Joyrell Godfrey v. Katy Independent School Dist

Filing

UNPUBLISHED OPINION FILED. [10-20208 Affirmed] Judge: PEH , Judge: JES , Judge: CH. Mandate pull date is 10/04/2010 [10-20208]

Joyrell Godfrey v. Katy Independent School Dist

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IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS United States Court of Appeals FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT Fifth Circuit FILED
N o . 10-20208 S u m m a r y Calendar September 13, 2010 Lyle W. Cayce Clerk

J O Y R E L L R. GODFREY, Plaintiff - Appellant v. K A T Y INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT Defendant - Appellee

A p p e a l from the United States District Court fo r the Southern District of Texas U S D C No. 4:08-CV-2433

B e fo r e HIGGINBOTHAM, SMITH, and HAYNES, Circuit Judges. P E R CURIAM:* J o y r e ll R. Godfrey filed suit against Katy Independent School District (" K I S D " ) after KISD failed to hire Godfrey as a history teacher in the fall of 2 0 0 7 . Godfrey raised claims of race discrimination under Title VII of the Civil R ig h t s Act of 1964 ("Title VII") and age discrimination under the Age D is c r im in a t io n in Employment Act of 1967 ("ADEA"), along with claims under 4 2 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983 and punitive damages. Godfrey's claims under § 1 9 8 1 and for punitive damages were dismissed from the case and not briefed on
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
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No. 10-20208 a p p e a l.1 The district court adopted the magistrate judge's Memorandum and R e c o m m e n d a t io n and granted KISD's motion for summary judgment on all r e m a in in g claims. We agree and AFFIRM the district court's order. I. G o d f r e y worked as a substitute teacher for KISD from 2003 to 2007. In A u g u s t 2003, she submitted a paper employment application to KISD that noted h e r race and age. Godfrey provided semi-regular updates to this application t h r o u g h o u t the years to indicate her continued interest in full-time employment. D u r i n g the fall of 2007, Godfrey applied for three full-time history teaching p o s i t io n s that are the subject of this appeal: 1) Morton Ranch High School, 2) S e v e n Lakes High School, and 3) Mayde Creek High School. Godfrey's 2007 a p p lic a t io n materials contained no information regarding her age or race, and t h e r e is no evidence that the hiring decision makers reviewed her 2003 a p p lic a t io n in relation to these positions. Instead of hiring Godfrey, Morton Ranch transferred Anthony Sheppard, a black male, into the history teaching position. Sheppard was already employed b y the school as an in-school suspension teacher. Moreover, he had previously d e fe r r e d an offer to teach history at Morton Ranch due to medical issues, which w e r e resolved by August 2007. Lastly, Sheppard was also hired to serve as an a s s is t a n t football coach. K I S D hired Taylor Hardy, a white female, to fill the history teaching p o s it io n at Seven Lakes. In addition to teaching duties, Hardy expressed an in t e r e s t in coaching tennis and working with the student council.

As a result, these issues are considered waived. See In re Tex. Mortgage Servs. Corp., 761 F.2d 1068, 1073 (5th Cir. 1985).

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No. 10-20208 A t Mayde Creek, KISD hired Michael White, a white male, to teach world h is t o r y . White had previously worked for the school as a substitute teacher, and t h e administration believed he would be a good fit for a full-time position based o n their prior experiences with him. Further, White was scheduled to receive his c o m p o s it e social studies certificate, which would allow him to teach social s t u d ie s courses in addition to history.2 N o n e of the hiring principals specifically remembered Godfrey applying for t h e above positions. Godfrey asserts that she met the Morton Ranch and Mayde C r e e k principals at job fairs. She also states that she spoke with the Seven L a k e s principal by phone. II. W e review a grant of summary judgment using the same standard of r e v ie w as the district court.3 Summary judgment is proper if there is "`no

g e n u in e issue as to any material fact'" and the moving party is entitled to a ju d g m e n t as a matter of law.4 We review questions of law de novo.5 In our r e v i e w , we consider all evidence "in the light most favorable to the party r e s is t in g the motion." 6 However, the party opposing the motion "cannot

e s t a b lis h a genuine issue of material fact by resting on the mere allegations of
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According to documents submitted by Godfrey and cited by KISD in its appellate brief, White received his Composite Social Studies Certification six days after his hire date. (Appellee Br. 35.)
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Dorsett v. Bd. of Trs. for State Colls. & Univs., 940 F.2d 121, 123 (5th Cir. 1991).

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552 (1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. Pro. Rule 56(c)).
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Lowery v. Ill. Cent. Gulf R.R. Co., 891 F.2d 1187, 1190 (5th Cir. 1990). Trevino v. Celanese Corp., 701 F.2d 397, 407 (5th Cir. 1983).

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No. 10-20208 t h e pleadings." 7 A. T itle VII prohibits employers from discriminating based on an individual's r a c e , color, religion, sex, or national origin.8 Absent direct evidence of

d is c r im in a t o r y intent, as is the case here, the Supreme Court has established a b u r d e n -s h iftin g framework for proof of discrimination via circumstantial e v id e n c e .9 Under this framework, the complainant carries the initial burden to e s t a b lis h a prima facie case of discrimination. Next, the employer must

a r t ic u la t e a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its action.1 0 Then, the c o m p la in a n t has an opportunity to show that the employer's reasons were mere p r e t e x t and "a coverup for a . . . discriminatory decision."1 1 While a showing of p r e t e x t does not automatically entitle an employee to judgment, it often will lead t o an inference of discrimination.1 2 T h e ADEA prohibits employers from discriminating because of an e m p lo y e e 's age. In contrast to Title VII analysis, the Supreme Court recently h e ld that under the ADEA the burden of persuasion never shifts to a party

Russell v. Harrison, 736 F.2d 283, 287 (5th Cir. 1984); see Reese v. Anderson, 926 F.2d 494, 498 (5th Cir. 1991).
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42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green Richard Ellis, Inc., 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).

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Note that the employer's burden is "only one of production, not persuasion, involving no credibility assessments." Russell v. McKinney Hosp. Venture, 235 F.3d 219, 222 (5th Cir. 2000).
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McDonnell, 411 U.S. at 805.

See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 120 S.Ct. 2097 (2000); Russell, 235 F.3d at 223.

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No. 10-20208 d e fe n d in g a mixed-motives discrimination claim.1 3 Instead, the plaintiff retains t h e burden to establish that age was the "but-for" cause of the employment's a c t io n . Here, Godfrey provides no evidence to support a claim that she would h a v e been hired but for her age.1 4 M c D o n n e ll created four elements needed for the plaintiff to establish her p r im a facie case.1 5 The district court found that Godfrey satisfied these elements fo r the Title VII claim. For purposes of the summary judgment appeal, we also a s s u m e Godfrey met her burden to establish a prima facie case.

B. U n d e r McDonnell, the burden then shifts to KISD to articulate n o n d i s c r i m in a t o r y reasons for not hiring Godfrey.1 6 KISD asserts that: 1) the r e le v a n t decision makers had no knowledge of Godfrey's race or age, and 2)

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Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc., 129 S.Ct. 2343 (2009).

The magistrate followed the McDonnell framework for the ADEA claim. She concluded that Godfrey had not established her prima facie case for age discrimination because handwritten notes on personnel records were insufficient evidence to demonstrate the ages of persons hired for the three history positions. Godfrey contends that this evidence was provided and verified by KISD. Even if this evidence is permissible to indicate the ages of the hired teachers, Godfrey does not provide evidence to show that age was the but for cause in the hiring decision. Further, the magistrate's memorandum proceeded in analysis as though Godfrey had met her burden for a McDonnell prima facie case and still found the evidence supported a grant of summary judgment. We agree. Generally, these factors are: 1) plaintiff is a member of a protected class; 2) she applied and was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; 3) she suffered adverse employment action; and 4) after her rejection, the position remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons with complainant's qualifications. McDonnell, 411 U.S. at 802.; see also Okoye v. Univ. of Tex. Houston Health Sci. Ctr., 245 F.3d 507, 512-13 (5th Cir. 2001) (addressing a racial discrimination claim).
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McDonnell, 411 U.S. at 802.

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No. 10-20208 K I S D filled the positions at issue with applicants who were better qualified than G o d r e y . We find KISD's evidence persuasive that its hiring decision makers did n o t know or recall Godfrey's age or race. However, we need not rely on this a s s e s s m e n t to affirm the summary judgment. E v e n if the school principals knew Godfrey's age and race while making h ir in g decisions, KISD offered a legitimate reason for not hiring Godfrey based o n unique teacher qualifications. Godfrey does not produce evidence that

d e m o n s t r a t e s this justification was pretext for discriminatory behavior. I n two of the three hirings, the school in question hired a teacher it had w o r k e d with previously. Anthony Sheppard was already employed by Morton R a n c h and simply reassigned to history. Further, the fact that Sheppard was p r e v io u s ly offered the history teaching position demonstrates the school's early in t e r e s t in hiring him. Similarly, Mayde Creek had a positive work history with M ic h a e l White when he was a substitute teacher there. Our sister circuit has fo u n d that familiarity and prior successful work experiences with an applicant a r e legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for employment decisions.1 7 In a d d it io n , an employer has a right to value some attributes, such as prior work e x p e r ie n c e with the school, over others. As we have held, "the employer's

ju d g m e n t as to qualifications will not be probative of the issue of a d is c r im in a t o r y motive unless the qualifications are so widely disparate that no

McMillian v. Svetanoff, 878 F.2d 186, 189 (7th Cir. 1989) (noting that "[a]n employer, even a public employer . . . is free to choose among qualified candidates so long as that choice is not based on unlawful criteria") (citing Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 259, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1097 (1981)).

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No. 10-20208 r e a s o n a b le employer would have made the same decision."1 8 Here, a reasonable e m p lo y e r would consider past experiences with an applicant, particularly for a tea c h in g position where interpersonal relations with students, other faculty, and t h e administration may be critical to the teacher's success. S i m i la r ly , a reasonable principal would consider coaching needs when fillin g teaching positions. Both Seven Lakes and Morton Ranch hired teachers w it h experience in specific sports. Hiring a teacher based on a suitability for a c o a c h in g position is not racially discriminatory. T h e parties dispute whether or not the hired teachers had equal or better c e r t ific a t io n s than Godfrey. Godfrey states she was a "Highly Qualified" teacher u n d e r the No Child Left Behind Act1 9 with a Texas Standard Classroom Teacher C e r t ific a t io n in history and a Master Teacher Certification from Iowa. Even if G o d fr e y demonstrated she had equal or slightly more advanced teaching c e r t ific a t e s compared to other applicants, she has not established pretext. "In o r d e r to establish pretext by showing the losing candidate has superior q u a lific a t io n s , the losing candidate's qualifications must leap from the record a n d cry out to all who would listen that he was vastly­or even clearly­more q u a lifie d for the subject job."2 0 Godfrey's qualifications do not "leap from the r e c o r d " as clearly superior to any of the three teachers hired. Any differences in tea ch in g credentials were compensated by experience and interest in other areas

See Deines v. Tex. Dep't Protective & Regulatory Servs., 164 F.3d 277, 282 (5th Cir. 1999). Price v. Fed. Express Corp., 283 F.3d 715, 723 (5th Cir. 2002) (holding that "better education, work experience, and longer tenure with the company do not establish that [an applicant] is clearly better qualified").
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20 U.S.C. §§ 6301-6578. Price, 283 F.3d at 723 (internal citations omitted).

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No. 10-20208 fo r which the schools needed faculty, including coaching and student activity s u p e r v is io n . III. W e hold that Godfrey has failed to disprove KISD's legitimate, n o n d is c r im in a t o r y explanation that other applicants were better suited to the s c h o o ls ' needs than Godfrey. She has not presented evidence of pretext for d is c r im in a t io n , nor has she shown that her race or age were motivating factors in KISD's hiring decisions. T h e summary judgment test for racial discrimination claims under § 1983 is the same as the Title VII test.2 1 For the reasons outlined above and in the m a g is tr a t e 's memorandum, we agree with the district court's decision. T h e r e fo r e , the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

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Patel v. Midland Memorial Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 298 F.3d 333, 342 (5th Cir. 2002).

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