USA v. Dwayne Jackson
OPINION filed: AFFIRMED, decision not for publication pursuant to local rule 206. Richard F. Suhrheinrich; Julia Smith Gibbons and David W. McKeague, Circuit Judges.
NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
File Name: 12a0149n.06
Feb 07, 2012
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
LEONARD GREEN, Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
DWAYNE WARREN JACKSON,
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED
STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
Before: SUHRHEINRICH, GIBBONS, McKEAGUE, Circuit Judges.
JULIA SMITH GIBBONS, Circuit Judge.
Defendant-appellant Dwayne Jackson
appeals his conviction for possession with intent to distribute fifty grams or more of crack
cocaine. Jackson entered a conditional guilty plea after the district court denied his motion to
suppress evidence seized from the apartment and automobile he shared with his girlfriend,
Michelle Ferguson. Jackson raises three issues on appeal. First, Jackson contends that the
police violated the Fourth Amendment by making a warrantless entry into his apartment without
his consent. Second, Jackson argues that Ferguson’s oral consent to the officers’ request to
search the apartment was involuntary because it was the product of duress and coercion. Finally,
Jackson argues that the police exceeded the scope of Ferguson’s consent to search the
automobile the couple shared because a reasonable person would have interpreted the exchange
between Ferguson and the police as granting permission only to retrieve Jackson’s identification
from beneath a visor in the vehicle.
For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
On March 11, 2009, Officer Robert Thomas of the Lexington Police Department’s
CLEAR Unit1 received information from his partner, Officer Joe Green, that an individual by the
name of Dwayne Jackson was engaged in crack cocaine dealing. The tip came from Jackson’s
ex-girlfriend, Tamika Crawford, who had approached Officer Green and told him that, in
addition to being engaged in narcotics trafficking, Jackson had stolen a television from her
house. Crawford told Green that Jackson lived in the Bridle Creek Apartments on Nicholasville
Road, but she did not know in which apartment unit he lived. She also told Green that Jackson
drove a white Lexus SUV. Green relayed this information to Thomas, who then went with
fellow CLEAR Unit officers Michael Sharp and R. B. Schwartz to the Bridle Creek Apartments
to investigate. The three officers drove in marked police cruisers and wore their uniforms and
duty belts, on which a firearm and a taser were holstered and visible.
Thomas, Sharp, and Schwartz drove through the Bridle Creek Apartments’s parking lot
to try to locate the Lexus SUV and knocked on some doors to see if they could locate Jackson,
but they were unsuccessful. They then began to exit the apartment complex in their vehicles, but
as Thomas was pulling out of the complex parking lot, he saw a white Lexus SUV pulling into
the parking lot. Thomas made a U-turn on Nicholasville Road and followed the SUV back into
The CLEAR Unit is a special task force of the Louisville Police Department that handles
many complaints of street-level narcotics trafficking. CLEAR stands for “Community Law
Enforcement Action Response.”
the lot. Officers Sharp and Schwartz also turned around and drove back into the complex, but it
took them several minutes to catch up with Officer Thomas.
After Jackson pulled into a parking space, exited the SUV, and shut the door, Thomas
approached him on foot and asked him to confirm his identity. Thomas then asked Jackson if he
owned the car, and Jackson replied that he did not own the car, but that the car belonged to his
girlfriend, Ferguson. Thomas asked if he could speak with Ferguson. Jackson said that he could
and indicated that Ferguson was in their apartment. Thomas asked Jackson if he would take him
up to talk to her, and Jackson indicated that he would. Sharp and Schwartz then pulled up
behind Thomas and Jackson and exited their patrol cars, at which point Thomas informed them
that Jackson was going to take them up to his apartment.
The three officers followed Jackson to his apartment door, which he unlocked with a key.
The officers were standing directly behind Jackson when he unlocked the door. Jackson opened
the door and went inside, but what happened next is disputed. Thomas testified that Jackson
walked in the front door, then looked back at him, at which point Thomas stepped inside. Sharp
also testified that “[i]t seemed like [Jackson] held the door, I think, for us” and did not object to
the officers’ entry into his apartment. Jackson, by contrast, claims that when he put his key in
the front door of the apartment, he said, “You all got to hold on a minute because I got to check
to see if my girl is decent.” However, all three officers testified that Jackson did not say
anything indicating that they should not come into the apartment or that they should wait outside
while Jackson confirmed that Ferguson was “decent.” Jackson testified that he shut the front
door of the apartment behind him until it latched and that the officers then opened the door and
walked into the apartment behind him without his permission.
Ferguson, who had been in bed with the flu that day, heard Jackson come in and say,
“Shel, the police are out here, and they want to talk to you,” at which point she “jumped” out of
bed and walked into the living room, where Jackson and the officers were standing. Ferguson
testified that she was “scared, frightened, nervous, shocked” and “very intimidated” by the sight
of the officers in her apartment because her prior involvement with the police was limited to
receiving a speeding ticket.
When Ferguson entered the living room, Thomas asked her if they could go into the
bedroom so they could talk alone. Ferguson agreed, and Thomas and Ferguson went into the
bedroom. Thomas then told Ferguson that he had received a complaint about a stolen TV and a
narcotics complaint against Jackson. Ferguson testified that Thomas asked her if the officers
could “take a look around,” and she agreed that they could. Ferguson testified that Thomas
never used the word “search” in his request, and she thought that the officers were merely asking
to look at things in the apartment that were visible, not to conduct a more invasive search.
Thomas testified that he specifically used the word “search” when asking for Ferguson’s consent
to search and conveyed to Ferguson that the objective of the search was to locate evidence of
narcotics trafficking. Thomas also testified that he explicitly asked Ferguson if he could search
both her apartment and her vehicle for evidence of narcotics trafficking, at which time she was
very cooperative and agreed.
Thomas did not threaten to get a search warrant if Ferguson refused to consent to the
search, and did not threaten her with arrest. However, Thomas also never informed Ferguson
that she had the right to refuse to consent to the search.
Thomas’s and Ferguson’s testimonies diverge regarding what happened next. Ferguson
testified that one of the officers asked Jackson to produce identification, at which point Ferguson
volunteered to go get Jackson’s driver’s license out of the SUV where he kept it under the
driver’s side vanity mirror. Thomas asked Ferguson if he could go get the license from the SUV
instead, and she agreed. Ferguson testified that she did not give Thomas consent to search the
By contrast, Thomas testified that after he and Ferguson spoke, they exited the bedroom
and he told Sharp and Schwartz, in front of Ferguson and Jackson, that Ferguson had given her
consent for the officers to search the apartment and her vehicle for illegal narcotics. Ferguson
did not say anything to contradict Thomas’s statement.
Thomas then took the keys to
Ferguson’s SUV, which were on a counter, and went out and searched the vehicle. In the center
console of the front seat, Thomas discovered crack cocaine and marijuana.
Then, according to Thomas, he returned to the apartment, directed the other officers to
handcuff Jackson, and informed them that he had found cocaine in the SUV. Sharp and Thomas
then conducted a search of the apartment while Schwartz stayed with Jackson.2 During the
search, Sharp discovered marijuana “roaches” on a table in the bedroom, and Thomas discovered
a .380 Jennings handgun and a loaded magazine sitting on top of rolled-up men’s underwear on a
shelf in the bedroom closet. The search also revealed digital scales and packaging material
consistent with narcotics trafficking. Thomas described the atmosphere during the search as
tense but professional, and Schwartz testified that the atmosphere in the apartment during the
Ferguson and Jackson both testified that the search of the apartment occurred before the
search of the SUV, not after. The district court credited the officers’ version of the events, i.e., that
Thomas first went downstairs and searched the SUV, then returned to the apartment, at which point
he and Sharp searched the apartment. Before either search occurred, Thomas stated in front of
Ferguson and Jackson that Ferguson had consented to a search of the apartment and the SUV. This
consent was never revoked. Accordingly, which search occurred first is not particularly relevant
to the Fourth Amendment inquiry.
search was “not hostile.” Ferguson’s eight year-old son remained asleep in the apartment’s
second bedroom during the entire search.
Ferguson testified that she did not know she had the right to tell the police officers to
leave her apartment after they entered it or to tell them not to search her apartment after she had
told them that they could “take a look around.” However, Jackson testified that he knew he had
a right to tell the police to leave the apartment after they entered, but that he did not do so
because he was “shook up” and “scared.” Similarly, Jackson testified that he did not attempt to
stop the search once it began because he was “shook up” and the officers were “aggressive[ly]”
searching. Neither Ferguson nor Jackson verbally objected during the search, and both conceded
that they were never threatened by the officers in any way.
Jackson was charged in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Kentucky with possession with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of a mixture or substance
containing a detectable amount of crack cocaine, a Schedule II controlled substance, in violation
of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), with being a convicted felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), and with two forfeiture counts. Jackson moved to suppress all evidence
derived from the March 11, 2009 searches. A suppression hearing was held during which
Thomas, Schwartz, Sharp, Jackson and Ferguson each testified.
The district court denied
Jackson’s motion to suppress the evidence seized, concluding first that the three officers
followed Jackson through the apartment’s front door without objection by Jackson. The court
thus credited the officers’ testimony over Jackson’s claim that he closed the door behind him
when he entered the apartment. The court also credited Thomas’s testimony that Ferguson gave
Thomas consent to search the apartment and the SUV, noting that Ferguson did not object when
Thomas told the other officers that she had given them permission to search both the apartment
and the SUV. The court concluded that the search had been conducted in a professional manner,
as indicated by the fact that Ferguson’s son did not wake up during the search.
acknowledging that the presence of officers wearing uniforms and police belts “might well have
been intimidating,” the district court found it particularly relevant that neither Jackson nor
Ferguson objected during the search.
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(a)(2), Jackson entered a conditional
guilty plea to Count 1 of the Indictment, which charged a violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1),
possession with intent to distribute 50 grams of a mixture containing a detectable amount of
crack cocaine, and Count 3, one of the forfeiture counts, preserving his right to appeal the district
court’s denial of his motion to suppress. Counts 2 and 4 were dismissed pursuant to a written
Jackson was sentenced to 175 months of imprisonment and filed a timely appeal
challenging his conviction.
In reviewing the district court’s denial of a motion to suppress, this court reviews the
district court’s factual findings for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo. United States v.
Beauchamp, 659 F.3d 560, 565 (6th Cir. 2011). “A factual finding is clearly erroneous when,
although there is evidence in the record to support the finding,” this court “is left with the
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” United States v. Lucas, 640
F.3d 168, 173 (6th Cir. 2011). “If there are two permissible views of the evidence, the district
court’s determination cannot be clearly erroneous.” Id. The evidence is viewed in the light most
favorable to the government. Beauchamp, 659 F.3d at 565–66.
The Fourth Amendment bars the government from conducting unreasonable searches and
“[A] search conducted without a warrant issued upon probable cause is ‘per se
unreasonable . . . subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.’”
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347, 357 (1967)). One of the specifically established exceptions to the warrant and probable
cause requirements is a search conducted pursuant to consent.
However, “[w]hen a
prosecutor seeks to rely upon consent to justify the lawfulness of a search, he has the burden of
proving that the consent was, in fact, freely and voluntarily given.” Bumper v. North Carolina,
391 U.S. 543, 548 (1968). “The government bears the burden of proving, through clear and
positive testimony[,] that the consent to search was given voluntarily.” Beauchamp, 659 F.3d at
571 (internal quotation marks omitted).
“Consent is voluntary when it is unequivocal, specific and intelligently given,
uncontaminated by any duress or coercion,” id. (internal quotation marks omitted), and not the
product of an “overborne will.” Lucas, 640 F.3d at 174. A search based on consent requires
more than “an expression of futility in resistance to authority or acquiescing in the officers’
request.” United States v. Worley, 193 F.3d 380, 386 (6th Cir. 1999); see also United States v.
Canipe, 569 F.3d 597, 603 (6th Cir. 2009) (“[M]ere acquiescence does not suffice to establish
free and voluntary consent.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Jackson argues that the police violated the Fourth Amendment when they made a
warrantless entry into the apartment he shared with Ferguson without his consent. “[T]he
physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment
is directed.” Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585 (1980) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The Fourth Amendment requires that searches of the home be reasonable, Illinois v. Rodriguez,
497 U.S. 177, 185–86 (1990), which generally requires that police obtain a warrant based upon a
judicial determination of probable cause prior to entering a home. Payton, 445 U.S. at 584–86.
However, the police may enter a home without a warrant or probable cause if an individual with
actual or apparent authority to do so grants the officers consent to enter. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at
186; see also United States v. Carter, 378 F.3d 584, 587–88 (6th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (Fourth
Amendment not violated when officers entered apartment pursuant to motel occupant’s consent);
United States v. Campbell, 317 F.3d 597, 608 (6th Cir. 2003) (“When one person consents to a
search of property owned by another, the consent is valid if the facts available to the officer at
the moment . . . warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that the consenting party had
authority over the premises.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Consent to a search may be
in the form of words, gesture, or conduct.” Carter, 378 F.3d at 587 (internal quotation marks
We have previously held that a suspect voluntarily consented to the entry into his motel
room of several police officers when the officers knocked on his motel room door, initially
identified themselves as housekeeping, then identified themselves as officers after the suspect
opened the door, asked permission to enter, and entered after the suspect stepped back, letting
them in. Id. We reasoned that the defendant’s act of stepping back from the front door after the
police identified themselves and asked permission to enter was conduct sufficient to convey his
consent to their entry. Id. at 588.
Here, the district court credited the officers’ testimony that Jackson led them up to the
apartment after they asked to speak with Ferguson, put his key in the door, opened it, went into
the apartment, and allowed the officers to follow him inside without objection. The district court
did not find Jackson’s testimony—that he closed the door behind him until it latched with the
officers outside and that the officers then opened the door and entered the apartment without his
The district court’s finding that Jackson consented to the officers’ entry into the
apartment is not clearly erroneous. The officers were standing right behind Jackson when he
unlocked the door, and each testified that they did not hear him object to their entry. Jackson’s
testimony that he said “You all got to hold on a minute because I got to check to see if my girl is
decent” is not corroborated by any other witness, and the district court’s determination that the
officers were more credible than Jackson is entitled to deference.
See United States v.
Montgomery, 621 F.3d 568, 572 (6th Cir. 2010). Thomas also testified that Jackson looked back
at him as Jackson entered the home, and Sharp testified that “[i]t seemed like [Jackson] held the
door” for the officers to enter.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
government, Jackson led the officers to his apartment after Thomas asked to speak with
Ferguson, and without saying anything, unlocked the door, entered the apartment, looked back at
the officers, and “seemed” to hold the door open to allow them to enter. Such conduct could
reasonably be interpreted as consent to their entry. The fact that Jackson did not object when the
officers followed him inside further supports the district court’s conclusion that he consented to
their warrantless entry.
Accordingly, we conclude that the district court’s finding that Jackson consented to the
officers’ entry into the apartment was not clearly erroneous, and the police officers therefore did
not violate the Fourth Amendment when they entered the apartment.
Jackson next argues that Ferguson’s oral consent to search the apartment was the product
of duress and coercion and was therefore involuntary. “[T]he question whether a consent to a
search was in fact ‘voluntary’ or was the product of duress or coercion, express or implied, is a
question of fact to be determined from the totality of all the circumstances.” Schneckloth, 412
U.S. at 227. This court considers several factors in determining whether consent was given
voluntarily, including the age, intelligence, and education of the individual giving consent;
whether the individual understood the right to refuse to consent to search; and whether the
individual understood his constitutional rights.
Lucas, 640 F.3d at 174.
This court also
considers “the length and nature of the detention, the use of coercive or punishing conduct by the
police, and indications of more subtle forms of coercion that might have affected [the]
judgment” of the person who consented to search. Id. “While knowledge of the right to refuse
consent is one factor to be taken into account, the government need not establish such knowledge
as the sine qua non of an effective consent.” Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 227.
There is no evidence in the record that Ferguson’s consent to the search of her apartment
and SUV was the product of duress or coercion. Thomas did not threaten to get a search warrant
if Ferguson refused to consent to the search nor did he threaten her with arrest. In fact, Ferguson
testified that none of the officers threatened her in any way before, during, or after the searches
Although Thomas never informed Ferguson that she had the right to refuse to consent to
the search, the Supreme Court has explicitly rejected a rule that would require an officer to
inform an individual that she has the right to refuse consent in order to render her consent
voluntary. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 231 (rejecting rule that would require officer to advise
subject of search of right to refuse consent). Ferguson testified that she did not know she had the
right to tell the police officers to leave her apartment after they entered it or refuse to let them
search her apartment after she had told them that they could “take a look around.” However,
Ferguson’s lack of knowledge that she could refuse consent—or withdraw it once given—is only
one factor to be considered in analyzing whether her consent was voluntary. Schneckloth, 412
U.S. at 248–49 (“Voluntariness is a question of fact to be determined from all the circumstances,
and while the subject’s knowledge of a right to refuse is a factor to be taken into account, the
prosecution is not required to demonstrate such knowledge as a prerequisite to establishing a
Similarly, though Ferguson and Jackson did not help the officers with the search of the
apartment, they also did not object to the search at any point or try to stop the officers from
searching. After marijuana was discovered during the search, Sharp issued Ferguson a citation
for possession of marijuana and possession of drug paraphernalia, but Ferguson was never
arrested or detained, either before or after she consented to the search. The search was not
disruptive enough to wake Ferguson’s sleeping son, a factor we, like the district court, find
relevant. Given that the search was not disruptive enough to wake Ferguson’s son, it is unlikely
that the police were acting in a manner aggressive enough to coerce Ferguson into consenting to
a search, or to convince her that she could not tell them to cease searching. Further, though the
officers were attired in uniforms and duty belts, neither Ferguson nor Jackson claimed that the
officers touched their handguns or tasers during the encounter in order to intimidate them.
The only testimony that supports Jackson’s argument that Ferguson was coerced into
consenting is Ferguson’s testimony that she did not know she could refuse consent and that she
was subjectively fearful and therefore consented to Thomas’s request to search because he was
being demanding. Ferguson testified that she was “scared, frightened, nervous, shocked” and
“very intimidated” by the officers in her apartment. She also testified that she felt Thomas was
“very demanding” when he spoke with her alone in the bedroom. Under the totality of the
circumstances, we conclude that Ferguson, an adult interacting with police officers in her own
home, who by her own admission was not threatened verbally or by any actions of the officers,
was not coerced into giving—or under duress at the time she gave—consent to search the
There is simply no evidence that Ferguson’s will was overborne by the mere
presence of three uniformed officers in her home, one of whom asked for her consent to search.3
Accordingly, we conclude that Ferguson’s consent was voluntarily given.
Jackson’s final argument on appeal is that the police exceeded the scope of Ferguson’s
consent to search the automobile the couple shared because a reasonable person would have
understood the exchange between Ferguson and Thomas as granting Thomas permission only to
retrieve Jackson’s identification from beneath a visor in the vehicle, not to conduct a full search.
The government contends that Jackson failed to preserve his claim that Ferguson limited
the scope of her consent to search the SUV.
The government concedes that Jackson’s
Contrary to Jackson’s argument, this case is not analogous to United States v. Worley, 193
F.3d 380 (6th Cir. 1999). In Worley, this court affirmed the district court’s suppression of evidence
seized pursuant to an alleged consent search on the ground that defendant’s consent to search was
involuntary. The Worley court held that the district court did not clearly err in concluding that
Worley’s consent was involuntary when police officers approached Worley in an airport and asked
him if they could look in a bag he was transporting, and he responded “You’ve got the badge, I
guess you can.” Id. at 386. The court concluded that Worley’s response was “a response conveying
an expression of futility in resistance to authority or acquiescing in the officers’ request,” rather than
a true expression of free and voluntary consent. Id.
Here, Ferguson’s statements to Thomas did not convey that she was merely acquiescing to
authority or agreeing to allow the officers to search out of a sense of futility. Ferguson, by her own
admission, agreed when Thomas asked her if the officers could “take a look around.” She did not
say anything that would indicate that her consent was only given because she felt it futile to resist
Thomas’s request, or that she was merely acquiescing to his assertion of authority.
conditional guilty plea preserved his right to challenge the denial of his motion to suppress,
specifically, Jackson’s claim that he did not consent to the police officers’ entry into his
apartment, and his claim that Ferguson did not consent to the search of the SUV at all. However,
the government argues that Jackson did not specifically argue in the district court or preserve in
his plea agreement his claim that Ferguson consented to the search of the SUV but limited the
scope of her consent to the search of the driver’s side visor.
From the record, it is apparent that Jackson did argue before the district court at the
evidentiary hearing that Ferguson limited the scope of her consent to Thomas’s search of the
SUV to the mirror area. Ferguson testified that she told the officers that she would go get
Jackson’s driver’s license from behind the driver’s side mirror in the SUV and that when
Thomas asked her if he could go get it instead, she agreed. Ferguson’s testimony, if believed,
would indicate that Ferguson limited the scope of her consent to Thomas’s search of the SUV to
the vanity mirror on the driver’s side. Thus, Jackson adequately presented his theory that
Ferguson limited the scope of her consent to the search of the SUV to the district court, and the
issue is not waived.
“The district court’s determination of whether a search exceeded the scope of consent is a
question of fact that we review for clear error.” Canipe, 569 F.3d at 604 (internal quotation
This court defers to the district court’s “credibility determinations while
construing the evidence in the light most favorable to the winner of the suppression motion—the
government in this instance.” Montgomery, 621 F.3d at 572.
The standard for measuring the scope of a suspect’s consent is one of objective
reasonableness—in other words, “‘what would the typical reasonable person have understood by
the exchange between the officer and the suspect?’” Canipe, 569 F.3d at 604 (quoting Florida v.
Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251 (1991)).
“The scope of a search is generally defined by its
expressed object.” Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 251. If an individual’s consent “would reasonably be
understood to extend to a particular container, the Fourth Amendment provides no grounds for
requiring a more explicit authorization.” Id. at 252.
Thomas and Ferguson recounted very different versions of their conversation in the
bedroom. Ferguson conceded that she agreed to let the officers look around her apartment but
testified that she never consented to a search of the SUV. Ferguson testified that, at some point,
one of the officers asked for identification from her and Jackson, and she then volunteered to go
get Jackson’s driver’s license out of the SUV, where he kept it under the driver’s side visor.
Ferguson testified that Thomas then asked her if he could go get the license from the SUV
instead, and she agreed. By contrast, Thomas testified that when they spoke alone in the
bedroom, he explicitly asked Ferguson if he could search both her apartment and her vehicle for
evidence of narcotics trafficking, and she agreed. Here, the district court credited Thomas’s
version of events over Ferguson’s, noting that after he exited the bedroom, Thomas, in
Ferguson’s presence, told the other officers that Ferguson had consented to a search of both the
apartment and the SUV, and Ferguson did not object. The district court’s determination that
Thomas was more credible than Ferguson and that his version of their conversation should be
credited was not clearly erroneous. Sharp and Schwartz testified consistently with one another,
and with Thomas, that Thomas told them in Ferguson’s presence that she had consented to a
search of her SUV and that Ferguson did not object. If Ferguson had not consented to a search
of her SUV when she spoke with Thomas in the bedroom, she likely would have objected when
Thomas told Schwartz and Sharp, in front of Ferguson, that she had. Under these circumstances,
the district court was entitled to credit Thomas’s version of their conversation. Accordingly, the
district court’s determination that Thomas was more credible than Ferguson and that Ferguson
consented to a search of her SUV was not clearly erroneous.
Crediting Thomas’s testimony, as the district court reasonably did, the search of the
center console did not exceed the scope of Ferguson’s consent to search the SUV. Thomas
testified that he explicitly told Ferguson that the officers were looking for evidence of narcotics
trafficking, and she thereafter consented to a search of the SUV. Because the expressed object of
the search was to uncover evidence of narcotics trafficking, the police were entitled to look in
any container in the SUV which could have contained such evidence. See Jimeno, 500 U.S. at
251–52 (holding that where individual consented to search of a car for narcotics and placed no
explicit limitation on the scope of the search, it was objectively reasonable for the police to
conclude that the consent included consent to search containers within car that might contain
narcotics). Accordingly, we conclude that Thomas did not exceed the scope of Ferguson’s
consent when he searched the center console of her SUV.
For the reasons stated above, we affirm Jackson’s conviction.
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