Anthony Hunt v. MI, et al

Filing

Per Curiam OPINION filed : AFFIRMED, decision not for publication pursuant to local rule 206. Jeffrey S. Sutton, Circuit Judge; David W. McKeague, Circuit Judge and Kenneth F. Ripple, Circuit Judge for the Seventh Circuit, sitting by designation. [09-2590, 10-1646]

Case: 09-2590

Document: 006111298989

Filed: 05/08/2012

Page: 1

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
File Name: 12a0481n.06
Nos. 09-2590/10-1646
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
FILED

ANTHONY G. HUNT,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
STATE OF MICHIGAN; JOHN DOE,
unknown defendants of City of Detroit, State
of Michigan, and Wayne County, in their
official capacities,
Defendants-Appellees.

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May 08, 2012
LEONARD GREEN, Clerk

ON APPEAL FROM THE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT
COURT FOR THE EASTERN
DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

BEFORE: SUTTON, McKEAGUE, and RIPPLE,* Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM. Anthony G. Hunt, a Michigan state prisoner, appeals a district court order
dismissing his civil rights complaint, filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and a district court order
denying his post-judgment motions. The appeals have been consolidated.
In 1999, a jury convicted Hunt of first-degree criminal sexual conduct, three counts of
assault, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. He was sentenced to 22 to
52 years of imprisonment. His conviction was upheld on direct appeal in the state courts, and his
petition for a writ of habeas corpus was denied. In 2009, Hunt filed this civil rights complaint under
42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that his arrest without a warrant was unlawful, his conviction was illegal

*

The Honorable Kenneth F. Ripple, Circuit Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit, sitting by designation.

Case: 09-2590

Document: 006111298989

Filed: 05/08/2012

Page: 2

Nos. 09-2590/10-1646
Hunt v. State of Michigan, et al.
due to his diminished capacity, and the state withheld the results of a competency evaluation. He
sought monetary relief as well as his release from imprisonment. The district court sua sponte
dismissed the complaint upon initial review for failure to state a claim, because Hunt’s claims were
barred by the holding of Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994). Hunt’s subsequent motions
to reconsider and amend his complaint were denied.
On appeal, appointed counsel argues that the district court erred in dismissing a potential
claim that an illegal search caused Hunt compensable injury, citing Heck, 512 U.S. at 487 n.7.
Upon de novo review, see Grinter v. Knight, 532 F.3d 567, 571–72 (6th Cir. 2008), we
conclude that this complaint was properly dismissed. Under Heck, a civil rights action for damages
that would imply the invalidity of a conviction may not be brought until the subject conviction has
been overturned. Although counsel argues that a claim that an illegal search caused Hunt
compensable injury would not necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction, and therefore would
not be barred by the doctrine in Heck, review of the complaint in this case reveals no such claim.
Hunt did raise a claim that his arrest without a warrant was unlawful, but that same claim was
rejected on direct appeal in the state court because the court found that Hunt consented to the police
entering his home. People v. Hunt, No. 223459, 2002 WL 31938728, at *3 (Mich. Ct. App. Nov.
22, 2002) (per curiam). Furthermore, it appears from the record of Hunt’s habeas corpus proceeding
that the evidence seized in the search was a weapon and a female undergarment. Hunt v.
Wolfenbarger, No. 04-10046, 2007 WL 2421551, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 24, 2007). Therefore, the
only conceivable injury from the seizure of this evidence would be Hunt’s conviction, which counsel
admits cannot be the basis of a damages claim under Heck.

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Case: 09-2590

Document: 006111298989

Filed: 05/08/2012

Page: 3

Nos. 09-2590/10-1646
Hunt v. State of Michigan, et al.
But even if we were to agree with Hunt that some of his search-and-seizure claims are not
barred by Heck, dismissal of his complaint was still proper because those claims are time-barred.
The search and arrest about which Hunt complains occurred in October 1998, but Hunt did not file
his complaint until November 2009, well beyond the three-year statute of limitations that applies to
§ 1983 claims in Michigan. See Wolfe v. Perry, 412 F.3d 707, 713–14 (6th Cir. 2005). To the extent
his claims are not barred by Heck, they do not benefit from the rule that a claim so barred does not
accrue until the state conviction has been overturned. Heck, 512 U.S. at 489–90; see Eidson v. State
of Tenn. Dep’t of Children’s Servs., 510 F.3d 631, 641 (6th Cir. 2007). Because Hunt’s claims are
either Heck-barred or time-barred, the district court properly dismissed his complaint.
Accordingly, the district court’s dismissal of this complaint and denial of his motions for
reconsideration and to amend his complaint are affirmed.

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