USA v. Jonathan Huguely
Per Curiam OPINION filed : The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. Decision not for publication. Danny J. Boggs, R. Guy Cole, Jr., and David W. McKeague, Circuit Judges.
NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
File Name: 14a0434n.06
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
DEBORAH S. HUNT, Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
JONATHAN C. HUGUELY,
Jun 16, 2014
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED
STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF
BEFORE: BOGGS, COLE, and McKEAGUE, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM. Jonathan C. Huguely appeals the district court’s judgment of conviction
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Huguely pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute crack
cocaine and possessing with intent to distribute cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1)
and 846. The district court sentenced him to the statutory mandatory minimum term of 120
months for the crack-cocaine conviction, see 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B)(iii), to run concurrently
with a 30-month term for the cocaine conviction.
On appeal, Huguely makes the following arguments: (1) imposition of the statutory
mandatory minimum sentence violated his due-process and equal-protection rights; (2) the
mandatory minimum sentence conflicts with the parsimony provision set forth in 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a); (3) the government breached the plea agreement by refusing to move for a downward
departure from the mandatory minimum sentence on account of his substantial assistance; and
United States v. Huguely
(4) the mandatory minimum sentence violates separation-of-powers principles. We review de
novo constitutional challenges to criminal statutes. United States v. Ostrander, 411 F.3d 684,
694 (6th Cir. 2005).
The district court’s imposition of the mandatory minimum sentence under 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(b)(1)(B) did not deny Huguely due process or violate his equal-protection rights. See
United States v. Blewett, 746 F.3d 647, 658 (6th Cir. 2013) (en banc), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct.
1779 (2014); United States v. Wimbley, 553 F.3d 455, 463 (6th Cir. 2009); United States v.
Pickett, 941 F.2d 411, 418 (6th Cir. 1991).
In addition, we have previously rejected the
arguments that mandatory minimum sentences conflict with the parsimony provision in
§ 3553(a), see United States v. Marshall, 736 F.3d 492, 500–01 (6th Cir. 2013), and violate
separation-of-powers principles, see United States v. Cecil, 615 F.3d 678, 696 (6th Cir. 2010).
Finally, whether reviewed de novo or for plain error, see United States v. Swanberg,
370 F.3d 622, 627 (6th Cir. 2004), Huguely’s claim that the government breached the plea
agreement fails. Under the terms of the agreement, the government would move for a downward
departure from the mandatory minimum sentence if Huguely provided substantial assistance,
unless he committed another crime, obstructed justice, or violated a court order.
government retained discretion to determine whether Huguely provided substantial assistance
and otherwise qualified for the motion. Because Huguely admitted that he committed two
misdemeanor offenses, the government was not obligated to move for a downward departure,
and Huguely has not alleged that the government’s decision to withhold the motion was based on
unconstitutional motives, see United States v. Lukse, 286 F.3d 906, 911 (6th Cir. 2002).
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
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