Zihra Saad, et al v. Michael Krause, et al
Per Curiam OPINION filed : We AFFIRM the district court s order denying Krause s motion for summary judgment on the reasoning of its opinion; decision not for publication pursuant to local rule 206. Alan E. Norris, Circuit Judge; David W. McKeague, Circuit Judge and Raymond M. Kethledge, Circuit Judge.
NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
File Name: 12a0768n.06
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
CITY OF DEARBORN HEIGHTS, et al.,
Jul 16, 2012
LEONARD GREEN, Clerk
ON APPEAL FROM THE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT
COURT FOR THE EASTERN
DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
NORRIS, McKEAGUE, and KETHLEDGE, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM. This is an appeal by a defendant police officer from an interlocutory ruling
denying his motion for summary judgment on plaintiff Zihra Saad’s excessive force claim under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 and intentional tort claims under state law.1 The action stems from events that
occurred on March 10, 2010, when defendant Dearborn Heights Police Officer Michael Krause
Though the district court’s ruling is interlocutory, we have jurisdiction to review it under
the collateral order doctrine.
Saad v. Krause, et al.
observed a stop sign violation and attempted to pull-over motorist Joseph Saad. When Saad
appeared to ignore Officer Krause’s emergency flashers, Krause pursued him into a nearby
residential driveway. There Saad exited his vehicle, ignored Krause’s verbal command to get back
in the car, and entered the house through the front door. When Krause followed onto the front porch
of the house, he was met by Saad’s 78-year old mother, Zihra Saad, plaintiff-appellee herein, who
refused Krause consent to enter despite his having allegedly pointed a firearm at her. Meanwhile,
other officers gained entry to the home by another way, let Krause in through the front door, and
Joseph Saad was arrested.
In this action, as relevant to this appeal, Zihra Saad’s excessive force and intentional tort
claims are premised on her claim that Krause pointed a firearm at her. Though Krause maintains the
gun was pointed only at the front door of the house, not at Zihra, the record presents a genuine fact
dispute on this point. Nonetheless, defendant Krause moved the district court for summary
judgment, contending that, even assuming he pointed his firearm at Zihra Saad, he is entitled to
qualified immunity on the § 1983 excessive force claim and governmental immunity on the
intentional tort claims. The district court denied Krause’s motion for summary judgment, concluding
that if the jury were to find that Krause pointed his weapon at Zihra—an unarmed 78-year old
woman who was not suspected of any crime and posed no threat to anyone’s safety, while demanding
entry to her home in pursuit of a motorist suspected only of running a stop sign and then ignoring
the commands of the pursuing police officer—then the jury could reasonably conclude, under the
facts and circumstances developed in trial, that Krause used excessive force and acted without good
Saad v. Krause, et al.
faith and/or with malice. On the extant record, the district court held that Krause was not entitled
to qualified immunity or governmental immunity.
On appeal, Krause has not raised any argument that is not fairly and adequately addressed
in the district court’s opinion. Although we review the district court’s ruling de novo, we find no
error. Accordingly, finding that a separate opinion would be duplicative and unnecessary, we hereby
AFFIRM the district court’s order denying Krause’s motion for summary judgment on the reasoning
of its opinion.
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