Michael Miller v. Comm. of Social Security

Filing

OPINION: The district court's judgment is AFFIRMED, decision not for publication. Julia Smith Gibbons, AUTHORING Circuit Judge; Raymond M. Kethledge, Circuit Judge and Jane Branstetter Stranch, Circuit Judge (Dissenting).

Case: 12-3644

Document: 006111663805

Filed: 04/22/2013

Page: 1

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
File Name: 13a0401n.06
No. 12-3644

FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
MICHAEL MILLER,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant-Appellee.

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Apr 22, 2013
DEBORAH S. HUNT, Clerk

ON APPEAL FROM THE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT
COURT FOR THE NORTHERN
DISTRICT OF OHIO

BEFORE: GIBBONS, KETHLEDGE, and STRANCH, Circuit Judges.

JULIA SMITH GIBBONS. Michael Miller appeals the district court’s judgment affirming
the denial of his applications for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income
benefits.
In 2002, Miller filed applications for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security
income benefits. The Social Security Administration denied the applications. On October 28, 2004,
after conducting an administrative hearing, an administrative law judge (ALJ) determined that Miller
was not disabled. Miller did not appeal that decision.
In 2007, Miller again filed applications for disability insurance benefits and supplemental
security income benefits, alleging that he became disabled in April 2001. After the Social Security
Administration denied the applications, Miller requested a hearing. In 2009, an ALJ conducted a

Case: 12-3644

Document: 006111663805

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hearing and denied Miller relief. The Appeals Council declined to review the case. The district
court affirmed the denial of Miller’s applications.
On appeal, Miller makes the following arguments: (1) the ALJ erred by improperly applying
the doctrine of res judicata to conclude that his residual functional capacity (RFC) was the same as
had been determined in his previous administrative proceedings in 2004; (2) the ALJ erred by failing
to give proper consideration to his cognitive and personality deficits and by relying on irrelevant
facts; and (3) the ALJ erred by disregarding the opinions of a registered nurse and doctor and the
medical expert who testified at his hearing and by crediting the opinions of several consulting
physicians. “Our review of the ALJ’s decision is limited to whether the ALJ applied the correct legal
standards and whether the findings of the ALJ are supported by substantial evidence.” Blakley v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 581 F.3d 399, 405 (6th Cir. 2009). “The substantial-evidence standard is met
if a reasonable mind might accept the relevant evidence as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id.
at 406 (internal quotation marks omitted). “We give de novo review to the district court’s
conclusions on each issue.” Id.
Miller first argues that the ALJ erred by improperly applying the doctrine of res judicata to
determine that his RFC was the same as it had been in 2004. The ALJ did not err, however, because
he did not find that res judicata compelled the conclusion that Miller’s RFC had remained unchanged
since 2004. Rather, the ALJ correctly determined that, because Miller failed to present new material
evidence concerning the period from April 2001 through October 28, 2004, the ALJ was bound by
the previous decision for that period. See Drummond v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 126 F.3d 837, 842-43
(6th Cir. 1997). Further, the ALJ properly based his decision concerning Miller’s RFC at the time
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Case: 12-3644

Document: 006111663805

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of the 2009 hearing on all of the evidence in the record pertaining to the period after October 28,
2004.
Miller next argues that the ALJ’s decision was not supported by substantial evidence because
he failed to give proper consideration to Miller’s cognitive and personality deficits and he relied on
irrelevant facts such as Miller’s ability to maintain part-time employment. Miller also argues that
the ALJ erred by disregarding the opinions of Katherine Proehl, who is an advanced practice
registered nurse, Dr. Ruth Martin, and Godfred Spring, the medical expert who testified at the
administrative hearing, and by crediting the assessments of Dr. Douglas Pawlarczyk and Dr. Jeffrey
Vasiloff, who concluded that Miller’s RFC remained the same as it had been during his 2004
proceedings.
To the extent that the ALJ erred by failing to find that Miller’s cognitive and personality
deficits constituted severe impairments, the error was harmless because the ALJ adequately took into
account the effects of those deficits by restricting Miller’s RFC to work that was simple and low
stress, that did not involve confrontation, negotiation, production quotas, or piece rate work, and that
involved only minimal interaction with others. See Maziarz v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 837
F.2d 240, 244 (6th Cir. 1987). Further, the ALJ did not err by considering Miller’s ability to
maintain part-time employment as one factor relevant to the determination of whether he was
disabled. See 20 CFR §§ 404.1529(c)(3), 404.1571, 416.929(c)(3), 416.971.
In addition, the ALJ gave valid reasons for discounting the opinions of Proehl, Martin, and
Spring and for crediting the opinions of the other consulting physicians. The ALJ reasonably
explained that he gave little weight to Proehl’s opinions, which were also signed by Dr. Martin,
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because the assessment that Miller was markedly limited in mental functioning conflicted with
Miller’s treatment records and other evidence demonstrating that he was able to engage in significant
daily activities and that he was able to maintain part-time employment for an extended period of
time. That explanation was a sufficient basis for discounting the opinions even assuming that Martin
was a treating physician. See Blakley, 581 F.3d at 406. The ALJ also reasonably explained that he
discounted Dr. Spring’s testimony that Miller met the regulatory listings for a psychotic, affective,
or personality disorder because Spring failed to identify evidence in the record demonstrating how
Miller met each requirement of one of the listings. See 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1, §§ 12.03,
12.04, 12.08. Finally, the ALJ reasonably relied on the functional assessments of Dr. Pawlarczyk
and Dr. Vasiloff because, as demonstrated by the subsequent reviewing opinions of Dr. David Dietz
and Dr. Anton Freihofner, the assessments were based on all of the information in Miller’s file and
not simply an adoption of the functional assessments made in 2004.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.

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Jane B. Stranch, dissenting. My review of the record reveals that the ALJ failed to give
proper consideration to the medical opinion evidence concerning Miller’s mental impairments. See
Gayheart v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., – F.3d –, 2013 WL 896255, at *8-9 (6th Cir. Mar. 12, 2013). First,
the ALJ should not have discredited the opinions of Dr. Martin and Nurse Proehl on the basis that
the opinions were inconsistent with their treatment notes because the notes thoroughly documented
and supported their diagnoses of severe mental impairments. Further, the ALJ failed to set forth a
sufficient basis for disregarding the testimony of Dr. Spring that Miller’s impairments met the
requirements of two regulatory listings. Finally, the ALJ should not have relied on Dr. Pawlarczyk’s
assessment of Miller’s mental limitations because Pawlarczyk merely adopted a prior functional
assessment without considering any of the new medical evidence that Miller presented. Because the
ALJ failed to give appropriate consideration to the medical opinion evidence, I would remand the
case to the Social Security Administration for further consideration. Accordingly, I respectfully
dissent from the majority’s opinion.

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