Robert Ellis v. Landing Associates, et al
Filing
PUBLISHED OPINION FILED. [09-60917 Reversed and Remanded] Judge: WED , Judge: JLW , Judge: JLD. Mandate pull date is 11/19/2010 [09-60917]
Robert Ellis v. Landingase: 09-60917 Document: 00511279015 C Associates, et al
Page: 1 Date Filed: 10/29/2010
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IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS United States Court of Appeals FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT Fifth Circuit FILED
October 29, 2010 N o . 09-60917 Lyle W. Cayce Clerk
R O B E R T J. ELLIS, P la in t if f -A p p e lla n t L IB E R T Y MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, M o v a n t-A p p e lla n t v. T R U S T M A R K BUILDERS, INC.; SCOTTY JONES, Individually and as E m p lo y e e /A g e n t of Landings Associates, Ltd., The Mitchell Company, and T r u s t m a r k Builders, Inc., D e fe n d a n t s -A p p e lle e s
A p p e a l from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi
B e fo r e DAVIS, WIENER, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges. W I E N E R , Circuit Judge: P la in t iff-A p p e lla n t Robert J. Ellis was injured in Mississippi while w o r k in g on a construction site for an Alabama employer who was a s u b c o n t r a c t o r for Defendant-Appellee Trustmark Builders, Inc. ("Trustmark"). E llis recovered workers compensation benefits from the State of Alabama under h is employer's policy, which included coverage of work sites in Mississippi. Ellis th en filed this tort action against Defendants-Appellees for damages. The district
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Case: 09-60917 Document: 00511279015 Page: 2 Date Filed: 10/29/2010
No. 09-60917 c o u r t applied Mississippi choice-of-law principles and held that Mississippi's w o r k e r s compensation scheme governed this suit, barring Ellis from bringing t o r t claims against Appellees. We reverse and remand for application of A la b a m a 's workers compensation scheme. I. FACTS & PROCEEDINGS A . Facts E llis was injured in February 2003 while working on an apartment c o m p le x construction site in Biloxi, Mississippi. The negligence asserted o c c u r r e d on that site where Ellis had been working for a month. In his c o m p la in t , Ellis identifies himself as "an adult resident citizen of Jackson C o u n ty , State of Mississippi." 1 W it h the exception of Ellis, however, all parties involved in this suit are A la b a m a residents, partnerships, or corporations. The apartment complex was o w n e d by Landings Associates, Ltd. ("Landings"). A partner of Landings, the M it c h e ll Company, was the general contractor for the construction project, and t h e Mitchell Company subcontracted with Trustmark, whose employee, Scotty J o n e s , allegedly constructed the wooden platform that is claimed to have caused E llis 's injury.2 Landings, the Mitchell Company, and Trustmark are Alabama p a r tn e r s h ip s or corporations, and all maintain their principal places of business in Alabama. Trustmark was not registered to do business in Mississippi at the t im e , its Mississippi Certificate of Authority having been revoked prior to the
Ellis later testified that he has "no permanent place of residence" and currently lives in Alabama but uses his mother's address in Mississippi as a permanent address for purposes of filing taxes and obtaining a driver's license. Ellis was injured when he was raised by a forklift in a wooden box to construct an archway. The box was not attached to the lift and slid off of the forks, causing Ellis to fall more than twenty-five feet to the ground. The cause of the injury is not pertinent to this appeal, however, and we do not reach the merits of the claim.
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No. 09-60917 a c c id e n t. Jones is an Alabama resident too, and he commuted from his Alabama h o m e to Mississippi on days that he worked on the construction site. T r u s t m a r k in turn sub-subcontracted in Alabama with Rusty Stevens, an A la b a m a subcontractor. Stevens hired Ellis, also in Alabama.3 Ellis spent the fir s t nine months of his employment for Stevens working with Jones in Alabama o n Trustmark projects. He then spent only the one month prior to his injury w o r k in g in Mississippi. Notably, Stevens maintained workers compensation in s u r a n c e only in the State of Alabama. He secured that insurance through M o v a n t -A p p e lla n t Liberty Mutual Insurance Company ("Liberty Mutual")--also a n Alabama corporation--to cover all his employees, including Ellis, while they w o r k e d out of state.4 A fte r Ellis's accident, Stevens filed a Notice of Injury with the Alabama D e p a r t m e n t of Industrial Relations, and Liberty Mutual filed a Combination S u p p le m e n t a r y and Claim Summary form with the same Alabama agency. Ellis r e c e iv e d workers compensation benefits pursuant to the State of Alabama's w o r k e r s compensation law. B . Proceedings A fte r Ellis began receiving the workers compensation benefits under S t e v e n s 's policy in Alabama, he filed this tort action in the Southern District of M is s is s ip p i, seeking damages for injuries resulting from Appellees' alleged n e g lig e n c e . The district court determined that Mississippi's workers
c o m p e n s a tio n law should control the case, interpreting Mississippi Code
The district court mistakenly stated that "Ellis was employed by Scotty Jones, a subcontractor on the project," Ellis v. Landings Assocs., Ltd., No. 1:04-CV-120, 2009 WL 4017278, at *1 (S.D. Miss. Nov. 19, 2009), but the fact is not disputed that Stevens was the subcontractor who employed Ellis. Appellees concede, "In the present case, there is no dispute that Plaintiff's employer provided workers' compensation under the laws of Alabama that covered Plaintiff while working in Mississippi."
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No. 09-60917 § 71-3-109(3) as a statutory directive on choice of law. The court then held that M is s is s ip p i law barred Ellis's tort suit. O n appeal, we vacated and remanded, rejecting the district court's d e te r m in a tio n : [S e c t io n ] 71-3-109(3) is not a statutory directive that takes the place o f Mississippi's ordinary choice-of-law rules, which remain a n t e c e d e n t to application of § 71-3-109(3). Therefore, before the d is t r ic t court may consider § 71-3-109(3), it must find that M is s is s ip p i choice-of-law rules direct it to apply Mississippi law. If c o n s id e r a t io n of those choice-of-law rules directs the district court t o Alabama law, then § 71-3-109(3) is irrelevant.5 O n remand, the district court conducted a succinct Mississippi choice-ofla w analysis and again concluded that Mississippi law should govern the case: I n the Court's opinion under the "most significant relationship test," M is s is s ip p i law applies. Notably, the accident occurred in M ississip p i. The negligent conduct which allegedly caused the injury o c c u r r e d in Mississippi. Finally, the injured plaintiff appears to h a v e been a Mississippi resident.6 T h e court then applied Mississippi Code § 71-3-109(3), held that Mississippi's w o r k e r s compensation statute barred Ellis from bringing this tort action against A p p e lle e s , and granted Appellees' motion for a summary judgment of dismissal.7 E llis then timely filed a notice of appeal. I I . ANALYSIS A . Standard of Review W e review a district court's choice-of-law determination de novo.8 Subjectm a t t e r jurisdiction in this case is based on diversity of citizenship. When sitting
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Ellis v. Trustmark Builders, Inc., 294 F. App'x 971, 974 (5th Cir. 2008). Ellis, 2009 WL 4017278, at *2 (footnotes omitted). Id. at *3. See Allison v. ITE Imperial Corp., 928 F.3d 137, 139 (5th Cir. 1991).
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No. 09-60917 in diversity, we apply the choice-of-law rules of the forum state--here, M is s is s ip p i-- t o determine which state's substantive law should apply.9 B . Choice of Law A substantive conflict exists between the workers compensation schemes o f Alabama and Mississippi. Mississippi's workers compensation law provides t h e exclusive remedy of a subcontractor's injured employee; suits against c o -e m p lo y e e s or the general contractor for damages are generally barred.1 0 A la b a m a 's workers compensation law permits a subcontractor's injured e m p lo y e e to sue co-employees or the general contractor whose negligence causes h is injury.1 1 We must determine which of these states' law governs this case. M is s is s ip p i's choice-of-law test consists of three steps: "(1) determine w h e t h e r the laws at issue are substantive or procedural; (2) if substantive, classify the laws as either tort, property, or contract; and (3) look to the relevant s e c t io n of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws." 1 2 T h e conflicting laws at issue here involve workers compensation and are n o t procedural--and therefore do not automatically dictate application of M is s is s ip p i law.1 3 As Ellis brings tort claims, we apply Chapter 7 of the
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See Ingalls Shipbuilding v. Fed. Ins. Co., 410 F.3d 214, 230 (5th Cir. 2005).
See MISS. CODE § 71-3-9; Salyer v. Mason, Techs., Inc., 690 So.2d 1183, 1184-85 (Miss. 1997) ("[W]here the subcontractor provided compensation coverage to its employees pursuant to its contract with the prime contractor, the prime contractor qualified as a statutory employer and was immune from a common law tort suit by the injured employee."); Brown v. Estess, 374 So.2d 241, 242 (Miss. 1979) ("It is this Court's opinion that the purpose, spirit and philosophy of the Workmen's Compensation Act is to make compensation the exclusive remedy of the employee where he is injured by the employer or any of its employees during the course of his employment."). See ALA. CODE § 25-5-11. See also Dueitt v. Williams, 764 F.2d 1180, 1181 (5th Cir. 1985) (setting out the conflict between Mississippi and Alabama workers compensation laws). Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Found. Health Servs., 524 F.3d 588, 593 (5th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted).
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See Davis v. Nat'l Gypsum Co., 743 F.2d 1132, 1134 (5th Cir. 1984).
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No. 09-60917 R e s ta t e m e n t (Second) of Conflict of Laws. Section 145 of the Restatement directs t h a t tort actions should be governed by the law of the state with "the most s ig n ific a n t relationship to [(1)] the occurrence and [(2)] the parties" and suggests t y p e s of contacts that should be considered for such a determination: C o n t a c t s to be taken into account . . . to determine the law a p p lic a b le to an issue include: (a ) t h e place where the injury occurred, (b) t h e place where the conduct causing the injury occurred, (c ) t h e domicil[e], residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of the parties, and (d) t h e place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered. These contacts are to be evaluated according to their relative im p o r t a n c e with respect to the particular issue.1 4 T h e Restatement also instructs that the weighing of these tort-specific factors s h o u ld be guided by the seven general choice-of-law considerations set out in § 6: (a ) t h e needs of the interstate and international systems, (b ) t h e relevant policies of the forum, (c ) t h e relevant policies of other interested states and the relative in t e r e s t s of those states in the determination of the particular issue, (d ) t h e protection of justified expectations, (e ) t h e basic policies underlying the particular field of law, (f) c e r t a in ty , predictability and uniformity of result, and (g ) e a s e in the determination and application of the law to be a p p lie d .1 5 T h e Supreme Court of Mississippi has further explained that "[t]he principles o f Sections 6 and 145 of the Restatement (Second) defy mechanical a p p lic a t io n -- th e y are less `rules of law' than generally-stated guideposts." 1 6 H e r e , the first two § 145 factors favor Mississippi, as both the injury and t h e allegedly negligent conduct that caused the injury took place on the
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RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145(2). Id. § 6(2). McDaniel v. Ritter, 556 So.2d 303, 310 (Miss. 1989).
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No. 09-60917 c o n s t r u c t io n site in Mississippi. These factors, however, are not dispositive. The R e s ta t e m e n t makes clear that for personal injury actions "the local law of the s t a t e where the injury occurred determines the rights and liabilities of the p a r tie s , unless . . . some other state has a more significant relationship under the p r in c ip le s stated in § 6 . . . ."1 7 Generally, the state where the injury occurred has a interest in awarding relief under its workers compensation law because "the S t a te might otherwise be required to care for the injured employee." 1 8 M is s is s ip p i does not have that interest here, however, because Ellis has already r e c e iv e d protection from the State of Alabama pursuant to its workers c o m p e n s a tio n law. T h e second two § 145 factors favor Alabama. Even though Ellis is a M is s is s ip p i resident, his relationship with his employer, Stevens, was centered in Alabama, as were all other relevant business relationships. And, all other p a r tie s are Alabama corporations or residents. Most importantly, Stevens took o u t and maintained Alabama workers compensation insurance from Liberty M u tu a l in Alabama, covering employees working out of state--and Ellis received b e n e fits pursuant to Stevens's coverage under Alabama's workers compensation la w . These facts satisfy us that Alabama has a more significant relationship to t h is case than does Mississippi, in large part because the parties have already e n g a g e d Alabama's workers compensation scheme.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 146 (emphasis added). See also Mitchell v. Craft, 211 So.2d 509, 510 (Miss. 1968) (holding that the site of the injury does not "invariably" determine choice of law when "the most substantial relationships of the parties and the dominant interest of the forum require application of [another state's] law"); In re Estate of Blanton, 824 So.2d 558, 562 (Miss. 2002) ("In Mitchell v. Craft, this Court modified the traditional rule that the governing law is the law where the accident occurred.").
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RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 181, cmt. a.
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No. 09-60917 W e addressed a similar situation in Duhon v. Union Pacific Resources Co. in which we had to apply Louisiana choice-of-law principles.1 9 We considered the " t o t a lit y of the circumstances" and found determinative the fact that the plaintiff h a d already received benefits from his direct employer pursuant to the workers c o m p e n s a tio n scheme of Louisiana.2 0 We weighed the interests of the two c o m p e t in g states and recognized that, despite the fact that the injury took place in Texas, Louisiana had "an interest in the consistent and comprehensive im p le m e n ta t io n of its workers' compensation laws."2 1 O u r main concern with regard to comprehensive implementation of w o r k e r s compensation schemes has been maintaining the underlying quid pro q u o of requiring employers to provide no-fault workers compensation benefits to e m p lo y e e s in exchange for tort immunity.2 2 Section 184 of the Restatement r e s o lv e s this issue by prohibiting recovery in tort "if the defendant is declared im m u n e from such liability by the workmen's compensation statute of a state
43 F.3d 1011, 1016 (5th Cir. 1995). When presented with conflicting tort laws, Louisiana will choose the state where the injury and negligent conduct occurred so long as one of the parties is domiciled in that state. See LA. CIVIL CODE art. 3544. Louisiana makes an exception to this rule, however, when the policies of another state "would be most seriously impaired if its law were not applied to that issue." Id. art. 3542. Ultimately then, a similar type of "most significant relationship" analysis takes place.
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See Duhon, 43 F.3d at 1014.
Carriere v. Chandeleur Energy Corp., No. 94-40119, 1994 WL 708709, at *4 (5th Cir. Dec. 9, 1994). We considered the facts of Duhon "indistinguishable from Carriere" and therefore held that the Carriere "interest analysis comparing the interests of Texas and Louisiana" applied in Duhon. Duhon, 43 F.3d at 1014. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CO N F L I C T OF LAWS § 6(2)(f) (listing "certainty, predictability and uniformity of result" as a relevant factor for consideration). See Duhon, 43 F.3d at 1014 ("Because Louisiana law imposes this burden on statutory employers [ ] to provide compensation benefits to statutory employees hired in Louisiana, no matter where they are injured, it is reasonable that they should be entitled to the corollary benefit of tort immunity."). See also Burbank v. Ford Motor Co., 703 F.2d 865, 866 (5th Cir. 1983) (noting that all states with a "comprehensive workers' compensation scheme" offer a quid pro quo for which "[t]he quid and the quo are the same under each act").
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No. 09-60917 u n d e r which the defendant is required to provide insurance . . . and under which . . . the plaintiff could obtain an award for the injury."2 3 The Restatement's c o m m e n ta r y explains: I t is thought unfair that a person who is required to provide in s u r a n c e against a risk under the workmen's compensation statute o f one state which gives him immunity from liability for tort or w r o n g fu l death should not enjoy that immunity in a suit brought in o t h e r states. . . . A person who accepts an award under the w o r k m e n 's compensation statute of a given state may justly be held b o u n d by the provisions of that statute insofar as immunity from t o r t and wrongful death liability is concerned.2 4 A p p e lle e s nevertheless urge that § 184 should apply to extend Mississippi's tort im m u n it y to them.2 5 But, § 184 only applies when a tort defendant is required t o provide insurance under a particular state's workers compensation scheme. T h a t was not the case here: Appellees were not required to, and did not, provide com p en s a tio n insurance covering Ellis under Mississippi's workers
c o m p e n s a ti o n law. Instead, Appellees' subcontractor, Stevens, maintained in s u r a n c e under Alabama's workers compensation law to cover his employees w h ile they were working in Mississippi. Appellees' argument thus fails. In fact, the reverse could arguably be true: Because Appellees were not r e q u ir e d by the State of Mississippi to provide workers compensation insurance u n d e r that state's law--and did not do so--they should not enjoy the corollary b e n e fit of tort immunity, which they thus have not earned. This rationale serves a s the basis for allowing tort recovery against third parties in some states: " [S ]in c e the third party could not have been liable for worker's compensation, he s h o u ld be prepared to make the injured person whole under normal tort
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RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 184. Id. § 184, cmt. b. Appellees' Br. at 31.
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No. 09-60917 p r i n c ip le s . Injured persons should not be deprived of access to the courts for r e d r e s s without reason."2 6 If an injured worker wants to pursue a tort action u n d e r the same state law that awarded him benefits, here Alabama's workers c o m p e n s a tio n law--which also happens to be the state law under which his em p loy er maintained workers compensation insurance and filed the claim for his in ju r y -- w e perceive no good reason to prevent the injured person from doing so. W e have also endorsed consideration of "the expectations of the parties a n d the minimization of adverse consequences that might follow from subjecting a party to the law of more than one state,"2 7 which echoes the Restatement's g u id in g principle, viz., "the protection of justified expectations." 2 8 The facts of t h is cases demonstrate that the employer, Stevens, and the employee, Ellis, r e a s o n a b ly expected that Alabama law would govern their workers
c o m p e n s a tio n claims. This was the anticipated situation even if the injury o c c u r r e d out of state, given the employer's maintenance of an Alabama in s u r a n c e policy covering temporary out-of-state work. This expectation is fo r t ifie d by the facts that Alabama is where Stevens both contracted with T r u s t m a r k and hired Ellis. In contrast, Trustmark was not even registered to d o business in Mississippi, so neither Trustmark nor its Alabama employee, J o n e s , should have expected to receive the tort immunity provided by M is s is s ip p i's workers compensation law. At bottom, the Restatement requires deferring to the state with the most s ig n ific a n t relationship to the particular issue in dispute. When assessing w h e t h e r a workers compensation law should afford tort immunity to parties, the im p o r t a n t state ties are naturally with the state where the employment
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Posey v. Union Carbide Corp., 705 F.2d 833, 834 (6th Cir. 1983). Carriere, 1994 WL 708709, at *4, adopted by Duhon, 43 F.3d at 1014. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6(2)(d).
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No. 09-60917 rela tion sh ip is centered--and particularly the state where the employer provides w o r k e r s compensation insurance coverage and the employee has already r e c e iv e d such benefits for the injury at issue. In this case, Alabama is that state, s o Ellis's tort action should be governed by Alabama's workers compensation la w , which has thus far governed the relationships between the parties. I I I . CONCLUSION W e reverse the district court's dismissal of Ellis's action and remand for fu r t h e r proceedings in which the district court shall apply Alabama's workers c o m p e n s a tio n scheme. As we hold that Mississippi law does not apply to this c a s e , we do not consider whether Mississippi Code § 71-3-109 would exempt Ellis fr o m Mississippi's workers compensation scheme. R E V E R S E D and REMANDED.
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