Bruce Leipzig v. Principal Life Insurance Co., et al

Filing 920101222

Opinion

Case: 10-10394 Document: 00511329597 Page: 1 Date Filed: 12/21/2010

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS United States Court of Appeals FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT Fifth Circuit FILED
N o . 10-10394 S u m m a r y Calendar December 21, 2010 Lyle W. Cayce Clerk

B R U C E LEIPZIG, M.D., P la in t if f -A p p e lla n t Cross-Appellee, versu s P R I N C I P A L LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, D e fe n d a n t -A p p e lle e Cross-Appellant.

A p p e a l from the United States District Court fo r the Northern District of Texas N o . 6:09-CV-36

B e fo r e DAVIS, SMITH, and SOUTHWICK, Circuit Judges. P E R CURIAM:*

Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

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Case: 10-10394 Document: 00511329597 Page: 2 Date Filed: 12/21/2010

No. 10-10394 W e remanded for the district court to explain its denial of attorney's fees t o Principal Life Insurance Co. ("Principal"). Leipzig v. Principal Life Ins. Co., N o . 10-10394, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 24396, at *18 (5th Cir. Nov. 29, 2010). In it s prompt response, the court explained that it "could not make a determination o f the reasonableness or necessity of Principal's attorney fees" because "no a m o u n t was requested, much less supported by affidavits" at the time of summ a r y judgment. Leipzig v. Principal Life Ins. Co., No. 6:09-CV-36, slip op. at 2 (N .D . Tex. Nov. 30, 2010). Principal's summary judgment brief and reply brief t o the district court, however, both stated that it intended to seek attorney's fees t h r o u g h a post-judgment motion. Appellant's Br. 49; R. 337, 839 n.31. And in r e s p o n s e to Principal's summary judgment motion, plaintiff Bruce Leipzig a g r e e d that attorney's fees should be addressed post-judgment. Appellant's Br. 4 9 ; R. 543. T h e district court reasoned that it "was not bound by the parties' agreem e n t" and therefore could sua sponte deny attorney's fees at the summary judgm e n t stage, because the parties had not submitted the materials required for it t o consider whether to grant the fees. Leipzig, No. 6:09-CV-36, slip op. at 2. Alt h o u g h ERISA gives the district court discretion to award reasonable attorney's fe e s , 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1) (2006), we review its decision for abuse of discretion. Todd v. AIG Life Ins. Co., 47 F.3d 1448, 1458 (5th Cir. 1995) (White, J.). Motions fo r fees under ERISA are subject to the time limits set forth in Federal Rule of C iv il Procedure 54. See Jones v. Cent. Bank, 161 F.3d 311, 312 (5th Cir. 1998). Rule 54(d)(2)(B) says, "Unless a statute or a court order provides otherwise, the m o t io n [for attorney's fees] must: (i) be filed no later than 14 days after the entry o f judgment . . . ." The motion must "specify the judgment . . . entitling the mova n t to the award," id., suggesting that an attorney's fee motion would normally

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Case: 10-10394 Document: 00511329597 Page: 3 Date Filed: 12/21/2010

No. 10-10394 b e filed after the entry of judgment so that the judgment could be specified.1 T h e district court points to no order that required the parties to file their m o t io n s for attorney's fees before a decision on summary judgment. The district judge's own motion practice rules do not specify when fee motions must be m a d e .2 If anything, those rules suggest that such motions are not due at the s u m m a r y judgment stage, because motions for summary judgment and fee applic a t io n s are addressed in different subsections (II.A.1 and II.A.4.b, respectively). Id. It was an abuse of discretion for the district court to deny attorney's fees for fa ilu r e to file the required materials where no statute or court order gave notice t h a t the motions for fees were due earlier than rule 54(d)(2)(B)(i) requires.3 T h e district court also noted that, in any event, it appropriately denied fe e s at the summary judgment stage because Principal did not subsequently file a post-judgment motion for fees. Leipzig, No. 6:09-CV-36, slip op. at 2. That is e r r o r that amounts to abuse of discretion: The reason Principal did not file a p o s t -j u d g m e n t motion is that fees had already been denied. We therefore

R E V E R S E the denial of attorney's fees and REMAND for further proceedings a s needed.

Whether, and if so, in what circumstances, a pre-judgment motion would be proper is not at issue here. See Sam R. Cummings, Requirements for District Judge Sam R. Cummings, available at http://www.txnd.uscourts.gov/judges/scummings_req.html (last visited Dec. 3, 2010). Cf. Pierce v. Barnhart, 440 F.3d 657, 664 (5th Cir. 2006) (holding that district court abused its discretion because it did not impose a cut-off date on the plaintiffs to refile their premature attorney's fees applications and then dismissed those applications as untimely).
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