USA v. Esteban Garcia-Guillen

Filing

UNPUBLISHED OPINION FILED. [12-40931 Affirmed ] Judge: EHJ , Judge: JLD , Judge: CH Mandate pull date is 06/24/2013 for Appellant Esteban Garcia-Guillen; granting motion for summary affirmance filed by Appellant Mr. Esteban Garcia-Guillen [7286943-2] [12-40931]

Case: 12-40931

Document: 00512260370

Page: 1

Date Filed: 06/03/2013

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit

FILED
No. 12-40931
Summary Calendar

June 3, 2013
Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee
v.
ESTEBAN GARCIA-GUILLEN,
Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
USDC No. 7:12-CR-661-1

Before JONES, DENNIS, and HAYNES, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Esteban Garcia-Guillen pleaded guilty to one count of illegal reentry and
was sentenced within the advisory guidelines range to 46 months in prison.
Garcia-Guillen now appeals the district court’s imposition of a 16-level
enhancement for a prior crime of violence pursuant to § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii) of the
United States Sentencing Guidelines. However, conceding that his sole issue on
appeal is foreclosed by circuit precedent, he moves for summary disposition.

*

Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not
be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
R. 47.5.4.

Case: 12-40931

Document: 00512260370

Page: 2

Date Filed: 06/03/2013

No. 12-40931
Garcia-Guillen contends that his prior conviction for burglary of a
habitation under Texas Penal Code § 30.02 does not constitute a crime of
violence for purposes of the § 2L1.2 enhancement. As Garcia-Guillen concedes,
he did not raise this argument in the district court, so our review is for plain
error. See United States v. Mondragon-Santiago, 564 F.3d 357, 361 (5th Cir.
2009). Garcia-Guillen asserts that the Texas offense of burglary of a habitation
does not constitute burglary of a dwelling because it defines a dwelling owner as
including a person with a greater right to possession. According to GarciaGuillen, this “greater right to possession” theory is unique to Texas and makes
the offense broader than generic burglary.
We recently rejected a materially indistinguishable argument. See United
States v. Morales-Mota, 704 F.3d 410, 412 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 2013 U.S.
LEXIS 3765 (May 13, 2013). In light of Morales-Mota, the district court did not
commit any error, plain or otherwise, in imposing the enhancement.
The motion for summary disposition is GRANTED. The judgment of the
district court is AFFIRMED.

2