly supports an inference that he felt guilty about t h e crime charged because he had in fact committed the crime. That the jury could also have found an innocent motive in Templeton's a c t io n s does not render the flight instruction erroneous.4 5 Because the evidence s u p p o r t e d the four required inferences, the district court did not abuse its

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Id.

See United States v. Murphy, 996 F.2d 94, 97 (5th Cir. 1993) (concluding that evidence the defendant rented a house under his friend's name supports a flight inference); United States v. Mesa, 660 F.2d 1070, 1078 (5th Cir. Unit B Nov. 1981) (concluding that evidence the defendant rented a hotel room under an assumed name supports a flight or concealment inference). See Murphy, 996 F.2d at 97 (concluding that the defendant's conduct constituted flight even though one month had passed since the crime). See id. (explaining that the evidence supported the defendant's consciousness of guilt in relation to the crime charged since the record did not show any other crime from which the defendant could have been fleeing). See Mesa, 660 F.2d at 1078 ("The fact that the record might sustain either inference does not make the concealment instruction erroneous.").
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Case: 09-50589

Document: 00511264437

Page: 16

Date Filed: 10/15/2010

No. 09-50589 d is c r e t io n in instructing the jury concerning flight. Further, given the strong e v id e n c e of Templeton's guilt, as discussed in Part II, any error in this regard w o u ld be harmless.

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F o r the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM Templeton's convictions.

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