USA v. Jamar Quarle

Filing

Per Curiam OPINION filed : The district court's judgment is VACATED and this matter is REMANDED to the district court for resentencing, decision not for publication. Danny J. Boggs, Circuit Judge; Eugene E. Siler , Jr., Circuit Judge and Alice M. Batchelder, Circuit Judge.

Case: 15-1161

Document: 30-2

Filed: 03/21/2016

Page: 1

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
File Name: 16a0158n.06
No. 15-1161
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
JAMAR ALONZO QUARLES,
Defendant-Appellant.

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FILED
Mar 21, 2016
DEBORAH S. HUNT, Clerk

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED
STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF
MICHIGAN

BEFORE: BOGGS, SILER, and BATCHELDER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

Jamar Alonzo Quarles, a federal prisoner, appeals a sentence of

204 months of imprisonment imposed following the entry of his guilty plea to a charge of being
a felon in possession of a firearm.
Quarles raises two issues on appeal: 1) whether he qualifies as an armed career criminal
within the meaning of the Armed Career Criminal Act, and 2) whether his criminal-history score
was correctly calculated with respect to two prior misdemeanors that the district court assigned
three criminal-history points pursuant to USSG §4A1.1(a).
The district court determined that Quarles was an armed career criminal under 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(e) based in part on a prior Michigan conviction for third-degree home invasion, see Mich.
Comp. Laws § 750.110a(4)(a), which the district court found was a violent felony under what is
known as the residual clause of 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) (defining

Case: 15-1161

Document: 30-2

Filed: 03/21/2016

Page: 2

No. 15-1161
United States v. Quarles
“violent felony” as a crime that “involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of
physical injury to another”).

The Supreme Court recently held that the residual clause is

unconstitutionally vague. Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2563 (2015). However, the
government argues that the crime of Quarles’s prior conviction is a “generic” form of burglary
and that we may thus affirm the district court’s determination that Quarles is an armed career
criminal. See Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276, 2281–86 (2013) (delineating the
contours of “generic” burglary and clarifying the application of the “formal categorical” and
“modified categorical” approaches). Upon consideration, we conclude that this issue is best
determined in the first instance by the sentencing court.
We do not reach Quarles’s argument regarding the district court’s calculation of his
criminal-history score because resolution of that issue will become necessary only if the court
determines that Quarles is not an armed career criminal. If Quarles is determined to be an armed
career criminal, his criminal-history score will be VI irrespective of whether the district court
correctly awarded three points for the two prior misdemeanors at issue. Accordingly, the district
court’s judgment is VACATED and this matter is REMANDED to the district court for
resentencing.

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