USA v. William Richmond-Hairston

Filing

Per Curiam OPINION filed : AFFIRMED the district court's judgment, decision not for publication. Boyce F. Martin , Jr., Circuit Judge; Richard F. Suhrheinrich, Circuit Judge and Julia Smith Gibbons, Circuit Judge.

Case: 12-1100

Document: 006111546008

Filed: 01/02/2013

Page: 1

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
File Name: 13a0005n.06

FILED

No. 12-1100

Jan 02, 2013
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
WILLIAM RASHAAD RICHMONDHAIRSTON,
Defendant-Appellant.

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DEBORAH S. HUNT, Clerk

ON APPEAL FROM THE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT
COURT FOR THE WESTERN
DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

BEFORE: MARTIN, SUHRHEINRICH, and GIBBONS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM. William Rashaad Richmond-Hairston, who is represented by counsel,
appeals his sentence imposed following his guilty pleas to charges of possession of a firearm by a
felon and possession with the intent to distribute marijuana.
Richmond-Hairston entered his guilty pleas pursuant to a plea agreement in which the
government agreed to dismiss a third count of possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drugtrafficking crime, which would have resulted in an additional lengthy consecutive sentence. The
advisory sentencing guidelines range was calculated at 151 to 180 months of imprisonment, which
included a two-level enhancement to the offense level for obstruction of justice. Richmond-Hairston
objected to the enhancement, without which his sentencing guidelines range would have been 130
to 162 months of imprisonment. He also argued that a downward variance was warranted because

Case: 12-1100

Document: 006111546008

Filed: 01/02/2013

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No. 12-1100
United States v. Richmond-Hairston
his criminal history was overstated; that he did not use the firearm and did not know that it was
stolen; that he had a difficult childhood; and that he had made an effort to cooperate with the
government.
These arguments were addressed at the sentencing hearing. The district court listened to a
tape recording of telephone calls made by Richmond-Hairston to his mother from the jail following
his arrest. During one of these phone calls, Richmond-Hairston lowered his voice, told his mother
that the police were coming to search her house, which he had given as his address, and said that she
should “get that . . . shit up out of there now.” The district court concluded that it was “quite
obvious” that Richmond-Hairston was referring to controlled substances that would be relevant
conduct in this case, and that the investigation of his crime was ongoing at that time. Therefore, the
court found that the obstruction of justice enhancement should be applied. However, the court also
noted that it would have imposed the same sentence without the enhancement, due to the overlap in
the guidelines ranges. The district court discussed the sentencing factors favorable to RichmondHairston, including his troubled childhood, his attempt at cooperation with the government, and his
behavior while on bond, as well as the negative factors of Richmond-Hairston’s criminal history and
the need for the sentence to deter criminal conduct. The district court imposed a sentence of 151
months of imprisonment.
On appeal, Richmond-Hairston reasserts his argument that the enhancement for obstruction
of justice was erroneous and argues that his sentence was also procedurally unreasonable because
it was not at the bottom of the guidelines range applicable without the enhancement.

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We review sentences for procedural and substantive reasonableness. Gall v. United States,
552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). First, we “ensure that the district court committed no significant procedural
error, such as failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) the Guidelines range, treating the
Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) factors, selecting a sentence
based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence.” Id. If no
procedural error occurred, we “then consider the substantive reasonableness of the sentence imposed
under an abuse-of-discretion standard.” Id. A sentence may be substantively unreasonable “if the
district court chooses the sentence arbitrarily, grounds the sentence on impermissible factors, or
unreasonably weighs a pertinent factor.” United States v. Brooks, 628 F.3d 791, 796 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 131 S. Ct. 3077 (2011). When a sentence falls within the applicable guideline range, we
afford it a rebuttable presumption of substantive reasonableness. Id.
Richmond-Hairston first argues that the enhancement to his offense level for obstruction of
justice was improper. The government must prove an obstruction of justice by a preponderance of
the evidence. United States v. Dunham, 295 F.3d 605, 609 (6th Cir. 2002). Whether reviewing the
district court’s finding of an obstruction of justice for clear error or de novo, see United States v.
Cole, 359 F.3d 420, 430 (6th Cir. 2004), we conclude that the district court’s finding was correct.
“[D]irecting . . . another person to . . . conceal evidence that is material to an official investigation
or judicial proceeding . . . , or attempting to do so” constitutes obstruction of justice under USSG
§ 3C1.1 cmt. n.4(D). The district court properly found that Richmond-Hairston’s telephone call to
his mother was obstruction of justice, correctly overruling his objections that it was not clear what
he was referring to and that any evidence found would not have been relevant. Moreover, any error
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by the district court would have been harmless because the court stated that it would have imposed
the same sentence without the enhancement. See United States v. McCarty, 628 F.3d 284, 294 (6th
Cir. 2010).
In his related second argument, Richmond-Hairston argues that his sentence is procedurally
unreasonable because it is not at the low end of the guidelines range applicable without the
enhancement for obstruction of justice. This argument reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of
the sentencing process. The sentencing court does not consider the sentencing factors in order to
choose a position on the guidelines range, but in order to choose a sentence that it believes is
sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to fulfill the purposes of sentencing. The sentence chosen
may fall at different positions on overlapping guidelines ranges, but this does not render the sentence
unreasonable.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.

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