Antoinette Anderson v. Law Firm of Shorty, Dooley, et al

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Antoinette Anderson v. Law Firm of Shorty, Dooley, et al

Doc. 0

Case: 10-30032

Document: 00511216173

Page: 1

Date Filed: 08/26/2010

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS United States Court of Appeals FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT Fifth Circuit FILED
N o . 10-30032 S u m m a r y Calendar August 26, 2010 Lyle W. Cayce Clerk

A N T O I N E T T E ANDERSON, P la in t if f -A p p e lla n t v. L A W FIRM OF SHORTY, DOOLEY & HALL; MICHAEL J. HALL, In his c a p a c it y as staff attorney for the Law Firm of Shorty, Dooley & Hall; ENTERGY C O R P O R A T I O N ; LEILA D'AQUIN, In her capacity as staff of Entergy C o r p o r a t io n ; PAUL A. CASTANON, In his capacity as Assistant Secretary for E n t e r g y Services, Incorporated, a subsidiary of Entergy Corporation; NEW O R L E A N S CITY; DEREK MERCADEL, In his capacity as staff attorney for City o f New Orleans; ANTOINE P. TURNER, In his personal capacity; ALLSTATE I N S U R A N C E COMPANY; JAMES A. STAPP, In his capacity as staff attorney fo r Law Offices of Harold G. Toscano; LAW OFFICES OF HAROLD G. T O S C A N O ; MARCUS V. BROWN, In his capacity as staff attorney for Entergy C o r p o r a t io n , mistakenly named Marcus D. Brown, D e fe n d a n t s -A p p e lle e s

A p p e a l from the United States District Court fo r the Eastern District of Louisiana U S D C No. 2:09-CV-4160

B e fo r e WIENER, BARKSDALE, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges. P E R CURIAM:*

Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

*

Dockets.Justia.com

Case: 10-30032

Document: 00511216173 Page: 2 No. 10-30032

Date Filed: 08/26/2010

A n t o in e t t e Anderson, proceeding pro se, appeals the dismissal of her c la im s under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985, and Louisiana law. Defendants were p a r tic ip a n t s in Anderson's state court personal injury action, which sought d a m a g e s for injuries allegedly suffered in an automobile accident in New O r le a n s . Anderson asserts that the district court erred in refusing to allow her to a m e n d her complaint to add claims against state-court Judges Reese and Cates, w h o allegedly made rulings adverse to Anderson. Although judicial immunity d o e s not bar claims for injunctive or declaratory relief in civil rights actions, see H o llo w a y v. Walker, 765 F.2d 517, 525 (5th Cir. 1985), Anderson could not obtain t h e desired injunctive relief for either Judge, because federal courts have no a u t h o r it y to direct state courts or their judicial officers in the performance of t h e ir duties. See Moye v. Clerk, DeKalb County Superior Court, 474 F.2d 1275, 1 2 7 6 (5th Cir. 1973). Because amendment of the complaint would have been fu t ile , there was no reversible error. See Avatar Exploration, Inc. v. Chevron, U .S .A ., Inc., 933 F.2d 314, 321 (5th Cir. 1991). N e x t , Anderson contends that the district court erred in dismissing, p u r s u a n t to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), h e r § 1983 civil-rights claims against the Shorty, Dooley & Hall law firm, M ic h a e l J. Hall (an attorney with that firm), Allstate Insurance Company, A n t o in e P. Turner (Allstate's insured), the Law Offices of Harold G. Toscano and J a m e s A. Stapp (attorneys who represented Allstate), Entergy Corporation, Paul A . Castanon (an Assistant Secretary for Entergy Services, Inc., a subsidiary of E n t e r g y ) and Leila D'Aquin and Marcus V. Brown (attorneys who represented E n te r g y ). Anderson contends that these defendants were involved in a

c o n s p ir a c y with Judges Reese and Cates to prevent her from obtaining relief in h e r state court action. W e review a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal de novo, "accepting all well-pleaded fa c t s as true and viewing those facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs". 2

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Date Filed: 08/26/2010

D o r s e y v. Portfolio Equities, Inc., 540 F.3d 333, 338 (5th Cir. 2008) (quoting S to k e s v. Gann, 498 F.3d 483, 484 (5th Cir. 2007)). "Factual allegations must be e n o u g h to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Bell Atl. Corp. v. T w o m b ly , 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). T o state a claim pursuant to § 1983, a plaintiff must claim a violation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States and demonstrate t h a t the averred deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of s t a t e law. E.g., Randolph v. Cervantes, 130 F.3d 727, 730 (5th Cir. 1997). "Plaintiffs who assert conspiracy claims under civil rights statutes must plead t h e operative facts upon which their claim is based. Bald allegations that a c o n s p ir a c y existed are insufficient." Lynch v. Cannatella, 810 F.2d 1363,

1 3 6 9 -7 0 (5th Cir. 1987) (footnote omitted). A n d e r s o n has not shown error in the district court's Rule 12(b)(6) d is m is s a l of her § 1983 conspiracy claims against the defendants listed above. Her complaint merely makes conclusory allegations of a conspiracy involving the v a r io u s defendants listed above, and those allegations are insufficient "to raise a right to relief above the speculative level". Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.

Anderson also fails to demonstrate in her pleadings that the defendants who are p r iv a t e actors were acting under color of state law. See Randolph, 130 F.3d at 730. Further, to the extent that Anderson's complaint sets forth a constitutional c la im against the City of New Orleans (a defendant in the state court action) and D e r e k Mercadel (the city's counsel in that action) that was not coextensive with h e r inadequately pleaded conspiracy claim, Anderson has abandoned any such c la im by failing to raise it in her opening brief and by failing to challenge the d is t r ic t court's reasons for dismissing such claims. See Yohey v. Collins, 985 F .2 d 222, 225 (5th Cir. 1993); see also Brinkmann v. Dallas Cnty. Deputy Sheriff A b n e r , 813 F.2d 744, 748 (5th Cir. 1987).

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A n d e r s o n contends that she stated a claim under § 1985(3).

Section

1 9 8 5 (3 ), however, applies only to claims of racial or other class-based d is c r im in a t io n . See Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102 (1971). Anderson's c o m p la in t made no allegation that the defendants had discriminated against her o n such grounds. Accordingly, Anderson's complaint did not state a claim under § 1985(3), and there was no error in the district court's dismissal of such claims. See Griffin, 403 U.S. at 102. B e c a u s e all of Anderson's federal claims were properly dismissed, the d is t r ic t court did not err in declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over A n d e r s o n 's state law claims. See Batiste v. Island Records, Inc., 179 F.3d 217, 2 2 6 -2 7 (5th Cir. 1999); 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). The district court complied with a p p l i c a b le precedent by dismissing Anderson's state law claims without p r e ju d ic e . See Bass v. Parkwood Hosp., 180 F.3d 234, 246 (5th Cir. 1999). A n d e r s o n asserts that the district court erred by dismissing her claims a g a in s t the City Of New Orleans and Mercadel without providing notice. Generally it is improper for a district court to dismiss a pro se complaint without a ffo r d in g the plaintiff the opportunity to amend, Bazrowx v. Scott, 136 F.3d 1 0 5 3 , 1054 (5th Cir. 1998); but, after reviewing the record, including Anderson's filin g s in opposition to the motions to dismiss filed by other defendants, we are c o n v in c e d that Anderson had pleaded her best case. Accordingly, there was no r e v e r s ib le error. See id. at 1054; Jacquez v. Procunier, 801 F.2d 789, 793 (5th C ir . 1986). Finally, Anderson contends that the district court violated Federal Rule o f Civil Procedure 38 and abridged her rights under the Seventh Amendment by d is m is s in g her claims without a jury trial. Because a jury, as a trier of fact, has n o role with respect to dismissals for failure to state a claim, the district court d id not violate the above provisions. See Barrett v. Indep. Order of Foresters, 625 F .2 d 73, 75 (5th Cir. 1980). A F F IR M E D . 4