Susan Campbell v. R. Michael Bolen

Filing 920100902

Opinion

Case: 09-60788

Document: 00511223963

Page: 1

Date Filed: 09/02/2010

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS United States Court of Appeals FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT Fifth Circuit FILED
September 2, 2010 N o . 09-60788 S u m m a r y Calendar Lyle W. Cayce Clerk

I n the Matter of: SUSAN LISA CAMPBELL, Debtor --------------------------------------------------S U S A N LISA CAMPBELL, also known as Lisa Caskill, Appellant v. R . MICHAEL BOLEN, Appellee

A p p e a l from the United States District Court fo r the Northern District of Mississippi U S D C No. 2:09-cv-25

B e fo r e DAVIS, SMITH, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges. P E R CURIAM:*

Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

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Case: 09-60788

Document: 00511223963

Page: 2

Date Filed: 09/02/2010

No. 09-60788 W illia m Cohn, the attorney for the debtor-appellant, Susan Lisa Campbell, a p p e a ls an order of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern D is t r ic t of Mississippi. That court ruled that pursuant to Uniform Local Rule 8 3 .1 , adopted in 2006--requiring persons be admitted to the Mississippi bar in order to be admitted to practice before the Northern District of

M is s is s ip p i-- C o h n shall only be allowed to practice before the Northern District " u p o n admission pro hac vice." Cohn acknowledges that he has never been a d m it t e d to the Mississippi bar, although according to documents submitted to t h is court, he was admitted to practice before the Northern District of M is s is s ip p i in 1982. The bankruptcy court's order was affirmed by the District C o u r t for the Northern District of Mississippi. A n y argument Cohn could have raised before this court is waived. " G e n e r a lly speaking, a[n] [appellant] waives an issue if he fails to adequately b r ie f it." United States v. Martinez, 263 F.3d 436, 438 (5th Cir. 2001). Under the F e d e r a l Rules of Appellate Procedure, a brief must contain the "appellant's c o n t e n t io n s and the reasons for them, with citations to the authorities and parts o f the record on which the appellant relies; and . . . for each issue, a concise s t a t e m e n t of the applicable standard of review." Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(9). I r o n ic a lly for an attorney seeking to defend his right to practice before a fe d e r a l court, Cohn fails to provide any standard of review. Although his brief d o e s contain a section titled "Standard of Review," it is void of any authority or d is c u s s io n of how we might analyze the case in light of the arguments and r u lin g s below. From his two and a half page argument section we can surmise t h r e e possible bases that Cohn intends to suggest justify reversal: that the b a n k r u p t c y court's order violates (1) the Due Process Clause; (2) the Ex Post F a c t o Clause; and (3) the general rules against statutory retroactivity. He cites n o authority, beyond the Constitution, in support of his Due Process Clause a r g u m e n t . The citations he provides in support of his Ex Post Facto Clause 2

Case: 09-60788

Document: 00511223963

Page: 3

Date Filed: 09/02/2010

No. 09-60788 a r g u m e n t comport with no system of citation of which we are aware and change fr o m paragraph to paragraph. Further, he makes no effort to rebut the district c o u r t's conclusion that the order is "civil and regulatory in nature" and thus the E x Post Facto Clause is inapplicable. His only reasoning in support of his r e t r o a c t iv ity argument is that Uniform Local Rule 83.1 is "not a judicial decision, b u t is a regulation." While we will liberally construe a pro se petitioner's brief, w e have no such obligation to an attorney seeking to defend his admission to a fe d e r a l bar. Accordingly, we conclude that the arguments on appeal have been w a iv e d and therefore DISMISS the appeal.

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