USA v. Bryon Parker
Per Curiam OPINION filed : The district court's order denying this motion to reduce sentence is AFFIRMED, decision not for publication. Deborah L. Cook and Richard Allen Griffin, Circuit Judges; and Walter H. Rice, United States District Judge for the Southern District of Ohio, sitting by designation.
NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
File Name: 14a0576n.06
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
BRYON S. PARKER,
Jul 30, 2014
DEBORAH S. HUNT, Clerk
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED
STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF
BEFORE: COOK and GRIFFIN, Circuit Judges; RICE, District Judge.
Bryon S. Parker, a federal prisoner, appeals a district court order
denying his motion to reduce sentence filed pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). Parker entered a
guilty plea in 2006 to charges of distribution of cocaine base and possession of cocaine with
intent to distribute. Because he had prior state convictions for trafficking cocaine and trafficking
within 1000 yards of a school, he was subject to a mandatory minimum sentence of 120 months
of imprisonment, which the district court imposed.
In this, his second motion to reduce sentence, Parker argued that the new mandatory
minimums of the Fair Sentencing Act (FSA) should apply. The district court determined that it
lacked the authority to reduce Parker’s sentence on that basis. Parker reasserts his argument on
appeal and argues that the failure to apply the new mandatory minimums violates the Equal
Protection Clause and the Eighth Amendment. His appeal brief was filed prior to the denial of
The Honorable Walter Herbert Rice, United States District Judge for the Southern
District of Ohio, sitting by designation.
United States v. Parker
certiorari by the Supreme Court in United States v. Blewett, 746 F.3d 647 (6th Cir. 2013) (en
banc), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1779 (2014), that is dispositive of his issues.
We review de novo a district court’s conclusion that it lacks authority to reduce a
sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). United States v. Payton, 617 F.3d 911, 913 (6th Cir.
2010). Section 3582(c)(2) is a narrow remedy that allows reduction of a sentence only in cases
where the Sentencing Commission has lowered the guidelines range. Blewett, 746 F.3d at 656;
United States v. Carter, 500 F.3d 486, 490 (6th Cir. 2007). It is therefore inapplicable in this
case, which is based on the lowering of the mandatory minimum sentences by Congress. See
United States v. Bell, 731 F.3d 552, 554-55 (6th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1922 (2014).
Therefore, the district court correctly concluded that it lacked authority to reduce Parker’s
The additional arguments raised by Parker on appeal also lack merit. He argues that
Dorsey v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2321, 2335 (2012), which held that the FSA applies only to
those sentenced after its enactment, is distinguishable because it was a case on direct appeal
rather than a motion to reduce sentence. However, it would be illogical to find that a defendant
sentenced before the effective date of the FSA could not receive the benefit of the Act, but then
allow him to move for a sentence reduction on the same ground. Cf. Blewett, 746 F.3d at 658.
Parker’s arguments raising Equal Protection and Eighth Amendment challenges were also
rejected in Blewett. Id. at 658-60.
Accordingly, the district court’s order denying this motion to reduce sentence is affirmed.
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?