USA v. Gary Keith

Filing

Per Curiam OPINION filed : the district court's judgment is AFFIRMED, decision not for publication pursuant to local rule 206. Damon J. Keith, Circuit Judge; Boyce F. Martin , Jr., Circuit Judge and John M. Rogers, Circuit Judge.

Case: 11-6404

Document: 006111463870

Filed: 10/12/2012

Page: 1

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
File Name: 12a1075n.06

FILED

No. 11-6404

Oct 12, 2012

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
GARY LLOYD KEITH,
Defendant-Appellant.

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DEBORAH S. HUNT, Clerk

ON APPEAL FROM THE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT
COURT FOR THE WESTERN
DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY

BEFORE: KEITH, MARTIN, and ROGERS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM. Gary Lloyd Keith appeals his conviction for receiving child pornography
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(2), and for possessing child pornography in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B).
Following the jury’s verdict finding Keith guilty of both charges, the government moved to
dismiss the possession charge. The district court granted the motion and sentenced Keith to 180
months of imprisonment. On appeal, Keith argues that: 1) the district court erred by permitting the
prosecutor to introduce evidence of his prior convictions for the purpose of establishing identity and
motive under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b)(2); 2) the district court violated his double-jeopardy
rights by permitting the trial to proceed on both offenses; and 3) the district court erred by allowing
the prosecutor to determine which charge to dismiss following the jury’s guilty verdict.

Case: 11-6404

Document: 006111463870

Filed: 10/12/2012

Page: 2

No. 11-6404
United States v. Keith
Keith asserts that the district court erred by permitting the prosecutor to present evidence of
his prior convictions. He states that the evidence was irrelevant to the issues of identity and motive.
In addition, the probative value of the evidence was substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect.
The legal determination regarding the admission of evidence of a prior conviction under Rule 404(b)
is reviewed de novo. United States v. Clay, 667 F.3d 689, 693 (6th Cir. 2012). However, “we
review for abuse of discretion the determination that the probative value of the evidence is not
substantially outweighed by unfair prejudicial impact.” Id. When reviewing whether the district
court properly balanced the probative value and “unfair prejudicial impact,” we consider “the
evidence in the light most favorable to [the] proponent, maximizing its probative value and
minimizing its prejudicial effect.” United States v. Carney, 387 F.3d 436, 451 (6th Cir. 2004)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
The evidence of Keith’s prior convictions was admissible for the proper purpose of
establishing both identity and motive. The evidence tended to show that Keith was the individual
responsible for the child pornography found on the computer and that his motive for obtaining it was
to replace the child pornography that had been seized in connection with his prior arrest. See United
States v. Perry, 438 F.3d 642, 648 (6th Cir. 2006). Further, given the importance of the evidence
for establishing identity and the fact that the district court repeatedly gave clear limiting instructions
to the jury concerning the evidence, the district court did not abuse its discretion when weighing the
probative value of the evidence against its prejudicial effect. See United States v. Myers, 123 F.3d
350, 363 (6th Cir. 1997).

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Case: 11-6404

Document: 006111463870

Filed: 10/12/2012

Page: 3

No. 11-6404
United States v. Keith
Keith argues that the district court violated his double jeopardy rights by permitting the trial
to proceed on both charged offenses because the offenses are effectively the same. We review the
legal aspect of questions of double jeopardy de novo. United States v. Jones, 489 F.3d 243, 254 (6th
Cir. 2007). Keith’s double jeopardy rights were not violated because a charged offense and a lesser
included offense may be tried simultaneously, and because the district court dismissed the lesserincluded offense of possessing child pornography before entering judgment and sentenced Keith only
on the charge of receiving child pornography charge. See United States v. Ehle, 640 F.3d 689,
698–99 (6th Cir. 2011).
Finally, Keith argues that the district court erred by allowing the prosecutor to decide which
charge to dismiss following the jury’s guilty verdict. Keith asserts that the decision should have been
made by the district court. Because Keith did not raise this objection in the district court, we review
the argument for plain error. See United States v. Corp, 668 F.3d 379, 387–88 (6th Cir. 2012). To
establish plain error, Keith must show that an obvious or clear error affected both his substantial
rights and the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceeding. See United States
v. Inman, 666 F.3d 1001, 1003–04 (6th Cir. 2012). The district court did not err because the court
made the decision to dismiss the possession charge upon the government’s motion after noting that
the charge carried the lesser penalty. See United States v. Avery, 128 F.3d 966, 972 (6th Cir. 1997).
The district court’s judgment is affirmed.

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