Yaldo, et al v. Doe, et al

Filing

Per Curiam OPINION: we therefore VACATE the district court's judgment to the extent that it dismissed the Trustee's claims, Dr. Yaldo's post-petition and injunctive-relief claims, and DHE's claims, and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We DENY the parties' appellate motions as MOOT, decision not for publication. Boyce F. Martin , Jr., Circuit Judge; Deborah L. Cook, Circuit Judge and James L. Graham, U.S. District Judge for the Southern District of Ohio, sitting by designation.

Case: 12-1840

Document: 006111734857

Filed: 06/26/2013

Page: 1

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
File Name: 13a0603n.06
No. 12-1840

FILED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

DEBORAH S. HUNT, Clerk

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Plaintiffs-Appellants,
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v.
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DR. DANIEL HADDAD; DANIEL S. HADDAD, )
MD, PC doing business as Laser Eye Institute; and )
JOHN DOE,
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Defendants-Appellees.
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Jun 26, 2013

MICHAEL A. STEVENSON, Chapter 7 Trustee for
the Estate of Mazin Yaldo; MAZIN K. YALDO, MD;
MICHIGAN GLAUCOMA INSTITUTE, PC;
ASSOCIATED EYE INSTITUTES OF DETROIT,
PC; DH EQUIPMENT, LLC; and ASSOCIATED
EYE SPECIALISTS OF FARMINGTON HILLS, PC,

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED
STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF
MICHIGAN

Before: MARTIN and COOK, Circuit Judges; GRAHAM, District Judge*

PER CURIAM. Plaintiffs-Appellants Dr. Mazin Yaldo, his Chapter 7 bankruptcy estate’s
trustee, Michael A. Stevenson (“Trustee”), three professional corporations d/b/a “Yaldo Eye Center,”
and DH Equipment, LLC (“DHE”) appeal the district court’s application of judicial estoppel to
dismiss their suit against a competitor they claim published false and misleading advertisments
about their business. Defendants-Appellees, Dr. Daniel Haddad and his professional corporation
d/b/a “Laser Eye Institute,” defend the court’s use of judicial estoppel, citing the Trustee’s
*

The Honorable James L. Graham, United States District Judge for the Southern District
of Ohio, sitting by designation.

Case: 12-1840

Document: 006111734857

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undisclosed conflict of interest. Appellees also support the judgment on multiple grounds not
reached by the district court, including standing and the merits of the claims. Appellants move to
strike these alternative arguments for lack of a cross-appeal, and both parties move the court to take
judicial notice of various aspects of the bankruptcy and discovery proceedings. For the following
reasons, we VACATE IN PART and REMAND the district court’s judgment and DENY the parties’
appellate motions as MOOT.

Though the district court dismissed the entire case with prejudice, appellants challenge only
four aspects of its judicial-estoppel ruling: (1) the dismissal of the Trustee’s claims; (2) the dismissal
of Dr. Yaldo’s post-bankruptcy-petition claims; (3) the dismissal of Dr. Yaldo’s request for
injunctive relief; and (4) the dismissal of DHE’s claims. Confining our review to these issues, we
find that the district court neglected to explain why the parties’ conduct justified judicial estoppel
of these claims.

The court’s categorical estoppel-of-all-claims-by-all-parties cannot stand in light of our
recent decision in Stephenson v. Malloy that “a debtor’s errors or omissions should not be
attributed to the trustee for purposes of judicial estoppel.” 700 F.3d 265, 272 (6th Cir. 2012)
(reversing the district court’s estoppel-based judgment against a Ch. 7 trustee where “[d]efendants
allege[d] no wrongdoing by the trustee”). Appellees suggest tension between Stephenson and our
prior precedent, White v. Wyndham Vacation Ownership, Inc., 617 F.3d 472, 478–84 (6th Cir. 2010)
(affirming the district court’s estoppel-based dismissal of a debtor’s sexual harassment suit, where

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No. 12-1840
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the debtor concealed the claims from her bankruptcy estate). Yet White did not squarely address
whether a debtor’s concealment of assets justifies estopping the bankruptcy trustee from bringing
claims on behalf of the bankruptcy estate and, thus, does not control. See 617 F.3d at 481 n.10
(rejecting the dissent’s suggestion that the court allow the debtor’s claims to proceed in light of the
plan confirmation order’s requirement that litigation proceeds go to the bankruptcy estate); see also
Stephenson, 700 F.3d at 272–73 (distinguishing White). To permit individualized consideration of
the Trustee’s pursuit of these claims, we VACATE that aspect of the court’s judgment and
REMAND for further consideration in light of Stephenson.

We similarly VACATE the district court’s summary dismissal of Dr. Yaldo’s postbankruptcy-petition claims (portions of which appear to request injunctive relief) and DHE’s claims
pertaining to the “Yaldo” tradename. Appellees suggest that Dr. Yaldo and DHE lack standing to
pursue these claims, pointing to Dr. Yaldo’s bankruptcy and a voided transfer of assets from him to
DHE. They further challenge the remaining claims on the merits, renewing arguments presented to
the district court in their motion to dismiss. Though properly preserved, the undeveloped nature of
these issues persuade us that the district court should resolve these matters in the first instance on
remand.

We therefore VACATE the district court’s judgment to the extent that it dismissed the
Trustee’s claims, Dr. Yaldo’s post-petition and injunctive-relief claims, and DHE’s claims, and

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REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We DENY the parties’ appellate
motions as MOOT.

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