Robyn Marshall v. Belmont County Board of Comm, et al

Filing

Per Curiam OPINION: the Judgment is AFFIRMED, decision not for publication. Alan E. Norris, Circuit Judge; Alice M. Batchelder, Circuit Judge and Jeffrey S. Sutton, Circuit Judge.

Case: 15-3601

Document: 25-2

Filed: 03/10/2016

Page: 1

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
File Name: 16a0133n.06
No. 15-3601
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
ROBYN MARSHALL,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
BELMONT COUNTY BOARD OF
COMMISSIONERS; GINNY FAVEDE;
MATTHEW COFFLAND; CHARLES
PROBST; CHRISTINE PALMER;
STEVE CLARK,
Defendants-Appellees.

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FILED
Mar 10, 2016
DEBORAH S. HUNT, Clerk

ON APPEAL FROM THE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT
COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN
DISTRICT OF OHIO

MEMORANDUM OPINION

BEFORE: NORRIS, BATCHELDER, and SUTTON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM. Plaintiff Robyn Marshall appeals from a grant of summary judgment to
defendants, the Belmont County Board of Commissioners; the three members of the Board of
Commissioners at the time of plaintiff’s termination, Ginny Favede, Matthew Coffland, and
Charles Probst; Christine Palmer, the county’s human resource director; and Steve Clark, a
county employee. Plaintiff was director of the county’s 9-1-1 center for several years. In 2013,
the Board of Commissioners voted to terminate Marshall purportedly based on her discipline of a
dispatcher and the Board’s perceived insubordination by plaintiff because she ignored their
directive not to discipline the dispatcher. Plaintiff’s complaint included state and federal claims
of gender discrimination, retaliation, and a state law claim for tortious interference with a
business relationship against Steve Clark. Clark is a county employee in another department, and

Case: 15-3601

Document: 25-2

Filed: 03/10/2016

Page: 2

Marshall v. Belmont Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs, et al
No. 15-3601
the father of the disciplined dispatcher. Plaintiff alleges that Clark’s complaints to the Board
about plaintiff led to her termination.
The district court found, and we agree, that plaintiff established a prima facie case of
gender discrimination. However, the district court went on to hold that the evidence tendered by
plaintiff did not include any credible evidence that the reason for discharge proffered by
defendants was mere pretext for gender discrimination. With respect to the retaliation claim, the
district court was skeptical as to whether plaintiff made out a prima facie case, but held that even
if it were to assume that a prima facie case of retaliation had been made out, the record failed to
establish pretext.
As for plaintiff’s tortious interference claim, the district court noted that defendant
Clark’s complaints against plaintiff—arguably a public official—may have been privileged,
which would be enough to defeat plaintiff’s claim. The district court decided not to engage in
that analysis, however, holding that plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the complaints were the
proximate cause of her termination.
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants on all claims, a
decision that we review de novo. Ramsey v. Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co., 787 F.3d 813, 818 (6th Cir.
2015) (citing Rose v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 766 F.3d 532, 535 (6th Cir. 2014)). We have
independently reviewed the record in detail, and have carefully considered the briefs submitted
by the parties. Because we detect no error in the district court’s detailed analysis, a reasoned
opinion by this court would serve no useful purpose. We therefore affirm based upon the district
court’s opinion. Marshall v. Belmont Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 110 F. Supp. 3d 780 (S.D. Ohio
2015).
The judgment is affirmed.
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