USA v. Rodrigo Macias-Faria

Filing

OPINION filed : The sentence imposed by the district court is AFFIRMED, decision not for publication. Richard Allen Griffin, Circuit Judge; Jane Branstetter Stranch, Circuit Judge and George C. Steeh, Authoring U.S. District Judge for the Eastern District of Michigan, sitting by designation.

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NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
File Name: 15a0170n.06

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-6414

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
RODRIGO MACIAS-FARIAS,
Defendant-Appellant.
______________________________________

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FILED
Mar 05, 2015
DEBORAH S. HUNT, Clerk

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED
STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY

Before: GRIFFIN and STRANCH, Circuit Judges; and STEEH, Senior District Judge.*
GEORGE CARAM STEEH, Senior District Judge.
Defendant’s first appeal to this court resulted in a remand for resentencing before the district
court. At resentencing, defendant Rodrigo Macias-Farias argued that his new sentence should be
lowered based on his efforts at rehabilitation while incarcerated. The district court resentenced
Macias-Farias to 295 months of prison, a reduction of over two-years from his original sentence.
On appeal, Macias-Farias argues that the district court failed to consider or explain its reasons for
allegedly rejecting his argument for leniency. Because the record reflects that the district court did
consider defendant’s leniency argument in reducing his sentence, we AFFIRM.

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The Honorable George Caram Steeh, Senior United States District Judge for the Eastern
District of Michigan, sitting by designation.

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United States v. Macias-Farias
I. BACKGROUND
Macias-Farias was convicted by a jury of conspiring to possess more than 1,000 kilograms
of marijuana with intent to distribute and aiding and abetting that possession. The district court first
sentenced Macias-Farias to 320 months imprisonment. In doing so, the district court enhanced his
sentence two levels for obstruction of justice finding that he perjured himself when he testified at
trial. Macias-Farias appealed. We affirmed his conviction but remanded the case for resentencing
because the district court’s findings were insufficient to support an obstruction of justice
enhancement. United States v. Macias-Farias, 706 F.3d 775, 783 (6th Cir. 2013).
Upon resentencing, the district court made specific findings that Macias-Farias had perjured
himself when he testified at trial and concluded that his offense level of 38, criminal history category
II, and guideline range of 262 to 327 months remained the same as determined at the original
sentencing. (R. 419 at 11). The government filed a resentencing memorandum that addressed the
sole issue of whether defendant had perjured himself at trial. (R. 404). In his response to the
government’s resentencing memorandum, Macias-Farias argued that the court should lower his
sentence based on his rehabilitation while incarcerated, stating that he had completed 12 hours of
anxiety and phobia management, stress management, and anger management respectively. (R. 407 at
5). Macias-Farias also argued that he was furthering his education, had obtained no disciplinary
reports, had exhibited good behavior, good living skills, and improved family/communication skills.
Id. At resentencing, the government argued that the court should impose the original sentence of
320 months, and opposed any reduction on the grounds that defendant committed his drug-

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trafficking offenses while on supervised release; thus suggesting he had not been rehabilitated.
R.. 419 at 12).
Also, the district court specifically informed the parties that it had reviewed their
resentencing memoranda and adjourned the hearing for several hours so that the court could look at
the briefs more closely. Id. at 5. Macias-Farias, through counsel, informed the court that he sought
a reduced sentence based on his alleged rehabilitation and the court informed counsel that it
understood that to be his argument. Id. The government argued that the court should reject MaciasFarias’s argument that he had made “post-rehabilitative efforts, anger management, and whatever
else was pointed out [as those efforts] do[] not overcome the previous factors that were considered
by this Court and the previous arguments made by the United States.” Id. at 12. In response, defense
counsel argued at some length that Macias-Farias’s sentence should be reduced to 240 months on
the grounds that he had reformed while in prison:
When you look at Mr. Macias-Farias, in the very short period of time relative to the
guideline range, he has done a lot of things in order to improve his life, improve his
demeanor, change his ways, and he continues on with his development of living
skills, family and communication skills, and work skills. This is all things that are
– when 3553 was written, these are all things that were taken into consideration in
mitigation, not aggravation.
Forward-looking is what happens to somebody from the moment that he is caught or
from the moment that he is starting to rehabilitate himself. Mr. [Macias-]Farias spent
a relatively short period of time compared to the time that Your Honor gave him
originally and has already shown changes in his behavior. His level and custody
suggest a decrease in recidivism. He has no disciplinary reports. He has worked very
hard to conduct himself and to improve himself in jail. I believe that behavior like
that should be warranted with a show of good rather than with a stick or further
punishment. . . . The progress that he has made until today only in a couple years
shows and indicates his future conduct.
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Id. at 13-14. Immediately after defense counsel argued for leniency, the district court stated on the
record:
All right. I’ve considered all these factors, the advisory guidelines, and 18 U.S.C.
Section 3553(a). This is a serious charge. On reflection, I don’t think that the overall
circumstances deserve a sentence at the high end of the guidelines, which is what
happened the first time around. I think that, considering all the circumstances, the
appropriate sentence would be at the mid range of the guideline range, which is still
a very significant sentence.
Id. at 14. The district court imposed a sentence of 295 months, which was more than two years less
than the original sentence. Id. at 15. In doing so, the court further explained that “[t]he sentence is
within the advisory guideline range, and otherwise for the reasons stated, the Court believes it is
sufficient, not less so or more so than is necessary, to provide reasonable punishment and security.”
Id. at 15-16.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Procedural Reasonableness Review
“[C]ourts of appeals must review all sentences . . . under a deferential abuse-of-discretion
standard.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007). A sentence within the advisory Guidelines
range is entitled to “a rebuttable presumption of reasonableness.” United States v. Richardson, 437
F.3d 550, 553 (6th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). At sentencing, MaciasFarias did not object to the sentence imposed or to the district court’s alleged failure to consider his
leniency argument. The district court inquired as to whether the parties had any objections to the
sentence pronounced as required by United States v. Bostic, 371 F.3d 865, 872 (6th Cir. 2004), and
Macias-Farias having failed to so object, his appeal is subject to plain error review. United States
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v. Wallace, 597 F.3d 794, 802 (6th Cir. 2010) (citing United States v. Vonner, 516 F.3d 382, 385-86
(6th Cir. 2008) (en banc)). “To show plain error, a defendant must show (1) error (2) that was
obvious or clear, (3) that affected defendant’s substantial rights and (4) that affected the fairness,
integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings.” Id. (citing Vonner, 516 F.3d at 386). No
such error has been committed here.
B. The District Court Considered Defendant’s Post-Sentencing Rehabilitation
When a defendant’s sentence has been set aside on appeal, upon remand, the district court
may consider evidence of defendant’s rehabilitation since his prior sentencing in determining a new
sentence. Pepper v. United States, 562 U.S. 476, __, 131 S. Ct. 1229, 1241 (2011). Macias-Farias
argues that the district court failed to consider his argument for leniency upon resentencing based
on his alleged rehabilitation while in prison. The sentencing judge must set forth his or her reasons
for a particular sentence and “[r]eversible procedural error occurs if the sentencing judge fails to ‘set
forth enough [of a statement of reasons] to satisfy the appellate court that he has considered the
parties’ arguments and has a reasoned basis for exercising his own legal decision making authority.’”
United States v. Bolds, 511 F.3d 568, 580 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting Rita v. United States, 551 U.S.
338, 356 (2007)). The length and specificity of the district court’s articulation of the rationale for
the sentence imposed will vary: “[s]ometimes the circumstances will call for a brief explanation;
sometimes they will call for a lengthier explanation.” Rita, 551 U.S. at 357. The law is well settled
that “[w]here a defendant raises a particular argument in seeking a lower sentence, the record must
reflect both that the district judge considered the defendant’s argument and that the judge explained
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the basis for rejecting it.” Richardson, 437 F.3d at 554. Reading the resentencing transcript as a
whole, it is clear that the district court both considered Macias-Farias’s leniency argument and
lowered his sentence.
Immediately after defense counsel argued at some length about Macias-Farias’s improved
behavior while in prison, the district court stated that “I’ve considered all these factors,” which was
a clear reference to defense counsel’s arguments. (R. 419 at 14). The district court also indicated
that it had read defendant’s resentencing memoranda and understood defense counsel’s argument
in favor of a reduced sentence based on Macias-Farias’s conduct while in prison. Id. at 5. The
district court did not reject Macias-Farias’s arguments for a lower sentence, but in fact lowered his
sentence significantly. Once the district court made specific findings that defendant perjured himself
at trial, thus warranting the sentencing enhancement, and ruled that the same Guidelines range
applied, the only other issue before the court which was raised by the parties, either in their
resentencing memoranda or at oral argument, was whether defendant’s sentence should be reduced
for his alleged good conduct and rehabilitative efforts while incarcerated. Thus, the only basis for
the district court’s imposition of a lower sentence upon remand was defendant’s changed
circumstances post-sentencing. In sum, Macias-Farias has failed to show that the district court made
an obvious or clear error at resentencing that affected his substantive rights, or that affected the
fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings. Wallace, 597 F.3d at 802.
III. CONCLUSION
The sentence imposed by the district court is AFFIRMED.

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