USA v. Freddell Bryant
Filing
Filed opinion of the court by District Judge Van Bokkelen. AFFIRMED. William J. Bauer, Circuit Judge; Joel M. Flaum, Circuit Judge and Joseph S. Van Bokkelen, District Court Judge. [6568992-1] [6568992] [13-1578]
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In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 13‐1578
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff‐Appellee,
v.
FREDDELL BRYANT,
Defendant‐Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Central District of Illinois.
No. 2:11‐CR‐20034 — Michael P. McCuskey, Judge.
____________________
ARGUED DECEMBER 2, 2013 — DECIDED APRIL 17, 2014
____________________
Before BAUER and FLAUM, Circuit Judges, and VAN
BOKKELEN, District Judge.*
VAN BOKKELEN, District Judge. The former gang leader
Freddell Bryant elected to become an informant for the
* Of the Northern District of Indiana, sitting by designation.
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United States to avoid an otherwise mandatory life sentence
for a drug charge. He obtained immunity from the direct use
of statements he would give the federal government under
their agreement, though not from federal use of any
admissions he might make in assisting state law
enforcement.
Bryant went on to provide information to Illinois
authorities under a separate agreement to which the United
States was not a party. In this state agreement, Illinois
promised him that his statements would not be used against
him directly in “any criminal prosecution,” but required in
exchange that he tell the truth. Bryant confessed to the state
authorities that he played a central role in a triple murder.
Illinois then shared Bryant’s cooperation statements with the
United States. The United States proceeded to use the
confessions directly, over his objection, to convict him of
three murder counts. On appeal, Bryant attempts to show
that this violated his contractual or constitutional rights. We
disagree and therefore affirm the district court’s denial of his
pretrial motions, albeit not for all of the same reasons the
district court cited.
I. Background
In his heyday, Freddell Bryant, also known as Freddy
Moe, was a cocaine‐running “general” in the Black P. Stones
gang. He plunged into desperation, however, when a federal
grand jury indicted him on April 4, 2007, alleging:
(1) conspiracy to distribute fifty grams or more of crack
cocaine and 500 grams or more of cocaine, from October
2003 through March 2007; (2) possession of 500 grams or
more of cocaine with intent to distribute it on July 12, 2004;
(3) possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug‐
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trafficking crime on October 17, 2003; and (4) possession of a
firearm by a felon. Count 1 threatened particularly
devastating consequences. Due to Bryant’s two prior drug
felonies and the allegation that at least fifty grams of crack
were involved, the penalties statute mandated a sentence of
“life imprisonment without release.” See 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(b)(1)(A)(iii) (version effective from July 27, 2006, to
April 14, 2009). To avoid life, he would have to beat count 1
on the merits or else earn the government’s help by assisting
it as an informant. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) (enabling this
method of evading an otherwise mandatory minimum
sentence).
On the day before trial was set to begin, Bryant opted to
plead guilty and cooperate. To hold their arrangement
together, he and the federal government reduced to writing
two separate but linked agreements. They had one
agreement regarding Bryant’s guilty plea and the
government’s sentencing recommendation. The second, the
cooperation agreement, was put down in a letter from the
assistant U.S. attorney to Bryant’s then‐lawyer. In it, the
government immunized Bryant from the direct use of the
statements he would provide in cooperating as required by
the agreement:1
1 Prosecutors have basically three forms of immunity to offer prospective
informants. Immunity from direct use only—the least‐generous variety,
and the one Bryant accepted—roughly means merely that the
cooperation statements themselves may not be introduced into evidence
to prove the case‐in‐chief against the cooperator. A more protective
agreement would also extend immunity from derivative use, so that
prosecutors would have to show any evidence offered in their case‐in‐
chief against the informant came from a legitimate source that was
independent of the cooperation statements. And finally, the most
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Dear … :
It is our understanding that your client,
Freddell Bryant, desires to cooperate with the
United States of America (“United States”) in
its efforts to enforce federal law on the
condition that his statements are protected by a
grant of use immunity to prevent him from
facing any greater criminal liability as a result
of cooperating. This letter is intended as a
grant of conditional direct use immunity.
To avoid any misunderstanding, the specific
terms of this grant of use immunity are:
1. The United States agrees that no statement
made or information provided pursuant
to this agreement may be directly
introduced as evidence against your client
in any criminal case, including sentencing,
excepting (1) a prosecution for making a
false statement or perjury, and (2) use as
impeachment or rebuttal evidence should
he subsequently testify or take a factual
position contrary to the information he
provides. The United States will be free to
make indirect, or derivative, use of his
statements. This agreement means only
that the fact he made certain incriminating
generous form of immunity for the cooperator is transactional immunity,
which saves the cooperator from prosecution for offenses related to the
cooperation statements. See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972)
(discussing the forms of immunity).
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statements pursuant to this agreement
may not itself be introduced as evidence
against him. The United States will also
remain free to discharge its duty to the
court by informing the court of any
information he provides. The court will be
notified that such information was
obtained pursuant to this grant of use
immunity.
2. In return, your client agrees that he will
provide
complete
and
truthful
information to law enforcement officials
regarding his criminal conduct and
everything he knows or has reason to
believe about the criminal conduct of
others … .
3. He agrees to provide complete and
truthful testimony to any grand jury, trial
jury, or judge in any proceeding in which
he may be called to testify by the United
States.
4. Your client further acknowledges and
agrees that he understands that the United
States’s [sic] grant of use immunity herein
is conditioned, in part, upon his complete
compliance with paragraphs 2 and 3.
Should he knowingly make any materially
false statement or omission in providing
information or testimony under this
agreement, the United States will be
entitled to use his statements and
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evidence he provides, directly and
indirectly, to institute and support a
criminal prosecution for any offense, as
well as a prosecution for giving false
statements and perjury.
5. For instance, your client must neither
conceal or [sic] minimize his own actions
or involvement in any offense, nor
conceal, minimize, fabricate, or exaggerate
anyone else’s actions or involvement in
any offense. He must be completely
truthful about the facts, whatever those
may be.
* * *
13. Any violation of any part of this agreement by
your client will void this agreement in its
entirety and will release the United States
from any obligation under this agreement.
* * *
This letter embodies the entirety of the United
States’s [sic] use immunity agreement with
your client. No other promise or agreement
exists between your client and the United
States regarding immunity.
(Appellant’s Separate App. 1–3.)
As required, Bryant assisted the government. For
example, at a jury trial in August 2009, he testified to the
drug trafficking of Keric Franklin, a member of his own
gang.
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However, Bryant’s prospects took another turn for the
worse in early 2010, when members of local law enforcement
began to suspect him of involvement in a March 2007 triple
murder in Danville, Illinois. The investigation prompted
Bryant to enter into a second cooperation agreement; this
time, with the Vermillion County State’s Attorney. The
United States did not review or become a party to the state
agreement, and did not know of its specifics when executed
on January 14, 2010.
In this second cooperation agreement, Bryant promised
Illinois that he would “give a complete and truthful taped
statement regarding the 2007 Danville triple homicide
investigation …[;] specifically[,] a detailed account of who
the shooters were and their roles in the murders.” In
addition to the foregoing “complete and truthful” language,
the state cooperation agreement said explicitly that “any
violation of any part of [the] Agreement by Fredell [sic]
Bryant [would] void [the] Agreement in its entirety
and … release the Vermillion County State’s Attorney’s
Office from any obligation under [the] Agreement.”
Although
this
agreement
recited
Bryant’s
“acknowledge[ment]” that he was not receiving a grant of
immunity, it also explained that anything Bryant would say
“during the statement [could] not and [would] not be used
directly against [him] in any criminal prosecution.”
Nowhere, however, did the state cooperation agreement
require that Bryant testify.
With the two separate cooperation agreements in place,
Bryant gave various members of state law‐enforcement
agencies two recorded statements about the triple murder;
the first on January 14, 2010, and the second on February 24,
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2010. On both occasions, Bryant admitted playing a central
role. He explained that the victims, Rodney Pepper, Madisen
Leverenz, and Tabreyan McCullough, were killed because
“some drugs and money came up missing.” But whereas
during the first session Bryant claimed he himself shot all
three victims, he later reinitiated contact with law
enforcement to change his story, and did so on February 24,
2010. During this second session, Bryant said his associates,
David Moore and Jerome Harris, were the ones who had
shot Leverenz and McCullough.
Two months later, by the April 29, 2010, date of Bryant’s
drug sentencing, the government was satisfied with his
cooperation. During an off‐record, in camera portion of that
hearing, the assistant U.S. attorney explained to the
sentencing judge the nature and value of Bryant’s service.
Though an account of those in camera proceedings was not
made available to this Court, we do know that on the record,
the assistant U.S. attorney characterized Bryant as having
“fulfilled” his “plea agreement and the agreements made in
that plea agreement.”2 (Tr. Sentencing Hr’g, Apr. 29, 2010,
11:5–13.) When the judge asked about the possibility of a
motion by the government for further reduction of Bryant’s
sentence to reward post‐sentencing cooperation, see Fed. R.
Crim. P. 35(b), the prosecutor replied, “I guess that’s always
a possibility, but it’s … not been anticipated.”
2
We think it is apparent that by “agreements made in that plea
agreement,” the assistant U.S. attorney was referring in part to Bryant’s
federal cooperation agreement. (See Tr. Sentencing Hr’g, Apr. 29, 2010,
29:21–25 (Court deems the cooperation agreement “incorporated into
the … signature on the plea agreement”).)
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The district court credited Bryant with providing truthful
trial testimony against Keric Franklin, and summarized
Bryant’s assistance: “I certainly believe that Mr. Bryant fully
cooperated [and] was truthful … .” (Tr. Sentencing Hr’g,
Apr. 29, 2010, 16:24, 17:5, 17:11–12.) Noting the danger of
reprisal that Bryant would face from Franklin in prison, the
sentencing judge decided “the government’s initial 20
percent [departure was] … too low given cooperation in
State matters” and other proceedings where Bryant had
given testimony that the judge deemed “fully truthful.” (Id.
19:10–14.) The district court later referred a second time to
Bryant’s cooperation in “State matters” (id. 22:5), ultimately
sentencing him to a total of 25 years on the drug‐related
charges.
After the drug sentencing, however, the uneasy
partnership between Bryant and the authorities unraveled.
In March 2011, the erstwhile gang general balked at the
Vermillion County State’s Attorney’s Office’s demand that
he testify within a state grand jury’s investigation of the
Danville murders. Bryant cited his Fifth Amendment right
against self‐incrimination and pointed to the absence from
his state cooperation agreement of a requirement that he
testify at all. The Vermillion County State’s Attorney’s Office
reacted by turning to the feds, inviting them to make use of
their more stringent cooperation agreement to pursue their
own investigation of the triple murder.
The United States did so, first by seeking to have Bryant
testify before a federal grand jury about his previous
statements regarding the Danville killings. Bryant initially
refused, and then got a chance to consult with an attorney
and refused again. The government advised him that it
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considered him in breach of his federal cooperation
agreement, and had him indicted on three counts of murder
during the commission of a drug crime.
In a consolidated pretrial motion, Bryant objected to the
use of his statements to Illinois authorities for purposes of
indicting him or affirmatively proving the elements of the
murder charges. He also sought a hearing pursuant to
Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972), to require the
government to show that its evidence derived from
legitimate, non‐immunized sources. District Judge Michael
P. McCuskey denied the consolidated motion in its entirety,
but expressed due process concerns over the possibility of
the government exploiting a cooperation agreement with no
specified termination date in another case by forcing an
informant to testify many years after forming the deal. See
United States v. Bryant, 905 F. Supp. 2d 877, 889 (C.D. Ill.
2012). The district court ruled:
[B]ased on the facts in this case, including, but
not limited to, the short duration between the
two interviews and that Defendant was
involved in drug trafficking at the time that he
committed the homicide (and admitted as
much in his statement to state prosecutors),
thereby creating a factual nexus between the
two indictments, … the federal authorities
were permitted to leverage his earlier use
immunity agreement to compel him to testify
regarding the homicides. Because the federal
cooperation agreement was still binding on
Defendant, the Government requested
Defendant testify before the grand jury, and
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Defendant refused to do so, Defendant must be
found in breach of his cooperation agreement.
Therefore, the Government is not bound by its
previous promise not to use his statements
against him.
Id. at 890. For those reasons, the motions to dismiss the
indictment and to suppress the statements were denied. Id.
Judge McCuskey denied the motion for a Kastigar hearing on
the additional ground that Bryant’s statements to Illinois
authorities were, in the first place, beyond the scope of the
immunity the United States had extended him. Id. at 891.
At trial, the government relied heavily on the self‐
incriminating statements Bryant had made to Illinois
authorities. He took the stand and testified upon cross‐
examination that he had been lying in those statements:
Q
Now, … I’m
talking
about
the
statements in January and February – those
statements … that you made to [the
officers], … they were asking you questions,
correct?
A
Yes.
Q
And you fabricated those statements
based on what sources of information?
A
[Bryant’s brother], my lawyer, the
streets.
Q
… And if you didn’t know something,
what did you do? Make it up?
A
Yes.
* * *
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Q
Why would you say [the things you said
to the officers in January and February 2010]?
A
Because at the time, … I was trying to
get me a big downward departure, and I was
trying to save the people that really did it.
* * *
Q
So you lied about –
A
Everything.
Q
No. You lied about your girlfriend
sleeping with Face to explain why you were
able to shoot three people? That’s why?
A
I said I lied about the whole thing.
Q
Yeah. And I asked why you lied about
this fact. You made up a story that TuTu was
sleeping with Face for no reason?
A
I lied about the whole thing.
(Tr. Trial, Dec. 7, 2012, 155:13–157:6, 198:24–199:8.)
The jury convicted Bryant on all three counts, Judge
McCuskey imposed three “consecutive” life sentences, and
this appeal has followed.
II. Discussion
Bryant claims the district court erred by allowing the
federal government to prove its murder charges using the
cooperation statements he gave state authorities. Those
statements, he contends, could serve neither as the basis for
indicting him nor at trial to prove the elements of the
charges against him.
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Bryant advances three supporting theories. First, he
derives from his federal immunity agreement a right not to
be prosecuted by the United States with the statements he
gave Illinois. Second, he invokes the rights he had under the
state agreement against the federal government on the view
that the federal government became Illinois’s agent. Finally,
he cites the repudiation of the “silver platter” doctrine and
argues that because Illinois could not prosecute him with the
statements he provided it, and Illinois was the United States’
direct source of the statements, the feds should likewise be
barred from using them against him directly.
We approach the appeal de novo as regards the law,
leaving undisturbed the district court’s findings of fact
unless they are clearly erroneous. See United States v.
Schuster, 706 F.3d 800, 805 (7th Cir. 2013).
A.
The method for interpreting plea and immunity
agreements is very much like that applied to other contracts,
unless special public‐interest concerns, such as those for
criminal defendants’ constitutional rights, demand
otherwise. See United States v. Munoz, 718 F.3d 726, 729 (7th
Cir. 2013) (describing the approach for plea agreements);
United States v. Andreas, 216 F.3d 645, 663 (7th Cir. 2000)
(“Immunity agreements, like plea bargains, are interpreted
as ordinary contracts in light of the parties’ reasonable
expectations at the time of contracting.”). Thus, we start
from the plain language of the agreement. See United States v.
Quintero, 618 F.3d 746, 751 (7th Cir. 2010) (so proceeding);
United States v. Cobblah, 118 F.3d 549, 551 (7th Cir. 1997) (“It
is the language of the contract that binds the parties.” (citing
United States v. Griffin, 84 F.3d 912, 919 (7th Cir. 1996))).
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Ambiguities go against the government as the drafting
party. See Munoz, 718 F.3d at 729. The Restatement (Second)
of the Law of Contracts often serves as a reliable authority
for the contract principles in this context. See, e.g., United
States v. Cieslowski, 410 F.3d 353, 362 (7th Cir. 2005) (citing
the Restatement); United States v. Wilson, 390 F.3d 1003, 1012
(7th Cir. 2004) (same); United States v. Williams, 198 F.3d 988,
994 (7th Cir. 1999) (same).
The plain language here reveals that the feds never
immunized statements Bryant would make in cooperation
with other authorities. Consider that for Bryant’s contract‐
based argument, he relies on the United States’ promise that,
with some inapplicable exceptions, “no statement made or
information provided pursuant to th[e federal immunity]
agreement may be directly introduced as evidence against
[him] in any criminal case.” But because that agreement was
for Bryant “to cooperate with the United States … in its
efforts to enforce federal law,” the statements he gave
Illinois authorities in ostensible support of their efforts to
enforce state law were not provided “pursuant to” the
federal agreement. This reading is appropriately literal.
Allowing Bryant to lever the federal cooperation agreement
to bar the government’s use of his statements to Illinois
would grant him the benefit of a bargain he never had. Cf.
United States v. Eliason, 3 F.3d 1149, 1153 (7th Cir. 1993) (“If
Eliason wanted to limit the use the federal government
could make of the information he provided to Florida
prosecutors, he and his counsel were obliged to follow the
accepted procedures and at least make an attempt to obtain
such an agreement or promise from the federal
government.”).
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There is, therefore, no need to address the duration of
Bryant’s cooperation duties extensively, even though the
parties have done so in considering whether Bryant
breached his federal agreements after the drug sentencing.
To be sure, “[w]hen the parties to a bargain sufficiently
defined to be a contract have not agreed with respect to a
term which is essential to a determination of their rights and
duties, a term which is reasonable in the circumstances is
supplied by the court.” Restatement (Second) of Contracts
§ 204 (1981). The questions of Bryant’s breach and the
duration of his cooperation duty are not essential to a
determination of his rights against the United States,
however, because the government did not promise him
immunity from confessions made during state cooperation
in the first place.
We take care to emphasize that Bryant’s objection on
appeal is to the government proving its murder charges with
the once‐immunized statements that Bryant gave state law
enforcement in January and February of 2010. In this Court,
that is, Bryant has not challenged any murder‐trial use of
admissions he made to federal authorities. (See Appellant’s
Br. 2 (“The issue presented for review is: Whether the district
court erred in permitting the Government to indict Mr.
Bryant based on Mr. Bryant’s immunized statements given
to state law enforcement and whether the district court
further erred in permitting the Government to introduce
those statements at trial.”), 14 (“Although the specific legal
bases for Mr. Bryant’s motions are distinct, each turns on the
same question: Did Mr. Bryant breach his cooperation
agreement such that the Government could use the
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immunized statements he made to state prosecutors?”).)3
Failure to develop an argument on appeal results in waiver
even if the argument was presented to the district court.
Local 15, Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, AFL‐CIO v. Exelon Corp.,
495 F.3d 779, 783 (7th Cir. 2007) (quoting Williams v. REP
Corp., 302 F.3d 660, 666 (7th Cir. 2002)).4
Bryant has cited lots of case law emphasizing the role of
the Due Process Clause in the analysis of immunity and plea
agreements, but none that undermines our interpretation.
We acknowledge that as a criminal defendant, Bryant
enjoyed a due process‐based right to fundamental fairness in
the bargaining of his agreements with prosecutors. See, e.g.,
United States v. Farmer, 543 F.3d 363, 374 (7th Cir. 2008). He
identified nothing unfair about the bargaining process in his
case, however. Moreover, the substance of what he got in
return for his cooperation—the chance to avoid a life
3 Bryant has suggested that statements to the feds were off‐topic, by
noting that the federal authorities “never questioned [him] about the
murders in the period between [his] 2007 guilty plea and 2010
sentencing.” Bryant further posits that “[i]f the Government envisioned
[his] federal cooperation to include testimony regarding the triple
homicide … it stands to reason that the Government would have sought
that cooperation before it made its sentencing recommendation … .” In
sum, Bryant complains of federal use of statements given to state
authorities, but his cooperation agreement does not support his
grievance.
4
If we had occasion to consider the legitimacy of the government’s
possible murder‐trial use of the statements Bryant gave to federal
authorities, the cooperation agreement would come back into play. We
would then have to decide whether that agreement was ongoing and
therefore breached when the government requisitioned Bryant’s
testimony before the federal grand jury.
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sentence—was tremendously valuable. His analogy to vague
criminal statutes fails, because it was his free and counseled
personal choice to agree to the contractual terms that he now
questions.
B.
Bryant’s second principal argument has two steps. In
step one, he offers the premise that the Vermillion County
State’s Attorney’s Office violated his due process rights by
prompting the federal murder prosecution with the
protected statements he made during state cooperation. In
step two, Bryant seeks to transfer responsibility for Illinois’s
alleged wrong to the federal government on the theory that
it became Illinois’s agent by investigating and prosecuting
him at the state’s suggestion. Cf. United States v. Long, 511
F.2d 878, 881–82 (7th Cir. 1975) (rejecting a defendant’s claim
that the federal government, as principal of a state, became
bound by a state agreement).
Regardless of step one, Bryant encounters an
insurmountable obstacle in step two. That is, the principal‐
agent relationship cannot arise without the agent’s
agreement to be controlled by the principal, Restatement
(Third) of Agency § 1.01 (2006),5 and Bryant lacks any
5 Before publication of the third Restatement of the Law of Agency, this
Court looked to its predecessor for guidance in considering the agency of
prosecutors. E.g., Staten v. Neal, 880 F.2d 962, 965 (7th Cir. 1989). The
requirement of the agent’s agreement to be controlled is contained
within that predecessor, as well. See Restatement (Second) of Agency § 1
(1958) (“Agency is the fiduciary relation which results from the
manifestation of consent by one person to another that the other shall act
on his behalf and subject to his control, and consent by the other so to act.”
(Emphasis added.))
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evidence that the United States consented to be controlled by
Illinois.
C.
Closely related to Bryant’s agency argument is his effort
to draw upon what he characterizes as a corollary of the
repudiation of the “silver platter” doctrine. See Elkins v.
United States, 364 U.S. 206, 223 (1960). The “silver platter”
label entered the parlance of federal criminal procedure in
Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74, 79 (1949). Elkins, 364 U.S.
at 208 n.2. In Lustig, the Supreme Court stated: “[A] search is
a search by a federal official if he had a hand in it; it is not a
search by a federal official if evidence secured by state
authorities is turned over to the federal authorities on a
silver platter.” 338 U.S. at 78–79. Since Elkins, 364 U.S. at 223,
however, the absence of federal involvement in the search no
longer makes the evidence available for direct use by the
government. “[E]vidence obtained by state officers during a
search which, if conducted by federal officers, would have
violated the defendant’s immunity from unreasonable
searches and seizures under the Fourth Amendment is
inadmissible over the defendant’s timely objection in a
federal criminal trial.” Id. Though these passages frame the
context as an illegal search, the underlying principles seem
to apply with equal force beyond Fourth Amendment
territory. In Elkins, the Supreme Court explained:
“[A] conviction resting on evidence secured
through such a flagrant disregard of the
procedure which Congress has commanded
cannot be allowed to stand without making the
courts themselves accomplices in willful
disobedience of law.” Even less should the
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federal courts be accomplices in the willful
disobedience of a Constitution they are sworn
to uphold.
Id. (citation omitted) (quoting McNabb v. United States, 318
U.S. 332, 345 (1943)). This Court therefore declined an
opportunity to distinguish Elkins as a search case in United
States v. Cozzi, 613 F.3d 725, 732–33 (7th Cir. 2010), and
proceeded to address the substance of an argument that the
government should not be allowed to prosecute on the basis
of an investigation spurred by a tip derived from compelled
statements.
We follow suit in addressing the merits of Bryant’s silver‐
platter claim, but find law enforcement’s conduct readily
distinguishable from such a scenario. For one reason, this
doctrine has been applied only with respect to illegally
obtained evidence. Here, Illinois authorities got Bryant’s
January and February 2010 statements legitimately, with his
voluntary agreement, informed by the assistance of counsel.
Second, and of equal importance, Illinois shared the
statements with the federal government before Illinois
allegedly breached its duty to Bryant by encouraging the
federal murder investigation. So the United States had these
arrows in its quiver regardless of Illinois’s putative
wrongdoing.6 In other words, Bryant’s silver‐platter claim is
missing but‐for causation. Therefore, even if we overlook his
6 If, on the other hand, knowledge of Bryant’s involvement in the triple
homicide did not reach federal authorities before the drug sentencing,
then he failed to provide “complete and truthful information to [them]
regarding his criminal conduct,” in breach of his federal immunity
agreement.
Case: 13-1578
Document: 40
Filed: 04/17/2014
20
Pages: 20
No. 13‐1578
insistence that he was lying to the state authorities, we must
reject this argument, as well.
III. Conclusion
We AFFIRM the district court’s order denying Bryant’s
consolidated pretrial motions.7
7
As appointed counsel, Barry Levenstam, Matthew S. Hellman, and
Ishan K. Bhabha have our thanks for skillfully representing the
Appellant.
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