Jasmine Winston v. City of Shreveport, et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS United States Court of Appeals FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT Fifth Circuit FILED
August 12, 2010 N o . 10-30012 S u m m a r y Calendar Lyle W. Cayce Clerk

J A S M I N E M. WINSTON, P la in t if f ­ A p p e lla n t v. C I T Y OF SHREVEPORT; MIKE VANSANT; D. R. SAWYER, Corporal; W. J. W I L L I S , Officer, D e fe n d a n t s ­ A p p e lle e s

A p p e a l from the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana U S D C No. 5:08-cv-00111

B e fo r e BENAVIDES, PRADO, and SOUTHWICK, Circuit Judges. P E R CURIAM:* J a s m in e M. Winston appeals the district court's grant of summary ju d g m e n t in favor of Officer W. J. Willis and former Interim Chief of Police Mike V a n s a n t on her § 1983 claim for false arrest, supervisory liability, and related s t a t e torts. The district court found that qualified immunity shielded Officer W illis because he acted reasonably under the circumstances, and that Winston

Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

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No. 10-30012 h a d failed to demonstrate that Chief Vansant had either failed to train or s u p e r v is e his officers, or had acted with deliberate indifference in allegedly fa ilin g to train or supervise them. On appeal, Winston argues that (1) no reasonable officer could have b e lie v e d there existed probable cause to arrest her for any of her charged crimes, a n d thus Officer Willis is not entitled to qualified immunity on her false arrest c la im ; (2) she has sufficiently demonstrated that Chief Vansant failed to train a n d supervise his subordinates, and this failure amounted to deliberate in d iffe r e n c e ; and (3) because the district court erred when it granted summary ju d g m e n t as to her federal claims, it also erred in doing so with regard to her p e n d e n t state claims for false imprisonment, excessive force, and vicarious lia b ilit y . Because we agree with the district court that (1) qualified immunity s h ie ld s Officer Willis, (2) Winston failed to demonstrate that Chief Vansant was d e lib e r a t e ly indifferent, and (3) these conclusions suffice to defeat Winston's s t a t e tort claims as a matter of law, we affirm the district court's grant of s u m m a r y judgment. I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND I n January 2007, Shreveport police officers, including Officer Willis and C o r p o r a l D.R. Sawyer, responded to a request to assist with crowd control of a r io t type situation at a local downtown nightclub known as "Club Ice." Approximately 1,500 people were inside the club attending a concert, and an a d d it io n a l 500 gathered outside. Based on the large number of people,

d is p a t c h e r s requested that all available officers from all four areas of Shreveport r e s p o n d . Between twenty and forty uniformed, undercover, and off-duty officers a s s is t e d to keep several disturbances in the crowd from erupting into violence. A Shreveport fire investigator determined that Club Ice's occupancy had e x c e e d e d its capacity, and the officers were instructed to prevent anyone from e n te r i n g the club. In response, the officers issued commands to the crowd to 2

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No. 10-30012 d is p e r s e , both verbally and over patrol car PA systems. The commands

c o n t in u e d for approximately thirty minutes, and at times, the officers physically p u s h e d people away from the entrance of the building. After some time had p a s s e d , part of the crowd had dispersed, but approximately 150­200 people r e m a in e d outside the club. A fte r Officer Willis had been present at the club for about a half-hour, W in s t o n , who had previously been drinking at a night club next door, attempted t o gain entrance to Club Ice through a side door. Officer Willis watched as W in s t o n tried to maneuver around another, unidentified police officer. Officer W illis then stepped between Winston and the unidentified officer, using his b a to n to push Winston away from the club. A c c o r d in g to Officer Willis and Corporal Sawyer, Winston struck Officer W illis twice: once in the jaw, and again on top of his head. Winston alleges that s h e simply flailed her arms as she lost her balance and did not mean to strike O ffic e r Willis, but concedes that the officers could have construed this as an a t t a c k . Corporal Sawyer responded by grabbing Winston around the shoulder a r e a and forcing her to the ground, where she struck her face on the sidewalk, in ju r in g her lips and teeth. The officers then arrested Winston and removed her f r o m the scene, and she was subsequently charged with refusal to disperse, r e s is t in g arrest, and battery on a police officer. W in s t o n filed suit, alleging false arrest and excessive use of force claims a g a in s t Officer Willis and Corporal Sawyer; Monell claims for unlawful policies a n d practices, which allegedly caused or contributed to her injuries, against the C it y of Shreveport, the Shreveport Police Department, and Chief Vansant; and p e n d e n t state law claims based on direct and vicarious liability. The defendants c o lle c t iv e ly moved for summary judgment, asserting that Corporal Sawyer and O ffic e r Willis were shielded by qualified immunity and that Winston produced n o evidence to support a Monell claim. 3

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No. 10-30012 S h o r t ly thereafter, Corporal Sawyer and the City of Shreveport made an o ffe r of judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68,1 which W in s t o n accepted. Based on the offer, the district court entered an order of p a r tia l judgement against the City of Shreveport and Corporal Sawyer. This d is p o s it io n provided that Winston's only remaining claims were against Officer W illis for false arrest and excessive use of force, and against the Shreveport P o lic e Department and Chief Vansant for supervisory liability. T h e district court then granted summary judgment in favor of Officer W illis , the Shreveport Police Department, and Chief Vansant. As to Officer W illis , the district court found that (1) he had probable cause to arrest Winston fo r failure to disperse, and was thus entitled to qualified immunity on Winston's fa ls e arrest claim;2 and (2) Winston failed to raise a genuine issue of material fa c t as to whether Officer Willis used excessive force, and he was thus entitled t o qualified immunity on that claim as well.3 As to the Shreveport Police

D e p a r t m e n t and Chief Vansant, the district court found the record entirely d e v o id of evidence demonstrating failure to train, supervise, or discipline Officer W illis , and that any alleged failure did not amount to deliberate indifference. Finally, the district court found that because Officer Willis acted reasonably

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Rule 68 provides that:

At least 14 days before the date set for trial, a party defending against a claim may serve on an opposing party an offer to allow judgment on specified terms, with the costs then accrued. If, within 14 days after being served, the opposing party serves written notice accepting the offer, either party may then file the offer and notice of acceptance, plus proof of service. The clerk must then enter judgment. Finding that Officer Willis had probable cause to arrest Winston for failure to disperse, the district court did not squarely address whether he had probable cause to arrest Winston for the other violations, although it opined, in a footnote, that he probably had probable cause to arrest her for battery on a police officer as well.
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On appeal, Winston no longer argues that Officer Willis used excessive force.

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No. 10-30012 u n d e r the circumstances, Winston's state law claims for direct and vicarious lia b ilit y failed. Winston timely appealed.4 I I . STANDARD OF REVIEW " W e review the district court's grant of summary judgment de novo, a p p l y i n g the same standard as the district court." Chaney v. Dreyfus Serv. C o r p ., 595 F.3d 219, 228­29 (5th Cir. 2010) (citing Golden Bridge Tech., Inc. v. M o to r o la , Inc., 547 F.3d 266, 270 (5th Cir. 2008)). Summary judgment is

a p p r o p r ia te "if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and a n y affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and t h a t the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). "Factual controversies are construed in the light most favorable to the n o n m o v a n t , but only if both parties have introduced evidence showing that an a c t u a l controversy exists." Lynch Props., Inc. v. Potomac Ins. Co. of Ill., 140 F.3d 6 2 2 , 625 (5th Cir. 1998) (citing Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th C ir . 1994) (en banc)). I I I . ANALYSIS O n appeal Winston advances several arguments. First, she contends that n o reasonable law enforcement officer would have, or could have, believed that t h e r e was probable cause to arrest her, and therefore the district court erred by fin d in g Officer Willis entitled to qualified immunity on her false arrest claim. Next, she argues that she offered sufficient evidence to survive summary ju d g m e n t on her supervisory liability claim against Chief Vansant. Finally, she a lle g e s that the district court erred when it dismissed her state law claims. We a d d r e s s each argument in turn.

This Court granted the Shreveport Police Department's unopposed motion for dismissal. The only remaining parties to this appeal are Officer Willis and Chief Vansant.

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No. 10-30012 A. F a ls e Arrest Claim against Officer Willis Q u a lifie d immunity protects government officials "from liability for civil d a m a g e s insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory o r constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808, 815 (2009) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 4 5 7 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). In order to determine whether qualified immunity s h ie ld s an official, the Supreme Court, in Saucier v. Katz, mandated a two-step a n a ly s is , in which a court must determine whether "the facts alleged show the o ffic e r 's conduct violated a constitutional right." 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). A c o u r t must also ask "whether the right at issue was `clearly established' at the t i m e of defendant's alleged misconduct." Pearson, 129 S. Ct. at 816 (citing S a u c ie r , 533 U.S. at 201). The Supreme Court has recently held that "[t]he ju d g e s of the district courts and the courts of appeals should be permitted to e x e r c is e their sound discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the q u a lifie d immunity analysis should be addressed first in light of the c ir c u m s t a n c e s in the particular case at hand." Id. at 818. The second step involves a determination of whether "the conduct was o b je c t iv e ly reasonable in light of clearly established law at the time that the c h a lle n g e d conduct occurred," and that "[t]he touchstone of this inquiry is w h e t h e r a reasonable person would have believed that his conduct conformed to t h e constitutional standard in light of the information available to him and the c le a r ly established law." Glenn v. City of Tyler, 242 F.3d 307, 312 (5th Cir. 2001) (c it a t io n s omitted) "This means that `[e]ven law enforcement officials who

r e a s o n a b ly but mistakenly [commit a constitutional violation] are entitled to im m u n it y .'" Id. (quoting Goodson v. Corpus Christi, 202 F.3d 730, 736 (5th Cir. 2 0 0 0 ) (alteration in original)). Because "[t]he constitutional claim of false arrest requires a showing of no p r o b a b le cause," Club Retro L.L.C. v. Hilton, 568 F.3d 181, 204 (5th Cir. 2009) 6

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No. 10-30012 (c it a t io n omitted), Officer Willis is entitled to qualified immunity "if officers of r e a s o n a b le competence could disagree" that Officer Willis had probable cause to a r r e s t Winston for any of the crimes for which she was charged. See Babb v. D o r m a n , 33 F.3d 472, 477 (5th Cir. 1994) (citation and internal quotation marks o m it t e d ). The Supreme Court has defined probable cause as the "facts and c ir c u m s t a n c e s within the officer's knowledge that are sufficient to warrant a p r u d e n t person, or one of reasonable caution, in believing, in the circumstances s h o w n , that the suspect has committed, is committing, or is about to commit an o ffe n s e ." Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 37 (1979) (citations omitted). Furthermore, this Court has stated that probable cause "does not demand any s h o w in g that [the belief that an offense was committed] be correct or more likely t r u e than false," because "the probable cause analysis only requires that we find a basis for an officer to believe to a `fair probability' that a violation occurred." Piazza v. Mayne, 217 F.3d 239, 246 (5th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted) (alteration in original). T h e district court correctly found that if Officer Willis had probable cause t o arrest Winston for any charge, it did not need to examine whether probable c a u s e existed for the additional charges. See Wells v. Bonner, 45 F.3d 90, 95 (5th C ir . 1995) ("The claim for false arrest does not cast its primary focus on the v a lid it y of each individual charge; instead, we focus on the validity of the arrest. If there was probable cause for any of the charges . . . then the arrest was s u p p o r t e d by probable cause, and the claim for false arrest fails."). Of the three c h a r g e s lodged against Winston--refusal to disperse, resisting arrest, and b a tt e r y on a police officer--the district court only decided that Officer Willis had p r o b a b le cause to arrest Winston for failure to disperse. With regard to that c h a r g e , Louisiana Revised Statute § 14:329.3 provides that: Any law enforcement or peace officer or public official responsible fo r keeping the peace may issue a command to disperse under the

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No. 10-30012 a u t h o r it y of R.S. 14:329.1-14:329.8 if he reasonably believes that r io t is occurring or about to occur. The command to disperse shall b e given in a manner reasonably calculated to be communicated to t h e assemblage. W h o e v e r willfully fails to comply with a lawful command to disperse s h a ll be punished in accordance with the provisions of R.S. 14:329.7. L o u is ia n a Revised Statute § 14:329.1, in turn, defines a "riot" as: [A ] public disturbance involving an assemblage of three or more p e r s o n s acting together or in concert which by tumultuous and v io le n t conduct, or the imminent threat of tumultuous and violent c o n d u c t , results in injury or damage to persons or property or c r e a t e s a clear and present danger of injury or damage to persons or p rop erty . W in s t o n contends that no reasonable officer could have believed that a riot w a s occurring or about to occur at the time of the encounter, and that no r e a s o n a b le officer could believe that Winston had been given a lawful command t o disperse. Both the record and her own testimony, however, belie her

a r g u m e n t . Officer Willis responded to "riot type" conditions where up to forty o ffic e r s were trying to prevent a volatile situation involving approximately 500 p e o p le from escalating. When he arrived, officers were trying to dispel several d is t u r b a n c e s in the crowd and attempting to prevent others from commencing. Even after approximately 300 individuals from the crowd had dispersed, W in s t o n herself testified that at the time of her encounter with Officer Willis, t h e scene "kind of exploded," and officers were both screaming and in the process o f physcially detaining those around her. Based on these circumstances, the o ffic e r s were well within their authority to conclude that a riot, as defined by s e c t io n 14:329.1, was imminent, and could thus lawfully issue commands to d is p e r s e . A d d it i o n a lly , Winston stated in her deposition that she was aware that O ffic e r Willis directed her to move back, and that she did not do so. Under these c ir c u m s t a n c e s , Officer Willis reasonably believed that he had probable cause to 8

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No. 10-30012 a r r e s t Winston for failure to disperse. As such, he is entitled to qualified

im m u n it y on Winston's false arrest claim.5 B. S u p e r v i s o r y Liability Claim against Chief Vansant S u p e r v is o r y officials may not be held liable under § 1983 for the actions o f subordinates on theories of vicarious liability or respondeat superior. Estate o f Davis ex rel. McCully v. City of North Richland Hills, 406 F.3d 375, 381 (5th C ir . 2005). Instead, Winston must demonstrate that (1) Chief Vansant failed to s u p e r v is e or train his subordinate officials; (2) a causal link exists between the fa ilu r e to train or supervise and the violation of Winston's rights; and (3) the fa ilu r e to train or supervise amounted to deliberate indifference. Id. We have held, with respect to the third prong, that "`deliberate in d iffe r e n c e ' is a stringent standard of fault, requiring proof that a municipal a c t o r disregarded a known or obvious consequence of his action," and that "for a n official to act with deliberate indifference, the official must both be aware of fa c t s from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious h a r m exists, and he must also draw the inference." Id. (citations and internal q u o t a t io n marks omitted). Additionally, "[d]eliberate indifference requires a s h o w in g of more than negligence or even gross negligence," and "[t]o satisfy the d e lib e r a t e indifference prong, a plaintiff usually must demonstrate a pattern of v io la t io n s and that the inadequacy of the training is obvious and obviously likely t o result in a constitutional violation." Id. (citations and quotations marks o m itte d ). Here, Winston offered the testimony of an expert who opined that the t e c h n iq u e employed by Corporal Sawyer to throw Winston to the ground after

Because we hold that Officer Willis reasonably believed that he had probable cause to arrest Winston for failure to disperse and is thus entitled to qualified immunity, we do not address whether he reasonably believed that he had probable cause to arrest Winston for resisting arrest or battery on a police officer.

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No. 10-30012 s h e struck Officer Willis was unwarranted, and that if the Shreveport Police D e p a r t m e n t taught and Chief Vansant approved the technique, the system was fla w e d . Winston also offered the deposition testimony of Corporal Sawyer who a s s e r t e d that he believed that he used a proper technique because it was in a c c o r d a n c e with the technique taught to him at the Shreveport Police Academy. Based on this evidence, Winston contends that Chief Vansant should have p r o p e r ly supervised the officers, withdrawn the policy, and offered proper r e tr a in in g . W in s t o n , however, has failed to offer any additional evidence that would t ie Corporal Sawyer's activity with any alleged failure by Chief Vansant p e r s o n a lly to train, supervise, or discipline his officers. At no point does she a s s e r t that Chief Vansant trained Corporal Sawyer at the Academy, or im p le m e n te d , endorsed, advocated, or was even aware of his officers' use of the c h a lle n g e d technique. Likewise, she does not advance any evidence that Chief V a n s a n t was "aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a s u b s t a n t ia l risk of serious harm" existed should this technique continue to be u s e d , nor has she demonstrated that Chief Vansant, in fact, "dr[e]w the in fe r e n c e ." Id. Additionally, Winston fails to demonstrate any "pattern of v io la t io n s " ; rather she offers her own sole incident with Corporal Sawyer. See id . Winston's failure to offer any proof of a pattern of violations demonstrates t h a t any alleged wrongdoing on the part of Chief Vansant could be characterized a s merely negligence, rather than the requisite deliberate indifference. As such, w e hold that the district court correctly found that Winston's § 1983 supervisory lia b ilit y claim against Chief Vansant fails as a matter of law. C. S ta te Law Claims U n d e r Louisiana law, we apply the same "reasonableness" standard to W in s t o n 's state law claims of false arrest and excessive force that we apply when a n a ly z in g whether qualified immunity shields Officer Willis against Winston's 10

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No. 10-30012 fe d e r a l constitutional claims. See Reneau v. City of New Orleans, No. Civ.A. 031 4 1 0 , 2004 WL 1497711, at *3­*4 (E.D. La. July 2, 2004) (citing Kyle v City of N e w Orleans, 353 So. 2d 969, 973 (La. 1977)). As discussed above, Officer Willis a c t e d reasonably throughout his encounter with Winston. We thus hold that W in s t o n 's state law claims for direct and vicarious liability fail as a matter of la w .6 I V . CONCLUSION B e c a u s e Officer Willis reasonably believed that he had probable cause to a r r e s t Winston for refusal to disperse, he is entitled to qualified immunity on W in s t o n 's false arrest claim. Additionally, because Winston has not

d e m o n s t r a t e d that Chief Vansant failed to adequately train Corporal Sawyer, o r that any alleged failure to train rose to the level of deliberate indifference, the d is t r ic t court correctly granted summary judgment in favor of Chief Vansant on W in s t o n 's supervisory liability claim. Finally, because Louisiana law adopts the s a m e "reasonableness" standard used in determining whether qualified im m u n it y applies, the district court correctly granted summary judgment in fa v o r of Officer Willis and Chief Vansant on Winston's state law claims for false a r r e s t , excessive force, and vicarious liability. We therefore affirm the district c o u r t's grant of summary judgment. A F F IR M E D .

Contrary to Winston's suggestion, the fact that the City of Shreveport and Corporal Sawyer extended an offer of judgment under Rule 68 does not impart liability to Chief Vansant or Officer Willis. Cf. Meadours v. Ermel, 483 F.3d 417, 422 (5th Cir. 2007) (holding that, in the qualified immunity context, each defendant's actions must be evaluated individually).

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