William Brown, Jr. v. Harris County, Texas, et al

Filing

UNPUBLISHED OPINION FILED. [10-20213 Affirmed] Judge: PEH , Judge: JES , Judge: ECP. Mandate pull date is 01/05/2011 [10-20213]

William Brown, Jr. v.Case: County, Texas, et al Harris 10-20213 Document: 00511322521

Page: 1 Date Filed: 12/15/2010

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IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS United States Court of Appeals FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT Fifth Circuit FILED
December 15, 2010 N o . 10-20213 S u m m a r y Calendar Lyle W. Cayce Clerk

W I L L I A M A. BROWN, P la in t iff ­ Appellant v. H A R R I S COUNTY, TEXAS, D e fe n d a n t ­ Appellee

A p p e a l from the United States District Court fo r the Southern District of Texas U S D C No. H-07-0644

B e fo r e HIGGINBOTHAM, SMITH, and PRADO, Circuit Judges. P E R CURIAM:* A fte r being charged with unlawful possession of a controlled substance and u n a b le to post bail, plaintiff-appellant William A. Brown was booked into the H a r r is County Jail at 1200 Baker Street in Houston, Texas. Brown was placed w it h approximately 70 other inmates in a general population cellblock known as t h e "6C2 dorm," which consists of a control center connected to a day room and

Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

*

Dockets.Justia.com

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No. 10-20213 s ix adjoining cells. Sitting in the control center, a deputy can observe the entire c e ll block except for a three-foot toilet area. B r o w n asserts that he was targeted by the other inmates because he was a "middle aged, clean-cut, well educated white male of medium build." On the m o r n in g of March 8, 2005, Brown told the deputy working in the control center, S a r a h Andrews, that he was having "problems" with the other inmates. Andrews responded by advising Brown to move his mattress into the day room, w h e r e he would be directly in her line of sight at all times. D e s p ite this precaution, Brown was attacked that afternoon in a p a r tic u la r ly brutal sexual assault. The assault took place shortly after Deputy A n d r e w s 's shift ended at 2:00 pm, and it apparently went unseen by the deputy w h o relieved her. Jail officials learned of the assault only upon finding Brown in ju r e d during a routine inmate check at approximately 2:30 pm. Although H a r r is County officials conducted a full investigation, they ultimately were u n a b le to identify the inmates responsible for the attack or to determine how the a t t a c k went unnoticed, in part because Brown's account of the attack was in c o n s is t e n t with the physical evidence that officials were able to collect. B r o w n subsequently brought this lawsuit alleging that jail officials v io la t e d his constitutional rights and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by failing to protect him fr o m attack by the other inmates. He also brings a claim under the Texas Tort C la i m s Act for "premises defects that posed an unreasonable risk of harm" b e c a u s e the jail was allegedly overcrowded and understaffed. The defendants n a m e d in the complaint include Harris County, the County sheriff, Deputy A n d r e w s , and several unidentified deputies. Brown's claims against the

in d iv id u a l defendants were dismissed for failure to make timely service, leaving

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No. 10-20213 o n ly the claims against the County. In a thorough opinion, the district court g r a n t e d summary judgment for the County. For the reasons below, we affirm. A s a pretrial detainee, Brown's constitutional claims arise under the Due P r o c e s s Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which--like the Eighth A m e n d m e n t -- p la c e s a duty on the State to protect against harm to persons in it s confinement.1 In a case alleging an "episodic act or omission" of a jail official, t h e plaintiff must show that the official acted with deliberative indifference to t h e detainee's rights.2 Deliberate indifference requires a showing of "subjective r e c k le s s n e s s as used in the criminal law," meaning that the official "knows of a n d disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must b o th be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a s u b s t a n t ia l risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference." 3 M o r e o v e r , to prevail on a claim against the County, Harris must show "a policy, c u s t o m , or rule (or lack thereof) of the [County] that permitted or caused the act o r omission."4 There must be a "direct causal link" establishing that "an official p o lic y promulgated by the [County's] policymaker was the moving force behind, o r actual cause of, the constitutional injury." 5 T h e district court correctly held that Brown has failed to show deliberate in d i f f e r e n c e by any jail official. Although Deputy Andrews was subjectively

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See Hare v. City of Corinth, 74 F.3d 633, 639 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc). Id. at 636 (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994)). Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837, 839­41. Scott v. Moore, 114 F.3d 51, 53 (5th Cir. 1997) (en banc). James v. Harris County, 577 F.3d 612, 617 (5th Cir. 2009).

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No. 10-20213 a w a r e that Brown faced a risk of harm from other inmates after he came to her w it h his concerns, a reasonable jury could not find that she was deliberately in d iffe r e n t because she responded appropriately by having Brown move his m a t t r e s s to the part of the cell where she could observe him best. Deputy A n d r e w s apparently either forgot or declined to relay Brown's concerns to the d e p u t y who relieved her, but even assuming that there was reason to do so--a q u e s t io n a b le assumption, given that Brown had expressed only a vague fear of " p r o b le m s " with other inmates and that Andrews did not observe anything u n u s u a l during her shift--this was at most simple negligence, not deliberate in d iffe r e n c e .6 A jury likewise could not find deliberate indifference by the deputy in the control room during the afternoon shift because Brown has offered no e v id e n c e that this deputy was subjectively aware of any threat of attack against B r o w n .7 T h e record further reflects that Harris County took significant steps to p r o t e c t inmate safety. 1200 Baker Street is a modern "In-Direct Observation" fa c ilit y , where deputies oversee inmates from control centers that present a d ir e c t line of sight to nearly the entire cellblock. Inmates who pose special risks o r face special threats due to their physical health, mental health, or sexuality
Deliberate indifference "is a degree of culpability beyond mere negligence or even gross negligence; it `must amount to an intentional choice, not merely negligent oversight.'" James, 577 F.3d at 617­18 (quoting Rhyne v. Henderson County, 973 F.2d 386, 392 (5th Cir. 1992)). We do not meant to condone what happened to Brown or to suggest that jail officials have no duty to protect the inmates in their custody from assault by other inmates. But maintaining safe and orderly prison is a difficult task, and even the most vigilant oversight may not be able to prevent every incident. We therefore allow claims against prison officials only if there is a clear and substantial showing of fault, as reflected by the deliberate indifference requirement. Whatever mistakes might have occurred in Brown's case, he has not offered evidence that can meet this very demanding legal standard.
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No. 10-20213 a re housed in separate cellblocks apart from the general population. Each report o f sexual assault results in a full investigation, which includes collection and t e s t in g of any DNA evidence. W e also agree with the district court that Brown has failed to offer e v id e n c e capable of showing that his assault was the product of any custom, p o lic y , or rule. Brown contends that Harris County had a custom of operating o v e r c r o w d e d jails, although much of his evidence is outdated and is not specific t o the facility where he was housed. Even if there were customary overcrowding a t 1200 Baker Street that policymakers purposefully chose to overlook, Brown h a s offered no competent evidence to show that sexual assault is a "known or o b v io u s consequence" of prison overcrowding or that overcrowding was the " m o v in g force" behind the assault he suffered.8 To the contrary, the record s h o w s that sexual assaults were not common at 1200 Baker Street. The jail had b e e n in operation for 26 months before Brown was assaulted, with an average d a ily population of approximately 3,000 to 3,200 inmates. During this time, t h e r e were only 31 reports of sexual assault, 21 of which were determined to be u n fo u n d e d and only two of which could be confirmed.9 None of the 31 prior r e p o r t s concerned any of the inmates housed in cellblock 6C2. This evidence d o e s not support Brown's claim that the size of the jail population routinely le a d s to sexual assaults. F in a lly , we affirm the district court's award of summary judgment to the C o u n ty on Brown's state-law premises liability claim, which contends that the la y o u t of the jail and the allegedly overcrowded conditions posed an

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James, 577 F.3d at 617. The remaining eight reports were still under investigation.

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No. 10-20213 u n r e a s o n a b le risk of harm. The Texas courts have held that sovereign immunity b a r s such claims unless the inmate can prove that a defect was the proximate c a u s e of the assault.1 0 As we have discussed, Brown has not presented evidence t h a t would allow a reasonable jury to find a causal link between the alleged d e fe c t s and the sexual assault. F o r the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is A F F IR M E D .

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See, e.g., Bonham v. Tex. Dep't of Crim. Justice, 101 S.W.3d 153 (Tex. Ct. App. 2003).

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