Willian Pineda-Herrera v. Loretta Lynch
Filing
UNPUBLISHED OPINION FILED. [16-60460 Affirmed ] Judge: EGJ , Judge: JES , Judge: JEG Mandate pull date is 09/07/2017 [16-60460]
Case: 16-60460
Document: 00514074789
Page: 1
Date Filed: 07/17/2017
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 16-60460
Summary Calendar
United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
July 17, 2017
Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk
WILLIAN PINEDA-HERRERA, Also Known as William Pineda-Herrera,
Petitioner,
versus
JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS, III, U.S. Attorney General,
Respondent.
Petition for Review of an Order of
the Board of Immigration Appeals
BIA No. A 200 968 272
Before JOLLY, SMITH, and GRAVES, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: *
Willian Pineda-Herrera, a native and citizen of Honduras, petitions for
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not
be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH
CIR. R. 47.5.4.
*
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review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) dismissing his
appeal of an order of an immigration judge (“IJ”) denying his motion to reopen.
The BIA rejected Pineda-Herrera’s allegation that he was ordered removed in
absentia. Additionally, with respect to Pineda-Herrera’s assertion that the
proceedings should be reopened to allow him to seek a provisional waiver of
unlawful presence, the BIA determined that his motion to reopen was untimely
and also declined to reopen sua sponte. We granted the Attorney General’s
motion to dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction as to review of the BIA’s
decision to deny sua sponte reopening, but we denied the Attorney General’s
motion to dismiss as to the remainder of the BIA’s order.
We review the denial of a motion to reopen “under a highly deferential
abuse-of-discretion standard.” Lugo-Resendez v. Lynch, 831 F.3d 337, 340 (5th
Cir. 2016) (internal quotations and citation omitted). The BIA “abuses its discretion when it issues a decision that is capricious, irrational, utterly without
foundation in the evidence, based on legally erroneous interpretations of statutes or regulations, or based on unexplained departures from regulations or
established policies.” Id.
Pineda-Herrera fails to address the BIA’s determinations that the
removal order was not ordered in abstentia; that the motion to reopen was
untimely because it was filed more than 90 days after the order of removal
became final; and that Pineda-Herrera failed to show that he exercised the
necessary due diligence for equitable tolling of the deadline for filing the
motion. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); Lugo-Resendez, 831 F.3d at 343–44.
Those issues are therefore abandoned. See Soadjede v. Ashcroft, 324 F.3d 830,
833 (5th Cir. 2003).
Pineda-Herrera’s sole argument is that, based on Matter of BarrientosVivas, 2015 WL 4873228 (BIA June 25, 2015), the BIA should have granted his
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motion to reopen. Barrientos-Vivas does not provide, however, that a desire to
apply for a provisional waiver is an exception to the requirement of timely filing a motion to reopen; in fact, Barrientos-Vivas explicitly noted that the
motion to reopen there was timely. See id. at *1; see also § 1229a(c)(7)(C).
Accordingly, Pineda-Herrera has failed to show that the BIA abused its discretion in denying the motion to reopen, see Lugo-Resendez, 831 F.3d at 340, and
the petition for review is DENIED.
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