James Farris, et al v. Union Pacific Railroad Co.

Filing 920100928

Opinion

Case: 10-50324

Document: 00511245374

Page: 1

Date Filed: 09/27/2010

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS United States Court of Appeals FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT Fifth Circuit FILED
September 27, 2010 N o . 10-50324 S u m m a r y Calendar Lyle W. Cayce Clerk

J A M E S H. FARRIS; SCOTT P. WATTS; ALLAN R. GASCH; SCOTT A. R O H A L ; MILO V. MARSHALL; WOODIE JOE JESSEE; V.G. S H A P O V A L O V ; MATTHEW R. MCCLOSKEY; JEREMY N. ROGERS; J I M M Y ESPINOZA; KIRK A. WOLFE; SAL SOSA; AUTRY P. CLIMER; R O B E R T T. BORDELON, P la in t iffs - Appellants v. U N IO N PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY, D e fe n d a n t - Appellee

A p p e a l from the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas U S D C No. 5:09-cv-130

B e fo r e HIGGINBOTHAM, SMITH, and HAYNES, Circuit Judges. P E R CURIAM:* T h e appellants, a group of locomotive engineers employed by Union Pacific R a ilr o a d Co. ("Union Pacific"), appeal from the district court's denial of their p e t it io n to set aside an arbitration award issued by the National Railroad

Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

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No. 10-50324 A d ju s t m e n t Board ("NRAB") pursuant to section 3 of the Railway Labor Act (R L A ), 45 U.S.C. § 153 (2006). We find no error in the district court's application o f its limited power to review NRAB awards to the undisputed facts of this case a n d therefore AFFIRM the denial of the petition. I . Facts & Procedural History T h e arbitration award that is the subject of the appellants' petition was t h e outgrowth of a seniority dispute resulting from the merger of Union Pacific w it h Southern Pacific Railroad Company ("Southern Pacific") in 1996. The u n d e r ly in g facts are not in dispute. T h e Surface Transportation Board ("STB"), a federal agency created by the I n t e r s ta t e Commerce Commission Termination Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-88, 1 0 9 Stat. 803, approved Union Pacific's application to merge with Southern P a c i f i c on August 12, 1996. As a condition of approving the merger, the STB r e q u ir e d the railroads to abide by the standard labor-union protections first im p o s e d in New York Dock Railway, 360 I.C.C. 60, aff'd sub nom. New York Dock R y . v. United States, 609 F.2d 83 (2d Cir. 1979). Pursuant to the New York Dock c o n d i t i o n s , Union Pacific was required to negotiate separate mergerim p le m e n tin g agreements ("MIAs") with the unions that represented its e m p l o y e e s at each geographic hub; until Union Pacific obtained an MIA at a p a r tic u la r hub, the New York Dock conditions required the two merged c o m p a n ie s to continue to operate as separate railroads with their unionized e m p lo y e e s covered by separate collective bargaining agreements ("CBAs"). Union Pacific's MIA for the San Antonio hub, where all the appellants worked, t o o k effect on June 1, 1999. T h e appellants worked as switchmen for Southern Pacific before the e ffe c t iv e date of the San Antonio MIA. They belonged to the United

T r a n s p o r t a t io n Union ("UTU") and were, until the effective date of the MIA, s u b je c t to UTU's CBA with Southern Pacific. 2

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No. 10-50324 I n December of 1997, Union Pacific offered its train and yard service e m p lo y e e s , including its switchmen, the opportunity to become Union Pacific e n g in e e r s . Union Pacific did not offer the appellants the opportunity to become e n g in e e r s at that time because the MIA was not yet in place and the New York D o c k rules required Union Pacific to treat Southern Pacific as a separate r a ilr o a d for labor purposes. Later, in May of 1999, Southern Pacific offered the a p p e lla n t s the same opportunity to become engineers for Southern Pacific. In r e s p o n s e , the appellants applied and were accepted as engineers. A fte r the MIA took effect, Union Pacific and Southern Pacific engineers w e r e merged into a single group with a single set of seniority rules. The

a p p e lla n t s took the position that they should be, under the several CBAs among S o u th e r n Pacific and Union Pacific and the switchmen's union and the e n g in e e r s ' union, granted seniority as against Union Pacific engineers based on t h e ir date of hire as switchmen rather than the date of their becoming engineers. The appellants reasoned in part that the unequal opportunity between pre-MIA U n io n Pacific switchmen and pre-MIA Southern Pacific switchmen to become e n g in e e r s required this result. Union Pacific, the surviving post-merger entity, d is a g re e d . T h e appellants exercised their rights under the RLA to seek arbitration b e fo r e the NRAB. After briefing and a hearing, the NRAB entered an

a r b it r a t io n award in favor of Union Pacific on May 23, 2008. The arbitration a w a r d concluded that Union Pacific had properly determined the appellants' s e n io r it y dates under the applicable CBAs and the MIA. T h e appellants timely filed a petition to set aside the NRAB arbitration a w a r d in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas as p e r m it t e d by the RLA. See 45 U.S.C. § 153(First)(q) (creating jurisdiction in the d is t r ic t courts to hear petitions to set aside NRAB award); see also § 153(First)(r) (s e t tin g two-year limitations period for such petitions). The parties filed cross3

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No. 10-50324 m o t io n s for summary judgment on a stipulated record. After carefully reciting t h e material facts, the highly deferential standard of review, and the applicable la w , the district court granted summary judgment for Union Pacific and denied t h e appellants' petition to set aside the arbitration award. A fte r entry of final judgment, the appellants timely appealed to this court. I I . Standard of Review W e review a grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same s t a n d a r d as the district court. Mitchell v. Cont'l Airlines, Inc., 481 F.3d 225, 230 (5 t h Cir. 2007). It is difficult to overstate the level of deference that federal c o u r ts must give to the NRAB's arbitration award. The statute creating

ju r is d ic t io n to entertain the appellant's petition in the federal courts permits the ju d ic ia r y to set aside an NRAB award if, and only if, (1) the NRAB has failed to c o m p ly with the requirements imposed on it by the RLA, (2) the NRAB exceeded it s statutory jurisdiction, (3) a member of the NRAB engaged in fraud or c o r r u p tio n . 45 U.S.C. § 153(First)(q); see also Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Sheehan, 4 3 9 U.S. 89, 93 (1978).1 In our review on these three points, we are also required t o regard the findings of the NRAB as "conclusive." § 153(First)(p). In

c o n s e q u e n c e , "the range of judicial review in [NRAB arbitration] cases is among t h e narrowest known to the law." Diamond v. Terminal Ry. Ala. State Docks, 4 2 1 F.2d 228, 233 (5th Cir. 1970). III. Discussion T h e appellants assert that two of these limited grounds for vacatur are s a t is fie d here: (1) that the NRAB acted outside its jurisdiction because its ruling b e a r s no rational relationship to the CBAs, and (2) that the award resulted from

Our precedent also recognizes that a court with jurisdiction to review the award may set it aside if rendered in violation of a party's constitutional right to due process of law. See S. Pac. Co. v. Wilson, 378 F.2d 533, 536­37 (5th Cir. 1967). No due process claim is raised in this appeal.

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No. 10-50324 f r a u d or corruption. The district court concluded, upon careful review of the r e c o r d , that the NRAB acted within its jurisdiction and did not engage in fraud o r corruption. We agree. A. N R A B 's Jurisdiction T h e appellants first argue that the NRAB acted outside its jurisdiction in r e n d e r in g the award that this the subject of this appeal. We have explained th a t, [i]n the arbitration context, an award `without foundation in reason o r fact' is equated with an award that exceeds the authority or j u r i s d i c t io n on the arbitrating body. . . . The arbitrator's role is to c a r r y out the aims of the [CBA], and his role defines the scope of his a u t h o r it y . When he is no longer carrying out the agreement or w h e n his position cannot be considered in any way rational, he has e x c e e d e d his jurisdiction. Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen v. Cent. of Ga. Ry. Co., 415 F.2d 403, 411­12 (5th Cir. 1 9 6 9 ). We may therefore reject an NRAB award as exceeding the arbitrator's ju r is d ic t io n if the order is "so unfounded in reason and fact, so unconnected with t h e wording and purpose of the [CBA] as to `manifest an infidelity to the o b lig a t io n of the arbitrator.'" Id. at 415 (quoting United Steelworkers of Am. v. E n te r . Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960)). A s explained in detail by the district court, the appellants' argument fails t o clear this high hurdle: the arbitrator made a good-faith, reasonable effort to in t e r p r e t and apply the CBAs to the facts of this case, and our inquiry e s s e n t ia lly ceases there. While the merits of the arbitrator's decision are

d e b a t a b le were we to undertake de novo review, we emphasize once again that w e "do not sit as super arbitration tribunals" and are definitively barred from " s u b s t it u t [in g ] [our] judgment[] for th[at] of the [NRAB] division[]." Diamond, 4 2 1 F.2d at 233. T h e argument made by the appellants itself belies their effort to contend o t h e r w is e : they argue only that the arbitrator applied the wrong provision of the 5

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No. 10-50324 C B A s at issue in assessing the appellants' seniority claims. The provision that t h e arbitrator did apply is at least arguably controlling. Cf. BNSF Ry. Co. v. B h d . of Maint. of Way Emps., 550 F.3d 418, 425 (5th Cir. 2008) (rejecting NRAB d e c is io n where arbitrator's reading was not "an arguable construction of" the C B A ). We cannot say that the arbitrator's award is so categorically wrong that it bears no relationship to the governing CBAs, see Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen, 415 F .2 d at 411­12, nor does it "ignore[] an explicit term in a CBA," see BNSF Ry., 5 5 0 F.3d at 425. The appellants merely disagree with the arbitrator's reading o f interrelated provisions of the multiple applicable CBAs. Thus, the appelants h a v e not met their burden of showing that the arbitrator's ruling bore so little r e la t io n s h ip to the CBAs as to have exceeded the NRAB's jurisdiction. B. F r a u d or Corruption T h e appellants next complain that some of the parties to the arbitration e n g a g e d in fraud. They do not, however, even allege any wrongdoing on the part o f the arbitrator. This omission defeats their claims. Section 153(First)(q) a llo w s the arbitration award to be aside "for fraud or corruption by a member of th e division [viz., an arbitrator] making the order." As the plain statutory text s u g g e s t s , the appellants were obligated to provide evidence of corruption on the p a r t of the arbitrator, not on the part of parties to the arbitration. See Trial v. A tc h is o n , Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 896 F.2d 120, 125­26 (5th Cir. 1990). We e x p la in e d in Trial that a claim does not fall within the judicial review provisions o f § 153 where "the fraud that the appellants allege was allegedly committed by [t h e railroad employer], not by an [NRAB] member." Id.; see also Woodrum v. S . Ry. Co., 750 F.2d 876, 882 (11th Cir. 1985) (noting that § 153(First)(q) limits v a c a t u r to "cases of `fraud or corruption by a member'" instead of the "more usual [r u le ] allow[ing] reopening without such limitation in case of any kind of fraud g e n e r a lly "). The appellants do not allege fraud on the part of the NRAB

a r b it r a t o r , and their claim therefore fails. 6

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No. 10-50324 I V . Conclusion F o r the foregoing reasons, the well-reasoned opinion of the district court is AFFIRMED.

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