Joseph Copeland, Jr. v. Joseph Cantwell, et al

Filing

Per Curiam OPINION filed : AFFIRMED, decision not for publication pursuant to local rule 206. Martha Craig Daughtrey, Circuit Judge; Raymond M. Kethledge, Circuit Judge and Bernice Bouie Donald, Circuit Judge. [11-4171, 11-4325]

Case: 11-4171

Document: 006111411120

Filed: 08/23/2012

Page: 1

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
File Name: 12a0938n.06
Nos. 11-4171/4325
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
JOSEPH COPELAND, JR.,
TODD E. TRIPLETT,

(11-4171)
(11-4327)

Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
THE COUNTY OF FRANKLIN, OHIO;
FRANKLIN COUNTY BOARD OF
COMMISSIONERS; SHERIFF JIM KARNES,
in his official capacity,
Defendants-Appellees,
JOSEPH CANTWELL; PHILLIP R. BARNETT,
in their individual and official capacities,
Defendants.

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FILED

Aug 23, 2012
LEONARD GREEN, Clerk

ON APPEAL FROM THE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT
COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN
DISTRICT OF OHIO

BEFORE: DAUGHTREY, KETHLEDGE, and DONALD, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM. Plaintiffs Joseph Copeland, Jr. and Todd E. Triplett appeal the
district court’s order of summary judgment against them in their civil-rights action, filed
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Copeland and Triplett each filed a complaint in state court
against Franklin County (Ohio) Sheriff Jim Karnes, Franklin County, and the County Board
of Commissioners (collectively, the County Defendants), as well as two former Sheriff’s
deputies, alleging violations of their federal civil rights and asserting claims under state law.
The two complaints were removed to federal court by the defendants and consolidated.
The district court granted the summary judgment motion filed by the County Defendants
on the federal claims and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law

Case: 11-4171

Document: 006111411120

Filed: 08/23/2012

Page: 2

Nos. 11-4171/4325
Copeland and Triplett v. County of Franklin, Ohio, et al.
claims against those defendants. The claims against the two former deputies were
voluntarily dismissed without prejudice.

On appeal, Copeland and Triplett contend that the district court erred in granting
summary judgment because the record reflects a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether a policy or custom of the County Defendants led to the deprivation of their civil
rights. We review a decision granting summary judgment de novo and will affirm when
there is no genuine issue of material fact and the defendants are entitled to judgment as
a matter of law. Johnson v. Karnes, 398 F.3d 868, 873 (6th Cir. 2005).

The litigation arose from an incident at the Franklin County jail, where Copeland and
Triplett were incarcerated at the time. Apparently, in the course of passing out bologna
sandwiches to the inmates, the two former deputies decided to “play a practical joke” on
Copeland. According to the complaints, the deputies gave Triplett a sandwich and told him
to put his penis on it, threatening him with discipline if he did not comply. They then took
a picture of the result with a cell phone. The deputies fed the sandwich to Copeland, who
was unaware of its recent contamination, and then showed him the cell-phone picture and
made “humiliating and insulting comments.” When the incident was discovered by jail
officials, both deputies were fired.

Copeland and Triplett contended that the deputies’ conduct amounted to a
constitutional violation, and they argue on appeal that summary judgment was improper
because a jury should have decided whether that conduct was the result of a county policy
or custom sufficient to create liability on the part of the County Defendants, relying on
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Case: 11-4171

Document: 006111411120

Filed: 08/23/2012

Page: 3

Nos. 11-4171/4325
Copeland and Triplett v. County of Franklin, Ohio, et al.
Powers v. Hamilton County Public Defender Commission, 501 F.3d 592, 607 (6th Cir.
2007). In that case, we held that a county “cannot be held liable for the constitutional torts
of its employees . . . on a respondeat superior theory.” Id. Instead, “liability will attach only
where the plaintiff establishes that the [county] engaged in a ‘policy or custom’ that was the
‘moving force’ behind the deprivation of the plaintiffs’ rights.” Id. A governmental custom
or policy can be established by, among other means, evidence of official action or the
agency’s written policies, proof of inadequate training or supervision, or evidence that such
violations are routinely tolerated. Thomas v. City of Chattanooga, 398 F.3d 426, 429 (6th
Cir. 2005).

In this case, Copeland and Triplett claimed that the County Defendants fostered an
atmosphere in the jail that encouraged misconduct by the staff and discouraged deputies
from reporting on each other. They attributed this situation to the County Defendants’
failure to provide adequate training and supervision, and they pointed to the deposition
testimony of the former deputies in support of this argument. However, the district court
found that the deputies’ testimony was self-serving and “an obvious attempt to justify their
conduct by claiming that ‘everyone does it.’” The court further held, correctly we conclude,
that the evidence “falls far short of showing that the (Sheriff’s Department) engaged in a
‘policy or custom’ that was the ‘moving force’ behind the (alleged) deprivation of (Plaintiffs’)
rights,” quoting Powers, 501 F.3d at 607, and citing Monell v. New York City Department
of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). As the district court noted:

[E]ven when accepting all of the evidence presented by Plaintiffs as true, and
drawing all justifiable inferences in their favor, the evidence does not support
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Case: 11-4171

Document: 006111411120

Filed: 08/23/2012

Page: 4

Nos. 11-4171/4325
Copeland and Triplett v. County of Franklin, Ohio, et al.
the accusation that the type conduct engaged in by [the two former deputies]
is accepted or ongoing at the Franklin County Jail. In spite of attempts to the
contrary, Plaintiffs have failed to provide any evidence to support the
contention that the conduct [at issue] was anything other than a violation of
the Sheriff’s Department’s rules and policies carried out by two deputies who
were terminated for their actions. Plaintiffs have failed to raise any genuine
issue of material fact as to whether there was a policy or custom at the
Franklin County Jail that encouraged or permitted the type of behavior in
which they engaged–let alone that the alleged policy was the moving force
behind the former Deputies’ conduct.

On this basis, the district court held that the County Defendants were entitled to
summary judgment on the claims filed against them as a matter of law, finding that “no
reasonable jury could return a verdict for [the plaintiffs] on their federal law claims filed
against the Franklin County Defendants.” The district court also declined to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims and dismissed them without prejudice,
citing our holding in Brandenburg v. Housing Authority of Irvine, 253 F.3d 891, 900 (6th Cir.
2001) (“the usual course is for the district court to dismiss the state-law claims without
prejudice if all federal claims are disposed of on summary judgment”).

We agree with both the district court’s reasoning and its result, and we therefore
AFFIRM the court’s judgment.

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