USA v. Ronnie Jackson

Filing

OPINION filed : the district court's judgment is AFFIRMED, decision not for publication. Ralph B. Guy , Jr., Circuit Judge; Raymond M. Kethledge, Authoring Circuit Judge and Jane Branstetter Stranch, Circuit Judge. **Pursuant to the opinion correction letter of 10/9/15, the opinion attached to this entry has been corrected.--[Edited 10/09/2015 by CL]

Case: 14-5950

Document: 40-3

Filed: 10/08/2015

Page: 1

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
File Name: 15a0685n.06
No. 14-5950

FILED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

Oct 08, 2015
DEBORAH S. HUNT, Clerk

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
RONNIE JACKSON,
Defendant-Appellant.

ON APPEAL FROM THE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT
COURT FOR THE WESTERN
DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

Before: GUY, KETHLEDGE, and STRANCH, Circuit Judges.
KETHLEDGE, Circuit Judge. A federal jury convicted Ronnie Jackson of numerous
robbery and firearm offenses after a three-day trial in which Jackson represented himself. On
appeal, he argues that the district court should have granted his motion for substitute counsel
and, relatedly, that his decision to represent himself was not voluntary. We reject his arguments
and affirm.
I.
Jackson and several accomplices committed six armed robberies at businesses in the
Memphis, Tennessee area. Police captured him at the scene of the last robbery.
A federal grand jury indicted Jackson for one count of robbery affecting interstate
commerce and one count of using a firearm during a crime of violence. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1951,
924(c). The district court appointed T. Clifton Harviel, Jr. to represent Jackson.

Case: 14-5950

Document: 40-3

Filed: 10/08/2015

Page: 2

No. 14-5950
United States of America v. Ronnie Jackson
Three months later, Jackson asked the court to remove Harviel and appoint new counsel.
Although the court found that Harviel had met all of his obligations to Jackson, the court granted
Jackson’s request. The court appointed Jeff Woods to represent Jackson.
Jackson was soon unhappy with Woods too. A month after his appointment, in February
2013, Jackson wrote to the court complaining that Woods was “fail[ing] to communicate with
[him].” At a hearing the following month, Jackson complained that he was constantly being
“shipped around” farther away from his attorney and indicated (by shaking his head) that Woods
was not able to meet with him at Jackson’s current “detention center.” But the court responded
that Woods would surely alert the court if he could not access his client.
In April, Woods filed a motion to transfer Jackson to a facility closer to Memphis—
where his criminal trial would occur.

At a later hearing, Woods expressed concern that

Jackson’s detention center was 150 miles away:
[Jackson] has a right to representation, and he’s been afforded
representation, but I think implicit in that is the ability to
communicate and see the client, and you are hard pressed to find
any criminal defense attorney who’s got—I mean because I’ve got
to drop an entire day just to go out there.
The district court asked Woods to contact the U.S. Marshal and request Jackson’s transfer before
the court ruled on his motion.
Later in April, Jackson sent a letter to the magistrate judge requesting new counsel. In
June, Jackson sent a letter to the district court judge with the same request. In support, Jackson
wrote that Woods had not visited him or written to him about his case. That same month, a
grand jury issued a superseding indictment charging Jackson with six counts of robbery affecting
interstate commerce and six counts of using a firearm during a crime of violence.

-2-

Case: 14-5950

Document: 40-3

Filed: 10/08/2015

Page: 3

No. 14-5950
United States of America v. Ronnie Jackson
In a July hearing, the district court addressed Jackson’s concerns about Woods. Jackson
said that he and Woods had met only once—after Jackson’s letters to the court complaining
about Woods’s lack of contact. Woods explained that a visit to Jackson’s detention facility was
“377 miles round trip.” Woods also said that he understood the issues in the case and had
spoken to the prosecutor on “numerous occasions.” Woods added that he had examined the
discovery file, given Jackson some case law regarding the district court’s jurisdiction over his
case, and sought Jackson’s transfer to a closer facility. Woods explained that Jackson had not
been transferred sooner because of a problem with a required health test. But Woods thought the
problem had been solved and that Jackson would be transferred soon. The district court seemed
satisfied that Jackson’s transfer would resolve any communication concerns and Jackson agreed.
The court then addressed Jackson’s other primary concern, namely jurisdiction over his
case. Jackson was insistent that the district court had none and that Woods should file a motion
to that effect. The court explained that such a motion would be frivolous and that, as an officer
of the court, Woods could not file it. Finally, after an extended colloquy on the subject, the court
stated that “I’ve already made a determination that this Court has jurisdiction[.]”
After still more discussion, Jackson said he was considering representing himself. The
court then put Jackson under oath and asked him about his legal education and experience,
explained the charges against him and their potential penalties, warned Jackson about the
dangers of representing himself, and expressly advised him not to do so. That colloquy runs
eight pages in the hearing transcript. When the court asked Jackson if he “still desire[d] to
represent [him]self,” Jackson asked for time to consult with Woods. Then Jackson started
complaining again about jurisdiction, at which point the district court set a trial date and ended
the hearing.

-3-

Case: 14-5950

Document: 40-3

Filed: 10/08/2015

Page: 4

No. 14-5950
United States of America v. Ronnie Jackson
Three months later, in October, Jackson wrote to the district court requesting new counsel
once again. Jackson asserted that Woods had not returned to see him and that Woods still
refused to file a motion challenging the court’s jurisdiction. Jackson reiterated these complaints
during a hearing later that month and said that he wanted a new attorney. The court responded
that Woods could not control where Jackson was held, and that Jackson could either work with
Woods or represent himself, which again the court urged Jackson not to do. Jackson persisted
with his jurisdictional theories.
Finally, the court said “the only question you need to answer for me is do you wish to
represent yourself or do you wish for Mr. Woods to continue to represent you?” Jackson said he
should have more options than to have Woods represent him or represent himself. The district
court responded that those were his only two options. Jackson said “I don’t want [Woods] on my
case.” The court replied, “[t]hen you are representing yourself.”
Jackson thereafter represented himself at trial. A jury convicted him of all of the charges
in the superseding indictment. The district court imposed a sentence of 1,846 months, which was
driven largely by a series of mandatory minimums on the gun counts. This appeal followed.
II.
Jackson argues that the district court violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel when
the court denied his motion to appoint another lawyer in place of Woods. We review for an
abuse of discretion the district court’s refusal to appoint new counsel. United States v. Marrero,
651 F.3d 453, 464 (6th Cir. 2011).
A.
When a defendant requests new counsel, the district court must “conduct an inquiry . . . to
determine whether there is good cause for substitution of counsel.” United States v. Vasquez,

-4-

Case: 14-5950

Document: 40-3

Filed: 10/08/2015

Page: 5

No. 14-5950
United States of America v. Ronnie Jackson
560 F.3d 461, 466 (6th Cir. 2009). When reviewing a district court’s decision to deny a motion
for substitution of counsel, we consider four factors:
[1] the timeliness of the motion; [2] the adequacy of the court’s
inquiry into the defendant’s complaint; [3] whether the conflict
between the attorney and client was so great that it resulted in a
total lack of communication preventing an adequate defense; and
[4] a balancing of the accused’s right to counsel of his choice and
the public’s interest in the prompt and efficient administration of
justice.
Marrero, 651 F.3d at 464.
With respect to the first factor—timeliness—our main concern is how close to trial a
defendant made his motion for new counsel.

See, e.g., United States v. Saldivar-Trujillo,

380 F.3d 274, 278 (6th Cir. 2004). Here, Jackson first alerted the district court that he was
unhappy with Woods in February 2013—one month after Woods was appointed.

Jackson

requested new counsel in April and again in October. His trial was in March 2014. The district
court did not express any concern about the timeliness of Jackson’s motions. So Jackson’s
motion was timely.
As for the second factor—the adequacy of the court’s inquiry into Jackson’s
complaints—Jackson had two principal concerns:

first, Woods’s refusal to file a motion

challenging the district court’s jurisdiction in this case; and second, Woods’s lack of
communication with him. In both the July and October hearings, the district court allowed
Jackson to go on at great length about Woods’s refusal to file a motion challenging jurisdiction.
And in the July hearing the court adequately inquired into Jackson’s complaints about his
communication with Woods: the court listened to Jackson’s complaints and allowed Woods to
explain why he had not seen Jackson more. In the October hearing, Jackson focused entirely on

-5-

Case: 14-5950

Document: 40-3

Filed: 10/08/2015

Page: 6

No. 14-5950
United States of America v. Ronnie Jackson
Woods’s refusal to file a jurisdictional motion, which was an issue as to which the district court
had already been more than patient. Hence, this factor weighs against Jackson.
The third factor is the most important: whether Woods’s lack of communication was so
complete that it prevented an adequate defense. Although Woods visited Jackson only once at
his detention center, the record shows that Woods provided Jackson with case law, told Jackson
that he would not file meritless motions on his behalf, and discussed Jackson’s desire to be
transferred closer to Memphis. Thus, there was not a complete breakdown in communication
between Jackson and Woods.
The last factor balances a defendant’s right to his preferred counsel with society’s interest
in “the prompt and efficient administration of justice.” Marrero, 651 F.3d at 464. This factor is
a wash: true, Jackson’s request for a new lawyer (his third) would not have delayed his trial; but
Jackson was not entitled to an unlimited succession of lawyers, particularly since the next lawyer
would not have been any more free to file frivolous motions (Jackson’s principal complaint
about Woods) than Woods was. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying
Jackson’s request for yet another new lawyer to represent him.
B.
Relatedly, Jackson appears to argue that the district court “forced” him to represent
himself and that his decision to do so, therefore, was not voluntary. After a district court has
properly rejected a defendant’s request for new counsel, it may leave the defendant with the
choice of representing himself or proceeding with his current counsel. Marrero, 651 F.3d at 466.
In either circumstance, “[t]o ensure that a defendant’s waiver of his right to counsel is knowing
and intelligent, the district court must ask the defendant a series of questions drawn from, or
substantially similar to the model inquiry set forth in the Bench Book for United States District

-6-

Case: 14-5950

Document: 40-3

Filed: 10/08/2015

Page: 7

No. 14-5950
United States of America v. Ronnie Jackson
Judge.” United States v. Heard, 762 F.3d 538, 543 (6th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks
omitted). The district court asked Jackson all those questions here, and urged him not to
represent himself. And once the district court properly denied Jackson’s motion for new counsel,
the court could leave Jackson with the choice of representing himself or proceeding with Woods.
Jackson’s waiver of counsel was knowing and intelligent.
The district court’s judgment is affirmed.

-7-