Aaron James v. Sharon Taylor

Filing

OPINION filed: The district court s judgment is REVERSED, and the case REMANDED with instructions to deny James s habeas petition; decision not for publication. Ralph B. Guy, Jr., Circuit Judge; Raymond M. Kethledge (authoring), Circuit Judge and Jane Branstetter Stranch, Circuit Judge.--[Edited 10/26/2015 by RMJ]

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NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
File Name: 15a0713n.06
No. 14-6135
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

FILED
AARON T. JAMES,

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Petitioner-Appellee,
v.
SHARON TAYLOR,
Respondent-Appellant.

Oct 26, 2015
DEBORAH S. HUNT, Clerk

ON APPEAL FROM THE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT
COURT FOR THE MIDDLE
DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

Before: GUY, KETHLEDGE, and STRANCH, Circuit Judges.
KETHLEDGE, Circuit Judge. Seventeen years ago, a Tennessee jury convicted Aaron
James of “especially aggravated kidnapping” in violation of Tennessee Code § 39-13-305. The
state court sentenced him to 60 years in prison as a career offender under Tennessee law. James
later filed a federal habeas petition, arguing that his trial counsel should have objected to James’s
sentencing as a career offender under Tennessee law. The district court granted James’s petition.
We reverse.
I.
In March 1998, James was already serving a prison sentence in Tennessee when he and
another inmate kidnapped a delivery-truck driver as part of a failed attempt to escape. A
Tennessee grand jury thereafter charged James with felony escape, aggravated robbery, and
especially aggravated kidnapping. Before trial, the prosecutor served James with two notices of
the prosecution’s intent to seek an enhanced sentence if James were convicted. The first notice
stated that James should be sentenced as a “repeat violent offender” under Tennessee Code § 40-

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35-120. The second notice, which by its terms was filed “pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated
§ 40-35-202(a),” stated that James was subject to “an enhanced punishment pursuant to
Tennessee Code Annotated § 40-35-106, et seq.” The latter provisions dictate longer sentences
for defendants with prior felony convictions, of which the second notice listed three.
The jury convicted James on all three counts. The trial court found that James was a
“repeat violent offender” and sentenced him to life in prison. On appeal, however, the Tennessee
Court of Criminal Appeals reversed James’s convictions for kidnapping and robbery, and
remanded for a new trial. The prosecution dismissed the robbery charge on remand. The jury
again convicted James of especially aggravated kidnapping and the trial court sentenced him to
60 years, this time as a career offender under Tennessee Code § 40-35-108. James then sought
state post-conviction relief, without success.
James thereafter filed a habeas petition in federal court, arguing for the first time that his
trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to James’s sentencing as a career offender. The
district court agreed, granted habeas relief, and ordered the State to resentence James. This
appeal followed.
II.
We review the district court’s decision to grant habeas relief de novo.

Haliym v.

Mitchell, 492 F.3d 680, 689 (6th Cir. 2007).
Everyone agrees that James’s federal habeas claim—that his trial counsel was ineffective
at James’s sentencing—is procedurally defaulted. But James argues (and the district court held)
that his default is excused by the alleged ineffectiveness of his state post-conviction counsel. See
generally Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S.Ct. 1309, 1318-19 (2012). In turn, Martinez would have us
engage in a kaleidoscopic inquiry in which the question of his trial counsel’s effectiveness

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appears again and again. Suffice it to say that James can obtain relief only if his trial counsel
was ineffective; so we cut to that question here. See Storey v. Vasbinder, 657 F.3d 372, 380 (6th
Cir. 2011).
James argues that, after his second trial, James’s counsel should have objected to James’s
sentencing as a career offender under Tennessee Code § 40-35-108. Under Tennessee law, a
defendant’s prior felony convictions place him in one of four sentencing categories: “standard”
(0-1 prior felony convictions), “multiple” (2-4), “persistent” (5+), or “career” (3+ class A
felonies if the current offense is likewise a class A felony). See Tenn. Code. Ann. §§ 40-35-105,
-106, -107, -108. If a prosecutor thinks a defendant should be sentenced as a multiple, persistent,
or career offender—and thus receive an enhanced sentence—the prosecutor must serve the
defendant with a notice to that effect before trial. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-202(a). If the
prosecutor does not file a timely notice, then the court must sentence the defendant as a standard
offender. State v. Cooper, 321 S.W.3d 501, 507 (Tenn. 2010); State v. Pender, 687 S.W.2d 714,
720 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1984).
Before James’s first trial, the prosecutor issued notice, “pursuant to Tennessee Code
Annotated § 40-35-202(a),” that he would seek “an enhanced punishment pursuant to Tennessee
Code Annotated § 40-35-106, et seq.” based on James’s three prior convictions for “class A”
felonies. The prosecutor’s reference to § 40-35-202(a) made clear that he sought to sentence
James as a “multiple, persistent or career offender.” The reference to section “§ 40-35-106, et
seq.” in turn told James where to look to determine which of those offender categories applied to
him. And the notice listed James’s three prior “Class A felony” convictions—for especially
aggravated robbery, second-degree murder, and especially aggravated kidnapping—as well as

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the dates and case numbers for those convictions. All of this information made plain that the
prosecution meant to sentence James as a career offender under § 40-35-108.
That notice was filed before James’s first trial, however, and he asserts that it did not
carry over to the second. But Tennessee caselaw refutes that assertion. In State v. Vance,
1996 WL 351464, at *4 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 27, 1996), the Tennessee Court of Criminal
Appeals held that a notice of enhanced sentencing filed before the defendant’s first trial remained
effective for purposes of sentencing after his second trial. That is the same basic fact pattern that
we have here. Similarly, a notice of enhanced sentencing as to one charge in an indictment
remains effective as to the same charge in a superseding indictment. See State v. Carter,
121 S.W.3d 579, 585-86 (Tenn. 2003). And a notice of enhanced sentencing as to a lesser
charge remains effective when the State later alleges a new element (in a superseding indictment)
that makes that charge more serious under Tennessee law. See State v. Livingston¸ 197 S.W.3d
710, 715-16 (Tenn. 2006).
These cases make clear that the career-offender notice filed before James’s first trial
remained effective for purposes of his second. In Vance, as here, the prosecution filed its notice
before the first trial.

In both Carter and Livingston the notice carried over to a second

indictment, whereas here the notice applied to only one. It is true, as James points out, that in his
second trial the prosecution did not seek to convict him on the robbery charge. But that fact is
simply immaterial under the caselaw as it comes to us here. In sum, James’s trial counsel had no
basis under Tennessee law to object to James’s sentencing as a career offender after his second
trial. James’s counsel therefore was not ineffective for omitting to make such an objection. And
without a meritorious claim for ineffective assistance, James can neither excuse his procedural
default nor obtain habeas relief.

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The district court’s judgment is reversed, and the case remanded with instructions to deny
James’s habeas petition.

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