Yvonne Meadows, et al v. Janie Braxdale, et al

Filing

UNPUBLISHED OPINION FILED. [09-50850 Affirmed] Judge: JES , Judge: JLW , Judge: JWE. Mandate pull date is 09/29/2010 [09-50850]

Yvonne Meadows, et al v. Janie Braxdale, et al

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Case: 09-50850

Document: 00511226890

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Date Filed: 09/08/2010

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS F O R THE FIFTH CIRCUIT United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit

FILED
N o . 09-50850 September 8, 2010 Lyle W. Cayce Clerk Y V O N N E MEADOWS; LARRY MEADOWS, P la in t if f s - A p p e lla n t s v. L A K E TRAVIS INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT; JANIE BRAXDALE, D e fe n d a n t s -A p p e lle e s

A p p e a l from the United States District Court fo r the Western District of Texas U S D C No. 1:08-CV-819

B e fo r e SMITH, WIENER, and ELROD, Circuit Judges. P E R CURIAM:* P la in t iffs -A p p e lla n t s Larry Meadows and Yvonne Meadows challenge the R a p t o r Visitor Management System ("Raptor") and the implementation (" R e g u la t io n FFF") of this system by Defendant-Appellee Lake Travis I n d e p e n d e n t School District ("the District"). Regulation FFF requires visitors t o schools in the District to provide personal identification to determine whether t h e y are registered sex offenders. The Meadowses challenge the policy as a v io la t io n of their constitutional rights to speech, assembly, association, freedom

Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.

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fr o m unreasonable search or seizure, privacy, procedural due process, and s u b s t a n t iv e due process, as well as various aspects of state law. The district c o u r t granted summary judgment in favor of the District and assessed costs a g a in s t the Meadowses. We affirm. I . FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS F o llo w in g an incident in which a sex offender gained access to a school in t h e District and exposed himself to a child, the District implemented Regulation F F F to provide greater safety for the students. Under Regulation FFF, every v is ito r is required to provide a state-issued photo ID as a condition of entering s e c u r e areas where students are present. Visitors scan their ID through the R a p t o r System, which takes a picture of the information on the front of the ID, b u t collects no other information. Raptor enables schools to monitor access to t h e ir premises and check visitors' names and dates of birth to determine w h e t h e r they are listed on the registered-sex-offender databases of any of the fift y states or the federal territories. Raptor has modern and secure encryption a n d storage procedures. The event that precipitated the instant litigation occurred when Mrs. M e a d o w s visited Bee Cave Elementary School ("the School") in September 2006. The Meadowses' children were students there at that time. Mrs. Meadows r e fu s e d to allow the School either to scan her driver's license or to permit the S c h o o l to input her information manually. As a result, she was denied access to t h e areas of the School that she wished to visit and had to meet with her c h ild r e n 's teachers in a conference room in the main office area. Similar

in c id e n t s occurred when Mrs. Meadows visited the school to attend a musical, a volleyball game, and the School's annual Thanksgiving lunch. T h e Meadowses brought suit in district court. The District moved for s u m m a r y judgment, which the district court granted on all claims. The district c o u r t also taxed costs against the Meadowses, who timely filed a notice of appeal. I I . ANALYSIS 2

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A . Standard of Review W e review grants of summary judgment de novo, applying the same s t a n d a r d as the district court.1 Summary judgment is appropriate when there a r e no genuine issues of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.2 B . Constitutional Violations T h e Meadowses asserted their constitutional claims via 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To prove a violation, a plaintiff must show that an entity, acting under the color o f state law, deprived him of a right under the United States Constitution or fe d e r a l law.3 We conclude, as did the district court, that the School's

e n fo r c e m e n t of Regulation FFF does not deprive the Meadowses of any right p r o t e c t e d by the Constitution, so they cannot prevail on their § 1983 claim. The Meadowses' main argument is that Regulation FFF violates their s u b s t a n t iv e due process right to direct their children's education. We disagree. The Meadowses must show they have a fundamental right to access the secure a r e a s of the School, but they have failed to do so.4 We readily acknowledge that p a r e n t s do have a constitutional right to direct their children's education,5 but t h e Meadows have put forth no caselaw for the proposition that this right e x t e n d s so far as to include the unfettered right of a parent to visit all areas of a school campus while students are present. All cases to which the Meadowses c it e involve parental interests more fundamental than merely visiting all areas o f a school in which the parents' children are present. The Meadowses were not

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See, e.g., Kohler v. Englade, 470 F.3d 1104, 1108-09 (5th Cir. 2006). Id. at 1109. See Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 49-50 (1999). See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997).

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See Meyers v. State of Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).

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d e n ie d the ability to make fundamental decisions about their children's e d u c a t io n . E v e n if we assume arguendo that the Meadowses have a fundamental r ig h t to access all areas of their children's school while children are present, R e g u la t io n FFF would still pass strict scrutiny. That regulation both addresses a compelling state interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve it. The District o b v io u s ly has a compelling interest in determining, inter alia, whether a p o t e n t ia l visitor to its school is a registered sex offender. The regulation is n a r r o w ly tailored because Raptor takes only the minimum information n e c e s s a r y to determine sex-offender status, identify the visitor, and ensure the la c k of false positives. The alternatives that the Meadowses proposed were n e ith e r more narrowly tailored nor workable. We also agree with the district court and adopt its reasoning regarding the o t h e r constitutional violations alleged by the Meadowses. The Meadowses have n o t shown in any meaningful way that they were denied procedural due process o r that any restriction of Regulation FFF denies their First Amendment rights. Further, the Meadowses claims of the violation of their right to privacy fail b e c a u s e they have not shown that they have a right to privacy in their driver's lic e n s e s , nor can they. But, even if the information were constitutionally

p r o t e c t e d , the state has erected adequate safeguards to ensure the privacy of the t h e information.6 Their Fourth Amendment claim similarly fails. Even if this w e r e to be construed as a search or a seizure, we would hold it to be a reasonable one. C. Costs T h e district court taxed $4,832.81 in costs against the Meadowses. We r e v ie w the award of costs for abuse of discretion.7 "Unless a federal statute, [the

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See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 601-02 (1977). See Pacheco v. Mineta, 448 F.3d 783, 793 (5th Cir. 2006).

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F e d e r a l Rules], or a court order provides otherwise, costs ­ other than attorney's fe e s ­ should be allowed to the prevailing party."8 Although attorney's fees are

e x p r e s s ly provided for in 42 U.S.C. § 1988, that section does not address costs o t h e r than attorney's fees, so the general mandate of Rule 54(d)(1) applies. "Rule 54(d)(1) contains a strong presumption that the prevailing party will b e awarded costs. [We have] held that `the prevailing party is prima facie e n tit le d to costs.'"9 As the Meadowses have neither shown us any basis for r e b u t t in g that presumption nor demonstrated that any of the costs were u n r e a s o n a b le , we are satisfied that the district court was well within its d is c r e t io n in awarding these costs to the Defendants-Appellees. I I I . CONCLUSION T h e Meadowses have failed to show, as they must to prevail under § 1983, t h a t they have been deprived of a constitutional right. Neither have they shown t h a t the district court abused its discretion in assessing costs against them. The g r a n t of summary judgment and the award of costs to the Defendants-Appellees a r e , in all respects, AFFIRMED.

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Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1). Pacheco, 448 F.3d at 793 (citations omitted).

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