Mary Scott v. Metropolitan Health Corp., et al

Filing

OPINION filed : AFFIRMED, decision not for publication. Alice M. Batchelder, AUTHORING Chief Circuit Judge; Richard F. Suhrheinrich, Circuit Judge and Jeffrey S. Sutton, Circuit Judge.

Case: 08-1934

Document: 006111776752

Filed: 08/07/2013

Page: 1

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
File Name: 13a0723n.06

FILED

Case No. 08-1934

Aug 07, 2013

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
MARY SCOTT,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
METROPOLITAN HEALTH CORP., et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
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DEBORAH S. HUNT, Clerk

ON APPEAL FROM THE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT
COURT FOR THE WESTERN
DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

BEFORE: BATCHELDER, Chief Judge; SUHRHEINRICH and SUTTON, Circuit Judges.
ALICE M. BATCHELDER, Chief Judge. Plaintiff-appellant Mary Scott appeals a postjudgment order denying her Federal Rule of Civil Procedure – Rule 60(b) motion to vacate an award
of sanctions. We affirm.
When the district court realized that plaintiff Mary Scott had prosecuted a baseless retaliatory
discharge suit (based on falsified evidence, perjury, and improperly withheld discovery), it dismissed
her case and awarded defense counsel $1.6 million in discovery sanctions, representing
approximately 80% of the costs incurred. Scott appealed, arguing, among other things, that the trial
judge should have sua sponte ordered a hearing so that Scott could testify in person, and should have
sua sponte recused himself. Scott appealed and we affirmed, holding that the sanctions were
properly imposed, a hearing was not required, and the recusal of the trial judge was not warranted.
Scott v. Metropolitan Health Corp., 234 F. App’x 341, 345 (6th Cir. 2007).
Scott filed a motion in the district court, seeking under Rules 60(b)(4) and 60(b)(6) to vacate

Case: 08-1934

Document: 006111776752

Filed: 08/07/2013

Page: 2

08-1934, Scott v. Metropolitan

the judgment on the grounds that the discovery sanction had actually been a criminal contempt order
and therefore the absence of a hearing violated due process, and that the trial judge should have
recused himself. The district court, relying primarily on the prior Sixth Circuit opinion, denied the
motion. Scott appeals.
We review the denial of a Rule 60(b) motion for an abuse of discretion. Browder v. Dept.
of Corrections, 434 U.S. 257, 263 n.7 (1978). We note first that Scott wholly failed to make any
argument relative to her Rule 60(b)(4) motion and, therefore, only her Rule 60(b)(6) motion is before
us. The district court did not abuse its discretion by relying on our prior, correct rulings to deny the
Rule 60(b)(6) motion. Moreover, her claims have no merit.
We AFFIRM.

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