USA v. Marcus Campbell
Per Curiam OPINION filed : AFFIRMED, decision not for publication. Boyce F. Martin , Jr., Circuit Judge; Richard Allen Griffin, Circuit Judge and Sandra S. Beckwith, U.S. District Judge for the Southern District of Ohio, sitting by designation.
NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
File Name: 12a1237n.06
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
DEBORAH S. HUNT, Clerk
Nov 29, 2012
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
ON APPEAL FROM THE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT
COURT FOR THE NORTHERN
DISTRICT OF OHIO
BEFORE: MARTIN and GRIFFIN, Circuit Judges; BECKWITH, District Judge.*
PER CURIAM. Marcus Campbell, who is represented by counsel, appeals a district court
judgment sentencing him to 180 months of imprisonment following his guilty plea to possessing
a firearm as a felon.
Campbell was sentenced under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e),
to the mandatory minimum sentence. While conceding that precedent is against his arguments, he
argues for the purposes of possible further appeal that the residual provision of the ACCA is void
for vagueness and that his previous convictions for third-degree burglary and fourth-degree
aggravated assault are not violent felonies.
“We review de novo a challenge to the constitutionality of a statute.” United States v.
Bowers, 594 F.3d 522, 527 (6th Cir. 2010). The residual clause of the ACCA, referring to a previous
The Honorable Sandra S. Beckwith, United States District Judge for the Southern District
of Ohio, sitting by designation.
United States v. Campbell
offense that “otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to
another,” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii), has been held by the Supreme Court to not be
unconstitutionally vague. Rather, the clause provides guidance that allows a person to conform his
conduct to the law. See Sykes v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2267, 2277 (2011); James v. United States,
550 U.S. 192, 210 n.6 (2007). Campbell hopes that the dissents in those cases will persuade us to
find the statute unconstitutionally vague. However, we are bound by the existing precedent to the
contrary. Thus, the district court did not err in overruling Campbell’s objection to his sentence based
on the alleged vagueness of the ACCA.
Campbell also argues that his previous convictions for third-degree burglary and fourthdegree aggravated assault are not violent felonies under the ACCA, in order to preserve these issues
for further appeal. However, he concedes that we have held to the contrary. See United States v.
Coleman, 655 F.3d 480, 482–83 (6th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1045 (2012) (holding that
third-degree burglary is a violent felony); United States v. Rodriguez, 664 F.3d 1032, 1037–39 & n.2
(6th Cir. 2011) (holding that fourth-degree aggravated assault is a violent felony).
The district court’s judgment is affirmed.
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