David Finley, Jr. v. Florida Parish Juv Deten Ctr
Filing
UNPUBLISHED OPINION FILED. [13-31030 Affirmed ] Judge: CES , Judge: EGJ , Judge: LHS Mandate pull date is 07/18/2014 [13-31030]
Case: 13-31030
Document: 00512679744
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Date Filed: 06/27/2014
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-31030
Summary Calendar
United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
June 27, 2014
DAVID FINLEY, JR.,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk
FLORIDA PARISH JUVENILE DETENTION CENTER,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Louisiana
USDC No. 2:12-CV-726
Before STEWART, Chief Judge, and JOLLY and SOUTHWICK, Circuit
Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Plaintiff-Appellant David Finley, Jr. (“Finley”) appeals the district
court’s summary judgment in favor of Defendant-Appellee Florida Parish
Juvenile Detention Center (“FPJDC”) on his employment discrimination and
due process claims. Finley also appeals the district court’s denial of his motion
for a new trial or—as the district court characterized it—his motion to alter or
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not
be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH
CIR. R. 47.5.4.
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amend judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P 59(e). For the reasons explained
herein, we affirm.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
FPJDC is a facility tasked with housing juveniles who have been
compelled to serve a period of residential detention.
Finley is an African-
American man who was employed by FPJDC from May 2008 to October 2011.
Kelsie McDonald (“McDonald”) is a Caucasian woman who was also employed
by FPJDC in 2011. On October 13, 2011, McDonald and several other FPJDC
employees attended a training session facilitated by Finley. Shortly after the
session concluded, McDonald told her supervisor, Donald Carter (“Carter”),
that during the training session, Finley made inappropriate sexual comments
to her that caused her to feel uncomfortable. 1 Carter confronted Finley with
McDonald’s allegation and Finley claimed that McDonald must have
misunderstood what he said. He also explained that he did not intend to cause
McDonald to feel uncomfortable. Shortly after Carter confronted Finley with
the allegation, Finley apologized to McDonald for making comments that
offended her. FPJDC initiated an internal investigation into the incident that
yielded a finding that Finley violated FPJDC’s policy prohibiting employees
from making comments of a sexual nature to other employees while on duty.
As a result, FPJDC terminated Finley.
Finley filed a federal law suit alleging violations of Title VII and 42
U.S.C. § 1981 under disparate impact and disparate treatment theories. The
suit also included state law breach of contract, intentional infliction of
Essentially, McDonald reported that during a break from the training, Finley told
her about an experience he had during a work-related trip where he and two women, while
under the influence of alcohol, engaged in some form of sexual conduct. McDonald believed
that Finley’s purpose in sharing the story with her was to suggest that she and Finley engage
in similar behavior during an upcoming work-related trip. McDonald also complained that
Finley previously made similar inappropriate comments to her while on duty.
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emotional distress, and defamation claims. 2
FPJDC initially moved for
summary judgment on Finley’s disparate treatment claims under Title VII and
§ 1981. FPJDC subsequently moved for summary judgment on Finley’s Title
VII disparate impact claim, due process claim, and state law claims for
defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, breach of contract. The
district court granted the motions and entered judgment in favor of FPJDC.
Finley moved for a new trial and the district court denied that motion as well.
Finley appeals the district court’s summary judgment on his Title VII
and § 1981 disparate treatment claims, due process claim, and the denial of his
motion for a new trial. Finley does not appeal the district court’s summary
judgment on his remaining claims.
II. DISCUSSION
A.
Finley argues on appeal that the district court erred in granting FPJDC’s
first partial motion for summary judgment which addressed Finley’s Title VII
and § 1981 disparate treatment claims. “We review a district court’s grant of
summary judgment de novo, applying the same standards as the district court.
We also review a district court’s conclusions of law . . . de novo.” Antoine v.
First Student, Inc., 713 F.3d 824, 830 (5th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted). “‘The
court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law.’” Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)). We view all facts and
inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Id.
Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate against an
employee on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 42 U.S.C.
Finley’s complaint did not clearly allege a due process cause of action. However, as
explained in more detail below, an alleged due process cause of action was dismissed with
the remainder of Finley’s claims.
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§ 2000e–2(a). Section 1981 is a federal law designed to ensure that all persons
in the United States have the “same right[s]” and, inter alia, “the full and equal
benefit of all laws . . . as is enjoyed by white citizens.” 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a).
“Claims of racial discrimination brought under § 1981 are governed by the
same
evidentiary
framework
applicable
to
claims
of
employment
discrimination brought under Title VII.” LaPierre v. Benson Nissan, Inc., 86
F.3d 444, 448 n.2 (5th Cir. 1996).
To survive summary judgment, a Title VII plaintiff must first establish
“a prima facie case of discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence.” Id.
at 448 (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 441 U.S. 792, 802 (1973)).
In order to show a prima facie case of discriminatory discharge, a
plaintiff must first establish that [he] (1) is a member of a
protected class, (2) was subjected to an adverse employment
action, (3) was qualified for [his] position, and (4) was replaced by
someone outside of the protected class.
Turner v. Baylor Richardson Med. Ctr., 476 F.3d 337, 345 (5th Cir. 2007). If
the plaintiff successfully establishes a prima facie case of discrimination, the
employer must articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its
adverse employment action. Id. If the employer articulates a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for its adverse employment action, the burden shifts
back to the plaintiff to show that the employer’s proffered explanation is
pretextual. Id. “[T]hat showing, when coupled with the prima facie case, will
usually be sufficient to survive summary judgment.” Id. (citing Reeves v.
Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 146–48 (2000)).
For purposes of our decision, we assume without deciding that Finley
presented sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case of employment
discrimination based upon his race or gender. FPJDC, however, provided a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its adverse employment decision—
that is—Finley’s violation of FPJDC’s policy against employees making
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remarks of a sexual nature while on duty. Therefore, we must decide whether
a genuine issue of material fact exists with respect to Finley’s allegation that
FPJDC’s stated reason for terminating him is pretextual. See Shackelford v.
Deloitte & Touche, LLP, 190 F.3d 398, 404 (5th Cir. 1999) (“Once a Title VII
case reaches the pretext stage, the only question on summary judgment is
whether there is a conflict in substantial evidence to create a jury question
regarding discrimination.”). In other words, our inquiry focuses on whether
evidence in the record demonstrates that FPJDC’s belief that Finley engaged
in sexually inappropriate dialogue, accurate or not, was the true reason for his
termination. See Laxton v. Gap Inc., 333 F.3d 572, 579 (5th Cir. 2003).
In an effort to demonstrate pretext, Finley alleges that McDonald’s
claim that he made sexually inappropriate comments is false.
Therefore,
according to Finley, an issue of material fact exists because his account of the
incident contradicts McDonald’s account.
Finley also claims that FPJDC
should not have believed McDonald’s allegation because she lacked credibility.
As the district court correctly opined, the appropriate question is not whether
McDonald’s allegation was true, but instead whether FPJDC terminated
Finley because it believed McDonald’s allegation was true, and not because of
his race or gender.
We conclude that Finley failed to present sufficient summary judgment
evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether FPJDC’s
stated reasons for terminating him were pretextual. The record demonstrates
that McDonald immediately reported Finley’s comments to her supervisor.
Shortly thereafter, the supervisor approached Finley to inform him about the
report and apprised him of the general nature of the allegation. The evidence
further demonstrates that Finley, an at-will employee, was bound by FPJDC’s
policy that prohibits employees from making sexually related comments while
on duty.
Moreover, the record includes documentation regarding Finley
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receiving disciplinary counseling for “inappropriate conversations” in
December 2009. The 2009 incident, coupled with McDonald’s allegation, would
certainly provide FPJDC with a legitimate nondiscriminatory basis for Finley’s
termination.
Finley has failed to sufficiently rebut FPJDC’s proffered
nondiscriminatory reason for terminating his employment. Accordingly, we
affirm the district court’s summary judgment in favor of FPJDC with respect
to Finley’s Title VII and § 1981 disparate treatment claims.
B.
Finley also challenges the district court’s summary judgment in favor of
FPJDC on his alleged due process claim. The substantive and procedural
posture of this claim is fairly unconventional. Although Finley’s complaint
specifically delineates by name several different causes of action, it does not
explicitly assert a due process cause of action.
Because Finley did not
specifically assert a due process cause of action in his complaint, FPJDC did
not initially move for summary judgment on his alleged due process claim.
However, during the motions practice in this case, FPJDC acknowledged—for
argument purposes only—that a due process cause of action was subsumed
within Finley’s breach of contract claim. As a result, FPJDC—in its reply
memorandum related to its second partial motion for summary judgment—
specifically urged the district court to dismiss Finley’s alleged due process
cause of action. After considering FPJDC’s various motions, the district court
dismissed all of Finley’s claims including his alleged due process claim.
On appeal, Finley argues that the district court’s summary judgment on
his due process claim was erroneous because FPJDC’s policies created a
property interest in Finley’s continued employment that was not to be
disturbed without proper notice and hearing. More specifically, Finley alleges
that FPJDC violated his due process rights because it failed to sufficiently
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inform him of the accusations against him and deprived him of an opportunity
to respond to the ultimate decision-maker.
In order for Finley to establish that he held a property interest in his
former job with FPJDC, he must demonstrate that he was not an at-will
employee. See Wallace v. Shreve Mem’l Library, 79 F.3d 427, 429–30 (5th Cir.
1996). Louisiana courts have explained that an employer’s policies do not
generally create an employment contract and any benefits contained within
those policies are “merely gratuitous” and “not binding” on the employer. Id.
at 430 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The record in this case
demonstrates that Finley was an at-will employee. Accordingly, we conclude
that Finley’s alleged due process claim is without merit.
C.
Finley also argues on appeal that the district court should have granted
his motion for a new trial on the disparate treatment and due process claims.
The district court properly treated Finley’s motion for a new trial as a motion
to alter or amend judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). See St. Paul Mercury
Ins. Co. v. Fair Grounds Corp., 123 F.3d 336, 339 (5th Cir. 1997) (concluding
that the movant’s post-summary judgment motion for a new trial was “more
properly construed as a request for reconsideration of the district court’s entry
of summary judgment”). “We review the district court’s denial of a Rule 59(e)
motion for an abuse of discretion. Under that standard, the district court’s
decision need only be reasonable.” Id. (footnote omitted). “This Court has
stated the trial court’s discretion in such matters is considerable.” Webster v.
Roadway Express, Inc. 199 F.3d 270, 272 (5th Cir. 2000).
A Rule 59(e) motion “serves the narrow purpose of allowing a party
to correct manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly
discovered evidence” and “is not the proper vehicle for rehashing
evidence, legal theories, or arguments that could have been offered
or raised before the entry of judgment.”
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Knight v. Kellog Brown & Root Inc., 333 F. App’x 1, 8 (5th Cir. 2009) (per
curiam) (unpublished) (quoting Templet v. HydroChem Inc., 367 F.3d 473, 478–
79 (5th Cir. 2004)). Having reviewed the record on appeal, including, inter
alia, Finley’s motion for a new trial and the district court’s order denying that
motion, we perceive no error in the district court’s judgment.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons explained above, we affirm the district court’s summary
judgment in favor of FPJDC and its denial of Finley’s motion for a new trial.
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