Danny Jefferson v. Public Safety and Corrections, et al

Filing

UNPUBLISHED OPINION FILED. [10-30618 Affirmed] Judge: WED , Judge: JES , Judge: LHS. Mandate pull date is 12/06/2010 [10-30618]

Danny Jefferson v. Public Safety and Corrections, et al 00511293982 Case: 10-30618 Document:

Page: 1 Date Filed: 11/15/2010

Doc. 0

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS United States Court of Appeals FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT Fifth Circuit FILED
November 15, 2010 N o . 10-30618 S u m m a r y Calendar Lyle W. Cayce Clerk

D A N N Y R. JEFFERSON, P la in t iff - Appellant v. L O U I S I A N A DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY AND CORRECTIONS, o n behalf of Probation & Parole Division; DANNY FULLER; DAVID W. C A G N O L A T T I, D e fe n d a n t s - Appellees

A p p e a l from the United States District Court fo r the Western District of Louisiana U S D C 3:09-CV-49

B e fo r e DAVIS, SMITH, and SOUTHWICK, Circuit Judges. P E R CURIAM:* D a n n y Jefferson, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court's order s e t t in g aside entry of default against the defendants. He argues the defendants s h o u ld not have been permitted to file a proposed answer while in default. Finding no error, we AFFIRM.

Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

*

Dockets.Justia.com

Case: 10-30618 Document: 00511293982 Page: 2 Date Filed: 11/15/2010

No. 10-30618 O n January 12, 2009, Jefferson filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against S t a te of Louisiana employees Danny Fuller and David Cagnolatti. Jefferson c la im e d the defendants violated his constitutional due process rights in a parole r e v o c a t io n hearing. dam ages. T h e defendants did not answer or otherwise respond. On February 26, 2 0 0 9 , Jefferson filed for entry of default. The clerk entered default the next day. The clerk's one-page "Notice of Entry of Default" included the following: "For the c o u r t to issue a default judgment under Fed.R.Civ.P. 55, a motion to that effect m u s t be filed by plaintiff. A delay of at least ten (10) days from the date of this n o tic e must elapse before issuance of a default judgment by the court under LR 5 5 .1 M&W." O n March 6, 2009, the State of Louisiana, on behalf of its employees, filed a motion to set aside the entry of default and a proposed answer. It attributed it s delay in answering the complaint to "inadvertent neglect" of counsel. Four d a y s later, Jefferson moved for default judgment. The district court granted the State's motion to set aside the entry of d e fa u lt . It found that the State had good cause for its untimely response, had n o t willfully failed to respond, and "took quick action to cure the default." The c o u r t also found that the State had a meritorious defense to Jefferson's suit, and t h a t Jefferson would not be prejudiced by setting aside the entry of default. After two earlier appeals to this court, which were dismissed, the district c o u r t granted summary judgment for defendants. This appeal followed. J e ffe r s o n 's primary argument is that the relevant procedural rule p r o h ib it s a party in default from filing a proposed answer. The cited rule states: " T h e court may set aside an entry of default for good cause, and it may set aside a default judgment under Rule 60(b)." Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(c). Jefferson has p o in te d to no other rule, case, or authority to support his argument. 2 He sought $4,022,000 in compensatory and punitive

Case: 10-30618 Document: 00511293982 Page: 3 Date Filed: 11/15/2010

No. 10-30618 R u le 55(c) makes no reference to a party's answer and cannot be read to p r o h ib it a party in default from filing a proposed answer. Id. A proposed a n s w e r can usefully detail the defaulting party's allegedly meritorious defenses. Those points will support the movant's argument that there is good cause to set a s id e the entry of default. Jefferson's claim of error is meritless. I n addition, Jefferson assumes he was automatically entitled to a default ju d g m e n t on the eleventh day after the clerk's entry of default. That is incorrect. T h e r e are two steps in the default judgment process ­ one for the clerk, and one fo r the court. The first step is entry of default. If the plaintiff files a sufficient a p p lic a t io n for entry of default, "the clerk must enter the party's default." Id. at 5 5 (a ) (emphasis added). The clerk did so here. T h e second step is consideration of a default judgment. Id. at 55(b). Because Jefferson's claim is a Section 1983 action with uncertain damages, the c o u r t could evaluate the proper amount of damages, "conduct hearings or make r e fe r r a ls [,]" or "investigate any other matter" as it saw fit. Id. at 55(b)(2). Entering a judgment based on the default is at the discretion of the court, which m e a n s Jefferson was not entitled to a default judgment simply because of the e a r lie r entry of a default. A defendant is entitled to file a motion to have either a n entry of default or even a default judgment set aside by showing "good cause." Id. at 55(c). The district court found that the State had shown good cause. W e review a court's order vacating an entry of default for an abuse of d is c r e t io n . Lacy v. Sitel Corp., 227 F.3d 290, 291-92 (5th Cir. 2000). Default ju d g m e n t s are "generally disfavored in the law and thus should not be granted o n the claim, without more, that the defendant had failed to meet a procedural t im e requirement." Id. at 292 (quotation marks and citation omitted). Nothing s u p p o r t s this default judgment other than the State's failure to meet the r e q u ir e m e n t of a timely answer. The district court accordingly did not abuse its d is c r e t io n in vacating the entry of default. 3

Case: 10-30618 Document: 00511293982 Page: 4 Date Filed: 11/15/2010

No. 10-30618 W e have just discussed the only argument fully addressed in Jefferson's b r ie f. Because Jefferson is proceeding pro se, however, we exercise our discretion t o address other arguments reasonably inferred from his brief. In re Texas Pig S ta n d s , Inc., 610 F.3d 937, 941 n.4 (5th Cir. 2010). J e ffe r s o n argues that the State's motion to set aside the entry of default a n d its proposed answer are "illegal" pleadings because counsel failed to attach a proposed order, thereby resulting in default judgment. See W.D. La. R. 7.4.1W. We note first that Jefferson himself filed a pleading with the same deficiency one m o n th prior to the State's pleadings in question. Additionally, as discussed a b o v e , the expiration of the 10-day waiting period would not have automatically r e s u lt e d in a $4 million default judgment. Regardless, while the State's

p le a d in g s were deemed deficient upon filing, the State soon corrected its error b y filing a proposed order. The district court then cautioned the State's attorney t o comply with the federal and local rules. The district court's resolution of this is s u e did not constitute error. A s a final matter, Jefferson complains that counsel for the State falsified t h e certificate of service for the motion to set aside the entry of default. This a r g u m e n t is based on the State's certificate of service referring to Jefferson with t h e wrong last name. Jefferson claims this was intentional, designed to ensure h e did not get the documents and thus hampering his ability to respond. This issue was addressed by the district court in its order of April 6, 2009. T h e court looked at Jefferson's filings in opposition to the State's motion, found t h a t he was aware of the State's motion, and therefore found any deficiency to b e harmless. The court declined to strike the motion or penalize the State. We r e v ie w the district court's decision on sanctions for an abuse of discretion. Whitehead v. Food Max of Miss., Inc., 332 F.3d 796, 803 (5th Cir. 2003). There w a s none. AFFIRMED.

4