Debra McKinzey v. Michael Astrue

Filing

Filed opinion of the court by Judge Manion. AFFIRMED. Daniel A. Manion, Circuit Judge; Terence T. Evans, Circuit Judge and David F. Hamilton, Circuit Judge. [6312913-3] [6312913] [10-2654]

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In the

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
No. 10-2654
D EBRA M C K INZEY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
M ICHAEL J. A STRUE,
Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of Illinois.
No. 09 CV 4024—Joe Billy McDade, Judge.

A RGUED F EBRUARY 10, 2011—D ECIDED JUNE 3, 2011

Before M ANION, E VANS, and H AMILTON, Circuit Judges.
M ANION , Circuit Judge.
Debra McKinzey applied
for Social Security disability benefits in 2004, but an administrative law judge found that she could perform
light work and was thus not disabled. She challenges
that determination. Despite some concerns over the
ALJ’s articulation of her reasons for denying McKinzey’s
claim, we find that the determination was amply sup-

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ported by substantial evidence in the record and that
remanding for further articulation would serve no purpose. We therefore affirm the decision of the district
court and the ALJ.

I.
In November 2004, McKinzey filed an application for
disability insurance benefits with the Social Security
Administration, alleging an onset date of February 27,
2003. Her claim was initially denied in April and again
on reconsideration in July 2005. She then requested a
hearing with an ALJ, which was held two-and-a-half
years later.

A. The Hearing
McKinzey testified that she was injured in 2001 while
working at an Eagles supermarket and that this injury
resulted in bilateral cubital tunnel syndrome—a compression of the ulnar nerve along the cubital tunnel on the
outside of the elbow—and ulnar neuropathy. These
injuries caused a 45% loss of use of one arm and 50% of
the other. For the next couple of years, she continued to
work at Eagles in less physically demanding positions.
Finally, in 2003, she was unable to perform a job as
a greeter and was laid off.
In 2004, she began a program to train as a dental hygienist, but was dropped from the program after completing her prerequisites because of problems with her

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hands. She then attempted a radiology technician program, but could not pursue that either because she was
at an elevated risk from radiation due to her previous
bout with skin cancer. Finally, she enrolled in a program
in electroencephalography (EEGs) and sleep studies.
She was still enrolled in this program at the time of her
hearing, but she was having difficulty with the clinical
work due to problems with her hands and vision, and
was not sure that she would be able to continue.
McKinzey testified to numerous health problems and
stated that the biggest impediments to her work were
her fingers, her vision, and the loss of feeling in her
feet due to Raynaud’s syndrome, which limits the circulation to extremities and can cause numbness.
After McKinzey testified, the ALJ questioned the vocational expert, Dennis Gustafson. The ALJ asked him
whether there were any jobs for a hypothetical 45-yearold with a high school education and some college, who
was capable of doing light or sedentary work, with the
ability to frequently lift 10 pounds and climb ramps or
stairs, but who was limited to only occasional handling,
fingering, or feeling with her hands, no climbing ladders,
ropes, or scaffolding, and who had to avoid moderate
exposure to vibrations and hazards. The ALJ and
Gustafson then discussed McKinzey’s testimony concerning her vision and concluded that the proper classification was a problem of visual accommodation
(meaning a problem shifting focus from near objects to
far) rather than visual acuity. The ALJ included this limitation in her hypothetical. Gustafson testified that such
a hypothetical person would not be able to return to

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any of McKinzey’s past work. And although some customer service skills would be transferable, the hypothetical manipulative limitations would rule out any
other work for such a person, absent specialized training.
The ALJ stated that she would need to go back through
the medical records to see if the limitations were warranted and then ended the hearing.

B. Medical Records
The medical records reveal that McKinzey has sought
treatment for numerous health concerns. She has a
history of skin cancer, and partially unsuccessful surgeries
on her face and breast to remove the cancer have led
to several cosmetic surgeries. She had some vision problems stemming from surgery on her eyes using a laser
that was later recalled by the manufacturer. At various
times, McKinzey has been assessed with ulnar neuropathy,
cubital tunnel syndrome, mild degenerative joint disease
in the spine, fibromyalgia, Raynaud’s syndrome, fluctuating vision, vasomotor rhinitis (chronic runny nose),
and depression and anxiety.
Her arm problems, which form the core of her evidence
of disability, go back through 2001. Shortly after her
work injury, McKinzey began seeing Dr. Thomas
VonGillern, an orthopaedic specialist, for symptoms of
constant tingling, numbness, cold fingers, and pain.
Dr. VonGillern noted impressions of mild bilateral
cubital tunnel. Following a nerve conduction study in
2002, McKinzey was assessed with mild to moderate
bilateral ulnar neuropathy. Dr. VonGillern scheduled

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her for surgery on her right ulnar nerve at her elbow
and, in anticipation, gave her restrictions on bending,
lifting, twisting, pushing, tearing, pinching, gripping,
and squeezing. McKinzey, however, cancelled the
surgery and stopped seeing Dr. VonGillern. When the
ALJ questioned her on her decision to forego surgery,
she replied both that her other doctors did not agree
and that she had come to distrust Dr. VonGillern.
A few weeks after cancelling her surgery, McKinzey
began seeing a neurosurgeon, Dr. David Udehn. His
initial impression was that McKinzey had ulnar neuropathy and was not responding to conservative therapy.
At that time, and again in June 2003, he recommended
that she proceed with surgery as Dr. VonGillern had
suggested. In November 2003, Dr. Udehn also recommended that McKinzey proceed with a functional
capacity evaluation; that evaluation found that she
could lift 10 pounds frequently and 20 pounds occasionally, occasionally climb ladders and crawl, and frequently bend, squat, kneel, and climb stairs. She
could repetitively perform simple grasping but not firm
grasping. In March 2004, Dr. Udehn again recommended
surgery and then in May he referred McKinzey to
Dr. Peter Pardubsky for a second opinion. Dr. Pardubsky
also recommended surgery.
In March 2005, an occupational evaluation found
that McKinzey had a full range of motion in the upper
extremities but had some limitations on fine manipulations and that her gross manipulations might be limited
by her low grip strength. In April 2005, at the request of

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the Social Security Administration, state agency
physician Dr. Francis Vincent performed a functional
capacity assessment based on McKinzey’s medical records. He noted that McKinzey could occasionally lift
20 pounds, frequently lift 10 pounds, stand or walk
6 hours out of an 8-hour workday, and sit 6 hours out
of an 8-hour workday. Her ability to push and pull with
her upper extremities was limited and she could not
perform excessively repetitive movement of the elbows
and hands. In addition, Dr. Vincent opined that McKinzey
could only occasionally use her hands for feeling, fingering, or handling. A second state agency physician,
Dr. William Conroy, affirmed Dr. Vincent’s assessment.
A chiropractic evaluation shortly after Dr. Vincent’s
opinion also stated that McKinzey was limited in the
use of her hands.
After a May 2005 examination, Dr. Pardubsky again
noted an impression of bilateral cubital tunnel syndrome
and unstable ulnar nerves. But now he recommended
surgery only if McKinzey’s symptoms continued to
worsen. Then, when Dr. Pardubsky saw her again in
August 2005, his opinion changed significantly. He still
noted an impression of bilateral ulnar neuropathy, but
found McKinzey’s examination benign, did not find
further diagnostic work-up necessary, and now recommended against surgery. While he noted that she might
have discomfort in her limbs, he did not see any progressive disabling process that would limit her. Moreover,
he found that she could use her arms to the fullest
extent possible.

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In March 2006, McKinzey underwent a neurological
evaluation with Dr. Robert Segura, which showed
some evidence of ulnar nerve irritation bilaterally. The
exam was followed by an electrodiagnostic nerve study
of McKinzey’s upper and lower limbs. The study showed
no evidence of cubital tunnel syndrome (i.e., ulnar entrapment at the elbows). Other than a nerve entrapment
near her ankle, McKinzey had no significant nerve conduction abnormalities.
In February 2007, McKinzey returned to Dr. Pardubsky
with complaints of thumb pain. Dr. Pardubsky noted
that McKinzey had full motion of her fingers, thumb,
wrist, elbow, and shoulder. Although McKinzey was
hesitant to move her thumb in some directions, after
encouragement she demonstrated full motion. In
addition, Dr. Pardubsky stated that McKinzey complained of an “intermittent tremor that appears to be
voluntarily present when she discussed exam of her
hands but is absent at rest.” He concluded that
McKinzey’s ongoing subjective complaints were inconsistent with objective findings. Without any evidence
of serious underlying pathology, he recommended
against any further diagnostic or surgical intervention
and suggested that McKinzey simply treat her symptoms.

C. ALJ’s Decision
The ALJ issued an unfavorable written decision in
April 2008. She proceeded through the familiar five-step
analysis. At step one, she found that McKinzey had not
engaged in substantial gainful activity since the alleged

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onset date of February 27, 2003. At steps two and three,
she found that McKinzey had a severe combination
of impairments—including fibromyalgia, degenerative
disc disease, bilateral mild ulnar neuropathy, a history
of multiple eye surgeries with dry eye syndrome, and
monovision—but that her impairments did not meet or
medically equal one of the impairments listed in 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1520(d), 404.1525, and 404.1526. The ALJ then
found that McKinzey had the residual functional capacity
to perform light work: she could lift up to 10 pounds
frequently; she could not do work activity involving
climbing ladders, ropes, or scaffolds, and could only
frequently climb stairs or ramps; she could only occasionally bend, stoop, crouch, crawl, or kneel; she was limited
to no more than frequent handling, fingering, and
feeling with both hands; she was limited to moderate
exposure to vibrations or hazards; and she required
frequent accommodations for vision problems.
In making this residual functional capacity finding,
the ALJ found that there was an underlying medically
determinable physical impairment that could be expected to produce McKinzey’s pain and other symptoms.
But she also found that McKinzey was exaggerating her
claims concerning the intensity, persistence, and limiting
effects of her symptoms. Specifically, the ALJ found it
inconsistent that McKinzey pursued several voluntary
cosmetic surgeries but did not pursue surgery that three
different specialists recommended to alleviate the symptoms of ulnar neuropathy and cubital tunnel syndrome. The ALJ also found McKinzey’s functioning considerably greater than alleged: although her impairment

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was essentially unchanged since the injury in 2001, she
had worked for two years before the alleged onset
date; further, she had maintained a level of activity since
2003 that was inconsistent with her alleged inability to
work. Finally, the ALJ noted that “the record includes
evidence strongly suggesting that the claimant has exaggerated symptoms and limitations.”
At step four, the ALJ found that McKinzey was unable
to perform any past relevant work. Finally, at step five,
the ALJ consulted the medical vocational guidelines
(known as the grids) and determined that there were
jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national
economy for someone with McKinzey’s age, education,
work experience, and residual functional capacity. Although she recognized the presence of some non-exertional limitations not accounted for in the grids, the ALJ
found that those limitations had “little or no effect on
the occupational base of light unskilled work.” The
ALJ thus concluded that McKinzey was not disabled
and denied her application.
The Appeals Council denied McKinzey’s request for
review of the ALJ’s decision in February 2009. In
April 2009, McKinzey filed this suit against the Commissioner of Social Security in the district court, seeking
review of the decision of the Social Security Administration under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). In May 2010, the district
court affirmed the Commissioner’s decision and entered
judgment against McKinzey. McKinzey appeals.

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II.

When the Appeals Council denies a request for review,
as it has here, we review the ALJ’s determination as the
final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security.
Nelms v. Astrue, 553 F.3d 1093, 1097 (7th Cir. 2009). We
review de novo the district court’s decision, and reverse
an ALJ’s determination only where it is not supported
by substantial evidence, which means “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate
to support a conclusion.” Skinner v. Astrue, 478 F.3d 836,
841 (7th Cir. 2007) (quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402
U.S. 389, 401 (1971)). Although we do not “reweigh evidence, resolve conflicts, decide questions of credibility,
or substitute our own judgment for that of the Commissioner,” we nonetheless conduct a critical review of the
evidence. Lopez ex rel. Lopez v. Barnhart, 336 F.3d 535,
539 (7th Cir. 2003). The ALJ must adequately discuss
the issues and must build an “accurate and logical
bridge from the evidence to his conclusion.” Id.
McKinzey argues that the ALJ’s discussion of the evidence was deficient in three respects. First, she argues
that the ALJ did not discuss an opinion by a state
agency physician regarding her limitations on her use
of her hands. Second, she claims that the ALJ failed to account for non-exertional limitations (principally her
vision impairments, but also environmental limitations
and others) in determining that there were jobs she
could do in the national economy. Finally, she argues
that the ALJ’s negative credibility determination is based
on mischaracterizations of the evidence and unreasonable inferences. We review each issue in turn.

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A. McKinzey’s Credibility
We start with McKinzey’s last argument, that the ALJ
erred in finding that McKinzey’s account of the intensity
and frequency of her symptoms lacked credibility. The
ALJ did conclude that the objective medical evidence
in the record could produce the symptoms of which
McKinzey complained. And given the testimony of the
vocational expert that there would be no jobs that a person with McKinzey’s reported symptoms could do, the
ALJ’s credibility judgment was the determinative issue
in this case. Had the ALJ found McKinzey credible, the
decision would most likely have been favorable. Although
we find some deficiencies in the ALJ’s discussion of
McKinzey’s credibility, we conclude that the ALJ has
pointed to sufficient evidence in the record to justify
her negative determination.
Like any determination by the ALJ, the findings concerning McKinzey’s credibility must be supported by substantial evidence. Further, the ALJ must explain her decision in such a way that allows us to determine
whether she reached her decision in a rational manner,
logically based on her specific findings and the evidence
in the record. See Skarbek v. Barnhart, 390 F.3d 500, 505
(7th Cir. 2004); Brindisi ex rel. Brindisi v. Barnhart, 315 F.3d
783, 787-88 (7th Cir. 2003). As long as the ALJ has explained her decision, this court “will not overturn an
ALJ’s credibility determination unless it is ‘patently
wrong.’ ” Skarbek, 390 F.3d at 504.
McKinzey argues that the reasons that the ALJ gave
for discounting her testimony regarding the severity of

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her symptoms were defective. Specifically, she attacks
the ALJ’s credibility determination in three places.
First, she argues that the ALJ improperly counted her decision to forego surgery against her. Second, she claims
that the ALJ drew unreasonable inferences from the socalled cosmetic surgeries she underwent over the years.
Finally, she asserts that the ALJ erred by holding
McKinzey’s pre-2003 work and her enrollment in college against her without taking into account the significant accommodations she required to pursue, ultimately unsuccessfully, those various vocations. McKinzey
argues that these three errors compel a remand because
the ALJ has not built the requisite logical bridge between
the evidence and her conclusions.
We disagree. The ALJ’s credibility determination was
not without fault. Indeed, we see some merit in two out
of three of McKinzey’s attacks.1 Despite her obligation
to consider McKinzey’s explanation for her failure to
seek surgery before drawing an adverse inference, S.S.R.
96-7p, the ALJ did not explain why she discounted
McKinzey’s facially valid reason for declining surgery,
namely that her physicians did not agree that it would

1

Regarding the third argument—that the ALJ improperly
considered what she labeled “cosmetic” surgeries against
McKinzey—the ALJ explicitly noted the logical connection
between McKinzey’s willingness to undergo rather extensive
surgery for non-disabling issues but her refusal to undergo
recommended surgery that might have alleviated her allegedly
severely disabling symptoms.

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necessarily help, and could even hinder.2 Further,
McKinzey’s unsuccessful attempts to pursue various vocations might just as easily provide corroboration that
her impairments significantly limited her ability to work,
as opposed to evidence that her ability was greater
than she alleged.
But what McKinzey’s account of the credibility determination leaves out is the final reason given by the
ALJ, namely that, “[i]n addition, the record includes evidence strongly suggesting that claimant has exaggerated
symptoms and limitations.” This statement was supported by reference to Dr. Pardubsky’s 2007 medical opinion, which in this case could be labeled a smoking gun:
“Objective findings at this time do not correlate with
[McKinzey’s] ongoing subjective complaints.” And—more
damning for McKinzey’s credibility—“she complains
of an intermittent tremor that appears to be voluntarily
present when she discussed exam of her hands but is absent at rest.” In other words, in the opinion of her own
treating specialist, McKinzey’s claimed symptoms were
contradicted by his clinical evaluation.

2

The Commissioner and the district court suggest that the
ALJ was justified in ignoring the explanation because, in their
view, it contradicts another reason she gave and because the
evidence in the record does not include opinions against
surgery. But it was the ALJ’s job, not the court’s, to articulate
the reasons for her decisions, as well as explore a claimant’s
asserted explanations for foregoing recommended treatments.
S.S.R. 96-7p. In any event, this oversight is not a determining
factor.

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In light of the substantial evidence that McKinzey was
exaggerating her symptoms even to a treating physician,
we conclude that the ALJ’s credibility determination
was adequately supported by evidence in the record.

B. Dr. Vincent’s Opinion
Next, we consider McKinzey’s argument that the ALJ
failed to explain the weight she gave to the state agency
physician’s opinion that McKinzey could only occasionally use her hands for handling, fingering, or feeling. Generally speaking, an ALJ’s “adequate discussion” of the
issues need not contain “a complete written evaluation of
every piece of evidence.” Schmidt v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 737,
744 (7th Cir. 2005). But when the evidence comes in the
form of a medical opinion from a state agency physician,
the agency’s own regulations and rules require that the
ALJ “not ignore these opinions and must explain the
weight given to the opinions in their decisions.” S.S.R. 966p; see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(f).
McKinzey argues that the ALJ did fail to explain her
treatment of these opinions, and that this failure alone
requires us to remand the matter to the agency for
further consideration. We agree with the former claim
but not the latter. Dr. Vincent concluded, based solely on
a review of the medical records to date, that McKinzey
had the following exertional limitations: she could lift
20 pounds not more than occasionally and 10 pounds
not more than frequently, could stand or sit no more
than 6 hours in the course of an 8-hour day, and could
not handle excessively repetitive activity. In addition,

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Dr. Vincent found that McKinzey could only occasionally
use her hands to handle, finger, or feel.3
While the ALJ was not required to follow Dr. Vincent’s
opinion, there is no indication in the record that she was
even aware that a state agency physician—two, actually—had opined that McKinzey had significant limitations with her hands, much less that she gave this opinion
proper consideration. The ALJ thus violated S.S.R. 96-6p,
which is binding on ALJs, see Lauer v. Apfel, 169 F.3d 489,
492 (7th Cir. 1999), and leaves no room for doubt that the
ALJ was required to consider Dr. Vincent’s opinion. This
was error.
But administrative error may be harmless: we will not
remand a case to the ALJ for further specification
where we are convinced that the ALJ will reach the
same result. Spiva v. Astrue, 628 F.3d 346, 353 (7th Cir.
2010). That would be a waste of time and resources
for both the Commissioner and the claimant. Thus, we
look at the evidence in the record to see if we can
predict with great confidence what the result on remand
will be. We note (yet again, see Spiva, 628 F.3d at 353 and
the critical discussion therein) that the harmless error
standard is not, as the Commissioner and district court

3

Dr. Vincent also checked the box indicating that no manipulative limitations had been established, but this was very likely
inadvertent in light of the specific limitations entered immediately thereafter. In any event, the ALJ did not discuss either
“finding” of Dr. Vincent, so we have no way to know what
the ALJ thought of the inconsistencies in the opinion.

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seem to believe, an exercise in rationalizing the ALJ’s decision and substituting our own hypothetical explanations for the ALJ’s inadequate articulation. We have already concluded that the ALJ erred. The question before
us is now prospective—can we say with great confidence
what the ALJ would do on remand—rather than retrospective.
Here, a review of the records convinces us that no reasonable ALJ would reach a contrary decision on remand
regarding McKinzey’s manipulative limitations. While
Dr. Vincent’s opinion is entitled to consideration as a nonexamining source, it does not carry significant weight
in comparison to the opinion of a treating specialist like
Dr. Pardubsky. 20 C.F.R. § 1527(d). Dr. Vincent reviewed
only medical records, and notably could not have taken
into account Dr. Pardubsky’s opinion, based on his personal observation just a few months after Dr. Vincent’s
opinion, that McKinzey had no significant limitations in
the use of her hands. Dr. Pardubsky’s history of treating
McKinzey, both before and after his August 2005 opinion,
give his opinion singular weight and importance.
Had the opinions been reversed—with Dr. Pardubsky
opining that McKinzey was significantly limited in the use
of her hands—we have no doubt that the ALJ would
not have been free to prefer a contrary opinion from a
state agency physician. See Elder v. Astrue, 529 F.3d 408,
415 (7th Cir. 2008) (outlining treating physician rule). In
short, we find the ALJ’s oversight harmless because although she failed to articulate her reasons for rejecting
a portion of Dr. Vincent’s opinion (or failed to notice that
portion, whatever the case may be) the proper place

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of that opinion in the context of the other evidence is
clear. It would serve no purpose to remand this case to the
ALJ for a statement of the obvious.

C. Vision Impairments
Finally, we turn to McKinzey’s argument that the ALJ
erred in determining that jobs exist in the national economy that McKinzey could perform. The medical vocational guideline grids provide a means for ALJs to determine whether a person with a particular claimant’s exertional limitation—standing, walking, lifting, and the
like—can perform any jobs in the national economy.
(20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 2 provides the
grids and an introduction to their use). The presence
of other, non-exertional limitations, not factored into the
grids, may preclude an ALJ from relying on the grids
and require a consultation with a vocation expert, but
only when the non-exertional limitations “substantially
reduce a range of work an individual can perform.”
Luna v. Shalala, 22 F.3d 687, 691, 692 (7th Cir. 1994).
The ALJ found that McKinzey’s additional non-exertional
limitations “have little or no effect on the occupational
base of unskilled light work” and did not consult a vocational expert. McKinzey argues that this was error;
she points to a number of non-exertional limitations,
but only her claim concerning her vision impairment merits discussion.
At the heart of this challenge is the ALJ’s unexplained
finding that McKinzey “requires frequent accommodation for vision problems.” This finding, claims McKinzey,

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is inconsistent with the ALJ’s subsequent assertion that
such “frequent accommodation” would have little or no
effect on the light unskilled jobs available. Yet again,
while we agree with McKinzey that the ALJ’s decision
was deficient in certain respects—we are left to guess
at what “frequent accommodation” means 4 —we cannot
conclude that any error here warrants a remand.
We would certainly prefer that the ALJ had provided some detail of what specific vision limitations
and accommodations she found that McKinzey had. But
here it appears obvious why the ALJ concluded that departing from the grids was unnecessary—and thus
equally obvious that any remand would lead to the same
result: nothing in the medical records or even in McKinzey’s own testimony suggests the type of visual impairment that would have reasonably caused an ALJ to
consult a vocational expert.
The two Social Security rulings most on point here, 8314 and 85-15, suggest that in most cases, only visual impairments severe enough to cause safety concerns will
have a significant impact on the occupational base of
light unskilled work. S.S.R. 83-14 states that visual impairments that would cause a claimant “to be a hazard to self

4

Some confusion may stem from the use of the term “accommodation” in a distinct sense at McKinzey’s hearing: there, the
vocational expert and the ALJ, having heard McKinzey describe
her vision impairment, concluded she had limits on her
visual “accommodation”—i.e., her ability to shift focus from
near to far quickly—rather than problems of visual acuity.

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and others—usually a constriction of visual fields rather
than a loss of acuity—the manifestation of tripping over
boxes while walking, inability to detect approaching persons or objects, difficulty in walking up and down stairs,
etc. will indicate to the decisionmaker that the remaining
occupational base is significantly diminished for light
work.” S.S.R. 85-15 appears to go even slightly further: “as
long as [a person] retains sufficient visual acuity to be
able to handle and work with rather large objects (and has
the visual fields to avoid ordinary hazards in a workplace), there would be a substantial number of jobs remaining across all exertional levels.”
The visual impairments suggested by the medical records and McKinzey’s own testimony are hardly of the
type or severity contemplated in the relevant Social Security rulings. The medical records cited monovision (one
of her eyes was corrected to see distance and the other
up close) and dry eye syndrome as causes for her fluctuating vision throughout the day, which the vocational expert and the ALJ took to mean difficulty shifting focus
from near to far. McKinzey’s own example of how
she was limited by her vision was that she required extra
time to take measurements during clinical work for her
EEG and sleep study program. Moreover, McKinzey
drove herself to the hearing with the ALJ, suggesting
that her visual impairments did not render her a danger
to self and others. Based on the criteria outlined in the
relevant Social Security rulings, no ALJ would reasonably
find that McKinzey’s need for extra time to shift focus
from near to far would “significantly impact” the occupational base for light unskilled work.

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III.

Although we have noted some problems with the
way the ALJ articulated her unfavorable determination—especially in her failure to acknowledge that Dr.
Vincent’s opinion was contrary to her finding and explain the weight she gave to that opinion—we have
also concluded that remanding this case to the agency
would serve no purpose in light of the overwhelming evidence supporting the ALJ’s decision. Accordingly, we
A FFIRM the district court’s judgment and the ALJ’s determination.

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