Kristofer Kastner v. Tom Lawrence, et al

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Kristofer Kastner v. Tom Lawrence, et al

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Case: 10-20048

Document: 00511183804

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Date Filed: 07/23/2010

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS United States Court of Appeals FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT Fifth Circuit FILED
July 23, 2010 N o . 10-20048 S u m m a r y Calendar Lyle W. Cayce Clerk

K R I S T O F E R THOMAS KASTNER, P la in t iff - Appellant v. T O M LAWRENCE, Individually and as Harris County Justice of the P e a c e Precinct 4 Position 2; DEANA FORRESTER, Individually and as H a r r is County Clerk; UNKNOWN CLERK, Individually and as Harris C o u n ty Clerk; BELINDA CINQUE, Individually and as Harris County C le r k ; HARRIS COUNTY; STATE OF TEXAS, D e fe n d a n t s - Appellees

A p p e a l from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas U S D C No. 4:09-CV-2491

B e fo r e WIENER, CLEMENT, and SOUTHWICK, Circuit Judges. P E R CURIAM:* K r is t o fe r Thomas Kastner filed suit against three county court clerks, the H a r r is County Justice of the Peace, Harris County, and the State of Texas, a lle g in g civil rights violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district court granted

Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

*

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No. 10-20048 t h e Defendants' motions to dismiss. On appeal, Kastner argues that the district c o u r t erred in denying discovery, in denying him the opportunity to amend his c o m p la in t , and in holding the Defendants immune from suit. Finding no error, w e AFFIRM. F A C T U A L AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY Kastner's complaint alleges that his wallet, credit card, checks, and other it e m s were stolen and that he reported the theft to the Harris County Sheriff's D e p a r t m e n t the same day. Thereafter, the thief used one of Kastner's checks to p a y for purchases at a Kroger grocery store. After the check was returned for in su ffic ie n t funds, Kroger executed an affidavit stating that Kastner had written t h e check, that it had verified his signature, and that a notice of insufficient fu n d s had been sent to the address on the license. Based on this affidavit, a w a r r a n t was issued for Kastner's arrest. Harris County constables arrested Kastner for issuance of a bad check and d e t a in e d him in the county jail. Kastner alleges that during his arrest and d e t e n t io n , he suffered physical, emotional, and reputational damage based on h is arrest; strip search; being forced to wear dirty, used jail clothes; and from the u s e of the handcuffs. The next month, the case against Kastner was dismissed fo r insufficient evidence. B a s e d on these events, Kastner filed suit under Section 1983. Proceeding p r o se, he alleged civil rights violations arising from the Defendants' false arrest a n d imprisonment, negligence, and negligent supervision and training. Kastner a lle g e s that the Defendants failed to assure themselves that Kroger had c o m p li e d with the applicable statutory requisites before issuing the warrant. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 32.41. Specifically, he alleges that notice of the bad c h e c k was improper, and that he was not allowed sufficient time to make r e s t it u t io n to Kroger for the amount of the check as required by the statute. He

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No. 10-20048 a ls o alleges that the Defendants erred in not determining that the wallet and c h e c k s were stolen before issuing the warrant. T h e magistrate judge recommended granting the Defendants' motions to d is m is s and denying Kastner's motions to recuse, to proceed with discovery, for d e fa u lt judgment, and for sanctions. The district court adopted the magistrate ju d g e 's Memorandum and Recommendations and dismissed with prejudice. D IS C U S S IO N A. Dismissal Under Rule 12(b) (6) W e review a dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) de n o v o , applying the same standard as the district court. Davis v. Tarrant County, T e x ., 565 F.3d 213, 217 (5th Cir. 2009). We will affirm if the complaint alleges fa c t s which if accepted as true, "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its fa c e ." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). We construe pro s e pleadings liberally. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). 1. A b s o lu te Immunity

T h e district court concluded that Judge Lawrence and the three court c le r k s all had absolute immunity for their actions in this case. Generally, judges have absolute immunity from damage suits. Mireles v. W a c o , 502 U.S. 9, 9-10 (1991). Immunity applies even where the judge's action " w a s in error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of his authority." Stump v . Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356 (1978). Two narrow exceptions exist to this im m u n it y : (1) if the actions are not taken in the judge's judicial capacity, and (2) if judicial action is "taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction." Mireles, 5 0 2 U.S. at 11. Kastner argues that both exceptions are applicable here. I n determining whether actions were taken in a judge's judicial capacity, w e apply a four-factor test: (1 ) whether the precise act complained of is a normal judicial fu n c tio n ; (2) whether the acts occurred in the courtroom or appropriate adjunct 3

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No. 10-20048 s p a c e s such as the judge's chambers; (3) whether the controversy centered a r o u n d a case pending before the court; and (4) whether the acts arose directly o u t of a visit to the judge in his official capacity. M a lin a v. Gonzalez, 994 F.2d 1121, 1124 (5th Cir. 1993). We construe these fa c t o r s broadly in favor of immunity. Id. The challenged action involves the issuance of arrest warrants, which is within the judge's judicial activity. The acts occurred in or near courtroom We reject Kastner's

s p a c e , and involved a case pending before the court.

c o n t e n t io n that Judge Lawrence was acting not in his judicial capacity, but in a n "administrative, legislative, or executive" capacity. Davis, 565 F.3d at 221. Kastner argues that because no offense was committed and certain p r o c e d u r e s were not followed, the judge was somehow completely stripped of his ju r is d ic t io n . In considering the argument, we note that under Texas law, the o ffe n s e of issuance of a bad check is a Class C misdemeanor, punishable by fine o n ly . Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 32.41(f). Under the Texas Constitution and the T e x a s Code of Criminal Procedure, justice of the peace courts have subject m a t t e r jurisdiction over such crimes. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 4.11; T EX. CONST. art. V, § 19. Consequently, Judge Lawrence's action was not taken " in the complete absence of all jurisdiction." Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11. This absolute immunity also extends to the court clerks. As stated by the d is t r ic t court, the Texas court clerks have the power to perform the ministerial t a s k of issuing process at the judge's behest; they do not determine probable c a u s e for arrest. See Sharp v. State, 677 S.W.2d 513, 514 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984). This is the duty of the judge. Court clerks are immune from actions "for

d a m a g e s arising from acts they are specifically required to do under court order o r at a judge's discretion." Clay v. Allen, 242 F.3d 679, 682 (5th Cir. 2001) (c it a t io n and quotation marks omitted). Because the clerks issued the warrant

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No. 10-20048 a t the direction of the justice of the peace, they are also protected by absolute im m u n ity . 2. E le v e n th Amendment Immunity

T h e Eleventh Amendment bars suits against the states unless the state h a s specifically waived its immunity or Congress has abrogated state immunity. Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66 (1989). Judge Lawrence n a m e d in his official capacity is also immune under the same principles. Davis, 5 6 5 F.3d at 228. K a s t n e r argues that the State of Texas has waived its immunity with the T e x a s Tort Claims Act. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §§ 101.021, 1 0 4 .0 0 2 . However, under Texas law, the waiver of immunity does not apply to a n y claim "based on an act or omission of a court of this state or any member of a court of this state acting in his official capacity or to a judicial function of a g o v e r n m e n t a l unit." Id. § 101.053(a). Therefore, the State has not waived im m u n it y , and dismissal of these claims was proper. 3. C la im s Against the County

H a r r is County can be liable under Section 1983 "only for acts that are d ir e c t ly attributable to it through some official action or imprimatur." James v. H a r r is County, 577 F.3d 612, 617 (5th Cir. 2009) (citation and quotation marks o m it t e d ). A plaintiff must show "in addition to a constitutional violation, that a n official policy promulgated by the municipality's policymaker was the moving fo r c e behind, or actual cause of, the constitutional injury." Id. That policy must b e unconstitutional or adopted "with deliberate indifference to the known or o b v io u s fact that such constitutional violations would result." Id. (citation and q u o t a t io n marks omitted). K a s t n e r alleges that there was an official policy of not properly issuing w a r r a n ts , and that the policy directly resulted in violations of his constitutional r ig h t s . He argues that the officials were not properly trained or supervised in 5

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No. 10-20048 h o w they issue warrants. However, "[a] local judge acting in his or her judicial c a p a c it y is not considered a local government official whose actions are a t t r ib u t a b le to the county." Krueger v. Remier, 66 F.3d 75, 77 (5th Cir. 1995) (c it a t io n s omitted). Kastner has not shown that the judge's "edicts or acts may fa ir ly be said to represent official policy." Monell v. Dep't of Social Servs. of the C ity of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). B. D e n ia l of Discovery T h e magistrate judge denied discovery until after the motions to dismiss w e r e heard. After granting the Defendants' motions to dismiss, the magistrate ju d g e recommended that Kastner's motion to proceed with discovery be denied. Kastner argues that this ruling was in error because it did not enable him to o b ta in evidence sufficient to defeat the Rule 12(b)(6) motion. " O n e of the purposes of immunity, absolute or qualified, is to spare a d e fe n d a n t not only unwarranted liability, but unwarranted demands

c u s t o m a r ily imposed upon those defending a long drawn out lawsuit." Siegert v . Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 232 (1991). In the context of qualified immunity, we have h e ld that even limited discovery on the issue of immunity is not appropriate u n t il the district court first determines that "the plaintiff's pleadings assert fa c t s , which, if true, would overcome the defense." Vander Zee v. Reno, 73 F.3d 1 3 6 5 , 1368-69 (5th Cir. 1996) (citation and quotation marks omitted). As previously noted, the exceptions to the absolute immunity protecting t h e judge and clerks in their individual capacities are very narrow. Mireles, 502 U .S . at 11-12. Kastner does not indicate that additional discovery would lead to e v id e n c e which would defeat the immunity of the state, Judge Lawrence, and the c o u n t y clerks. Kastner alleges that discovery would lead to evidence showing a policy or c u s t o m giving rise to liability for the county. However, the judge's judicial a c t io n s cannot be attributed to the county. See Krueger, 66 F.3d at 77. Kastner's 6

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No. 10-20048 a lle g a t io n s do not indicate any policy or custom of the county apart from the a c t io n s and directions of the judge and those acting at his direction. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying discovery. C. Denial of Leave to Amend K a s t n e r contends that the district court erred in not allowing him to a m e n d his complaint. The request to amend was made for the first time in his o b je c t io n s to the magistrate's Memorandum and Recommendations. Generally, a pro se litigant should be offered an opportunity to amend his c o m p la in t before it is dismissed with prejudice. Bazrowx v. Scott, 136 F.3d 1053, 1 0 5 4 (5th Cir. 1998). However, granting leave to amend is not required where t h e plaintiff has already pled his "best case." Id. W e are convinced that Kastner already pled his best case. He has given n o indication of what material facts he would include in an amended complaint. See Brewster v. Dretke, 587 F.3d 764, 768 (5th Cir. 2009). Accordingly, we c o n c lu d e that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying leave to am end. D. Motions to Recuse T h e district court denied Kastner's motions to recuse the magistrate and d is t r ic t judges. We review a denial of a motion to recuse for abuse of discretion. Andrade v. Chojnacki, 338 F.3d 448, 454 (5th Cir. 2003). "Any justice, judge, or magistrate judge of the United States shall d is q u a lify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably b e questioned." 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). Kastner correctly states that a judge should r e c u s e himself when a reasonable person, with knowledge of the circumstances, w o u ld question the judge's impartiality. See Republic of Panama v. Am. Tobacco C o ., Inc., 265 F.3d 299, 302 (5th Cir. 2001). However, we disagree with his c o n c lu s io n that a reasonable person would question the judges' impartiality in t h is case. 7

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No. 10-20048 " [J ]u d ic ia l rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basis for a bias or p a r tia lit y motion." Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994). Where the g r o u n d s for recusal arise solely in the course of the judicial proceedings, judicial r u lin g s will only "in the rarest circumstances evidence the degree of favoritism o r antagonism required." Id. Kastner has not shown any favoritism or

a n t a g o n is m on the part of the district court or magistrate judge, but merely e x p r e s s e s disagreement with specific rulings by the court on motions and routine c a s e management matters. There has been no abuse of discretion. A F F IR M E D .

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