Daynean Richards v. JRK Property Holdings

Filing

UNPUBLISHED OPINION FILED. [10-10125 Affirmed] Judge: PEH , Judge: JES , Judge: CH. Mandate pull date is 01/10/2011 [10-10125]

Daynean Richards v. JRK Property Holdings Case: 10-10125 Document: 00511327060

Page: 1 Date Filed: 12/20/2010

Doc. 0

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS United States Court of Appeals FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT Fifth Circuit FILED
N o . 10-10125 S u m m a r y Calendar December 20, 2010 Lyle W. Cayce Clerk

D A Y N E A N RICHARDS, Plaintiff - Appellant v. J R K PROPERTY HOLDINGS, Defendant - Appellee

A p p e a l from the United States District Court fo r the Northern District of Texas U S D C No. 09-CV-1561

B e fo r e HIGGINBOTHAM, SMITH, and HAYNES, Circuit Judges. P E R CURIAM:* P la in t iff Daynean Richards appeals the dismissal of her Title VII e m p lo y m e n t discrimination and retaliation claims. b e lo w , we AFFIRM. I n May 2009, Richards filed a charge of discrimination against JRK P r o p e r ty Holdings ("JRK") with the Texas Workforce Commission Civil Rights D iv is io n . The only particulars listed on the charge were: (1) Richards was t e r m in a t e d from her position as Property Manager in October 2008; (2) Leslie
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
*

For the reasons stated

Dockets.Justia.com

Case: 10-10125 Document: 00511327060 Page: 2 Date Filed: 12/20/2010

No. 10-10125 F r a z ie r told Richards she was being terminated due to her failure to falsify g o v e r n m e n t documents; and (3) Richards believed she was discriminated against b e c a u s e of her race and in retaliation for refusing to falsify government d o c u m e n t s .1 Richards received a notice of dismissal and right to sue from the U .S . Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Richards, represented by c o u n s e l, filed a complaint in the Northern District of Texas in August 2009. The o n ly facts alleged in the complaint were: (1) Plaintiff is a resident of Desoto, T e x a s ; (2) Defendant is a company with offices in Los Angeles, California; and (3 ) "Plaintiff was discharged due to race and retaliation in October 20, 2008." Neither the complaint nor the Workforce Commission charge asserted that R ic h a r d s was an employee of JRK. Further, the documents provided no

s u p p o r t in g explanations for why Richards believed she was discriminated a g a in s t based on race, whether the government documents were connected to a p r o t e c t e d activity under Title VII, or whether Leslie Frazier was a r e p r e s e n t a t iv e of JRK. I n September 2009, JRK filed a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of C iv il Procedure 12(b)(6). The district court granted the motion, finding that R ic h a r d s 's pleading contained nothing more than "labels" and "conclusions" and i t "failed to allege sufficient facts to state a plausible claim to relief." The c o m p la in t was dismissed without prejudice. W e review de novo a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under R u le 12(b)(6).2 Under Rule 8(a)(2), a pleading must contain "a short and plain

Plaintiff's Complaint incorporated her Workforce Commission charge so the court may consider the attachment in assessing the motion to dismiss.
2

1

In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 495 F.3d 191, 205 (5th Cir. 2007).

2

Case: 10-10125 Document: 00511327060 Page: 3 Date Filed: 12/20/2010

No. 10-10125 s t a t e m e n t of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." While we a s s u m e that all factual allegations in the complaint are true, those allegations " m u s t be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level," 3 and the c o m p la in t must "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face."4 To survive a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the complaint does not need "detailed factual a lle g a t io n s , but it [needs] more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfullyh a r m e d -m e accusation."5 Specifically, "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." 6 I n the Plaintiff's complaint, she asserted that she was discharged due to h e r race in violation of Title VII, which prohibits an employer from "d iscrim in a t[in g ] against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, c o n d itio n s . . . because of such individual's race, color, . . . or national origin." 7 H o w e v e r , the complaint did not set forth any factual allegations to support a r a c i a l discrimination claim. The only facts alleged were: (1) Richards was t e r m in a t e d from her position as a property manager in October 2008; and (2) R ic h a r d s believed she was terminated because she is African-American. Richards provided no facts that lend support to her belief that she was t e r m in a t e d because of her race. Her assertion of racial discrimination is a legal c o n c lu s io n that the court is not required to accept and does not suffice to prevent

3

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Id. at 570. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). Id. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).

4

5

6

7

3

Case: 10-10125 Document: 00511327060 Page: 4 Date Filed: 12/20/2010

No. 10-10125 a motion to dismiss.8 Without sufficient factual allegations in her complaint, R ic h a r d s has not satisfied her burden of providing fair notice to the Defendant.9 T o state a Title VII retaliation claim, the Plaintiff must allege facts that t e n d to establish: (1) she engaged in an activity protected by Title VII; (2) an a d v e r s e employment action occurred; and (3) a causal link existed between the p r o t e c t e d activity and the adverse action.1 0 "Protected activity is defined as o p p o s i t i o n to any practice rendered unlawful by Title VII, including making a c h a r g e , testifying, assisting, or participating in any investigation, proceeding, or h e a r in g under Title VII."1 1 Here, Richards did not assert that she was

p a r t ic ip a t in g in any protected activity. She indicated she was discharged for fa ilin g to falsify government documents, but she made no allegation that those d o c u m e n t s were connected to a Title VII investigation or that her failure to fa ls ify was an activity protected by Title VII.1 2 Her complaint fails to allege facts s t a t in g a claim for retaliation that is plausible on its face. W e therefore AFFIRM the district court's judgment dismissing Appellants' c la im s .

See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949; Landavazo v. Toro Co., 301 Fed. App'x 333 (5th Cir. 2008) (unpublished). See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 n.3; Dark v. Potter, 293 Fed. App'x 254 (5th Cir. 2008) (unpublished).
10 9

8

Gee v. Principi, 289 F.3d 342, 345 (5th Cir. 2002).

Ackel v. Nat'l Commc'ns, Inc., 339 F.3d 376, 385 (5th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). We also note that Richards could not base her retaliation claim on her EEOC filing because that charge was filed over seven months after she was discharged.
12

11

4