Michael Riley, Sr. v. Louisiana State Bar Assn, et al

Filing

UNPUBLISHED OPINION FILED. [10-30313 Affirmed ] Judge: CDK , Judge: FPB , Judge: JWE Mandate pull date is 10/07/2010 [10-30313]

Michael Riley, Sr. v. Louisiana State Bar Assn, et al

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Case: 10-30313

Document: 00511235208

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Date Filed: 09/16/2010

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS United States Court of Appeals FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT Fifth Circuit FILED
September 16, 2010 N o . 10-30313 S u m m a r y Calendar Lyle W. Cayce Clerk

M I C H A E L J. RILEY, SR., P la in t if f -A p p e lla n t , v. L O U I S I A N A STATE BAR ASSOCIATION; LOUISIANA ATTORNEY D I S C I P L I N A R Y BOARD; OFFICE OF DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL FOR T H E LOUISIANA ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY BOARD, Defendants-Appellees.

A p p e a l from the United States District Court fo r the Eastern District of Louisiana, USDC No. 2:09-CV-07710

B e fo r e KING, BENAVIDES, and ELROD, Circuit Judges. P E R CURIAM:* P la in t iff-A p p e lla n t Michael J. Riley appeals the district court's decision to d is m is s his claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. We agree with the d is t r ic t court that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine deprives the court of jurisdiction t o hear Riley's claims, and accordingly, we AFFIRM.

Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

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Case: 10-30313

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Date Filed: 09/16/2010

No. 10-30313 F ACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND W e begin by noting that this is not the first time Riley has asked this C o u r t to collaterally review a final judgment of the Louisiana Supreme Court. Riley was disbarred from the Louisiana State Bar in 1987. After twice s e e k in g readmission unsuccessfully, he sought readmission for the third time in 2003. On November 19, 2004, the Louisiana Supreme Court denied his Riley then sued the Louisiana State Bar

a p p lic a t io n for readmission.

A s s o c ia t io n ("LSBA") and the Louisiana Attorney Disciplinary Board ("LADB") in United States District Court, for the Eastern District of Louisiana in what b e c a m e Riley I. In Riley I, Riley claimed that he was denied readmission in v io la t io n of his civil rights, the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection C la u s e under the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court found, in part, that u n d e r the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction o v e r Riley's claims which amounted to nothing more than an impermissible c o lla t e r a l attack on the Louisiana Supreme Court's ruling denying Riley r e a d m is s io n to the Louisiana State Bar. Riley appealed the district court's d e c is io n in Riley I to this Court, and we affirmed the district court's dismissal for la c k of subject matter jurisdiction. See Riley v. Louisiana State Bar Ass'n, 214 F e d .A p p x . 456 (5th Cir. 2007). W e now find ourselves presented with Riley II. On June 17, 2009, Riley a g a in moved for readmission to the LSBA. On August 19, 2009, he received a le t t e r from the LADB's Office of Disciplinary Counsel ("ODC"), concerning a lle g a t io n s of misconduct from when Riley was employed by FEMA in 2006-07. The LADB then granted a stay of Riley's June 2009 readmission application, in o r d e r to pursue the disciplinary investigation concerning Riley's alleged m is c o n d u c t during his tenure with FEMA. On December 10, 2009, Riley received a notice of sworn statement demand fr o m the ODC. The next day, Riley filed an application for emergency writ, 2

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No. 10-30313 O b je c t io n , and Motion for Relief from the notice of sworn statement with the L o u is ia n a Supreme Court. On December 14, the Louisiana Supreme Court d e n ie d Riley's application for relief from the notice to give sworn statement. Two d a y s later, on December 16, Riley filed the instant action in federal district c o u r t, once again against the LSBA and LADB, asserting that the application of L o u is ia n a Supreme Court Rule XIX(6)(A) to him, as it applies to his conduct that h e deems "unrelated to the practice of law" following the termination of his m e m b e r s h ip , amounts to an unconstitutional denial of his First and Fourteenth A m e n d m e n t rights afforded by the U.S. Constitution and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1 9 8 5 , and 1988.1 O n February 3, 2010, the district court granted the Defendants' Motion to D is m is s for lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction. In doing so, the district court fo u n d that, just as this Court had already explained in Riley I, the R o o k e r -F e ld m a n doctrine applies to subsequent suits that are "inextricably in t e r t w in e d " with a final state court judgment­thus barring the district court's s u b j e c t matter jurisdiction over Riley's claims. The district court dismissed R ile y 's claims with prejudice, and the instant appeal followed. A N A L Y S IS " W e review a ruling on a Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lack o f subject matter jurisdiction de novo." Budget Prepay, Inc. v. AT&T Corp., 6 0 5 F.3d 273, 278 (5th Cir. 2010). "The party asserting jurisdiction bears the b u r d e n of proof." Id. W e note that in the three and one-half years since we issued our decision in Riley I, the law in this Circuit regarding the Rooker-Feldman doctrine has not

On December 30, 2009, Riley filed an Amended Complaint, challenging the issuance of a subpoena in the disciplinary investigation, and adding a claim under the Fourth Amendment.

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No. 10-30313 c h a n g e d , evolved, or dissipated.2 Thus, in Riley I, we explained that "[t]he R o o k e r -F e ld m a n doctrine directs that federal district courts lack jurisdiction to e n te r ta in collateral attacks on state court judgments." Riley I, 214 Fed.Appx. at 4 5 8 (citing Liedtke v. State Bar of Tex., 18 F.3d 315, 317 (5th Cir. 1994)). This is because "[c]onstitutional questions arising in state proceedings are to be r e s o lv e d by the state courts." Liedtke, 18 F.3d at 317. Our decision in Liedtke a d v is e s individuals like Riley that: [i]f a state trial court errs the judgment is not void, it is to be r e v ie w e d and corrected by the appropriate state appellate court. Thereafter, recourse at the federal level is limited solely to an a p p lic a t io n for a writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme C o u r t . The casting of a complaint in the form of a civil rights action ca n n ot circumvent this rule, as absent a specific delegation[,] federal d is t r ic t courts, as courts of original jurisdiction, lack appellate ju r is d ic t io n to review, modify, or nullify final orders of state courts. Id. (internal citations, quotation marks, and brackets omitted). Accordingly, if Riley feels that the Louisiana Supreme Court's decision not t o grant his emergency relief and enjoin the LSBA from completing their d is c ip lin a r y investigation constitutes a violation of his constitutional rights, R ile y 's recourse is with the United States Supreme Court­not the federal district c o u r t in the Eastern District of Louisiana. See id. Riley's "request for . . . in ju n c t iv e relief, stripped to essentials, is an attack on the judgment of the state d is t r ic t court. His . . . suit, which arises from the state proceeding, is

`in e x t r ic a b ly intertwined' with that judgment." Id. at 318 (citation omitted). Thus, for the same reasons we iterated in Riley I, we once again conclude t h a t "[u]nder Rooker-Feldman, the district court lacked jurisdiction over Riley's c la im s and properly dismissed his suit." Riley I, 214 Fed.Appx. at 459.

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine refers to the doctrine derived from two Supreme Court cases, see District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923).

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No. 10-30313 C O N C L U S IO N F o r the aforementioned reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district c o u r t.3

In affirming the district court, we also recognize the sagacity in Judge McNamara's warning to Riley "that if he files any further pleadings barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, his multiplication of proceedings may well be deemed `unreasonable' and `vexatious' to warrant the imposition of sanctions."

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