Gerald Charleston v. Board of Trustees of the Univ, et al
Filing
Filed opinion of the court by Judge Flaum. AFFIRMED. Diane P. Wood, Chief Judge; Joel M. Flaum, Circuit Judge and John Daniel Tinder, Circuit Judge. [6540108-1] [6540108] [13-2081]
Case: 13-2081
Document: 27
Filed: 12/20/2013
Pages: 15
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 13‐2081
GERALD CHARLESTON,
Plaintiff‐Appellant,
v.
BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE UNIVERSITY
OF ILLINOIS AT CHICAGO, et al.,
Defendants‐Appellees.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 1:12‐cv‐09463 — Suzanne B. Conlon, Judge.
____________________
ARGUED NOVEMBER 6, 2013 — DECIDED DECEMBER 20, 2013
____________________
Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and FLAUM and TINDER, Circuit
Judges.
FLAUM, Circuit Judge. Gerald Charleston, a former medi‐
cal student, brought this § 1983 action after the University of
Illinois College of Medicine dismissed him for unprofession‐
al conduct. Charleston advances procedural due process,
substantive due process, and equal protection claims against
the university, its administrators, and his clinical instructors.
Case: 13-2081
Document: 27
Filed: 12/20/2013
2
Pages: 15
No. 13‐2081
The district court dismissed his constitutional claims at the
Rule 12(b)(6) stage. It found that Charleston did not plead
sufficient facts to establish that he had a protected property
interest in his continued education at the medical school, nor
to demonstrate that the university singled out Charleston for
unfavorable treatment. We affirm.
I. Background
We assume the following facts, taken from Charleston’s
complaint, to be true. In fall 2010, Charleston was beginning
his fourth year at the University of Illinois College of Medi‐
cine at Chicago. He had finished his Obstetrics and Gynecol‐
ogy clinical rotation the previous June. But in September,
two of Charleston’s preceptors, Dr. Ralph Kehl and Dr. Nan‐
cy Wozniak, submitted a complaint to the College of Medi‐
cine asking that Charleston be required to repeat the rota‐
tion. Kehl and Wozniak’s complaint alleged that Charleston
had committed errors in his written work (including plagia‐
rism in his patient histories and other reports), that he did
not complete his quizzes until one week after the rotation’s
conclusion, that his case log did not have the required physi‐
cian signatures, that he spent four weeks of the rotation
without a preceptor, and that he did not perform well
enough to pass. Kehl and Wozniak’s complaint was for‐
warded to the College of Medicine at Urbana‐Champaign
Student Progress and Promotions Committee (which we will
call “the Student Progress Committee”), which held a meet‐
ing in October to discuss it. Charleston was not permitted to
attend the Student Progress Committee meeting. He was,
however, permitted to submit a letter regarding the precep‐
tors’ allegations. Upon review of the complaint and Charles‐
ton’s letter, the Student Progress Committee recommended
Case: 13-2081
No. 13‐2081
Document: 27
Filed: 12/20/2013
Pages: 15
3
that Charleston be assigned a mentor to ensure that he did
not make similar mistakes in his future clinical rotations. At
that point, Charleston states, the matter was resolved.
However, without notice to Charleston, Kehl and Wozni‐
ak’s complaint and Charleston’s letter were forwarded to
another decision‐making body, the College of Medicine at
Urbana‐Champaign Executive Committee (we’ll call it “the
Executive Committee”). Accompanying the complaint was a
new letter from James Hall, the Associate Dean for Student
Affairs for the College of Medicine. Hall alleged that back in
2008, Charleston had acted “unprofessionally” while serving
as a teaching assistant in the School of Molecular and Cellu‐
lar Biology. Charleston never had an opportunity to address
Hall’s allegation. He maintains that it was false. On October
27, the Executive Committee disregarded the Student Pro‐
gress Committee’s earlier recommendation and instead de‐
cided that Charleston should be dismissed from medical
school entirely. Charleston appealed the Executive Commit‐
tee’s decision (it is not clear to whom), but the dismissal was
upheld. He then appealed to the College Committee on Stu‐
dent Promotions, which also voted to dismiss him. Charles‐
ton appealed once more (again, not clear to whom), but to no
avail. Charleston’s dismissal was made final in January 2011.
Charleston filed a § 1983 action in federal district court
against the Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois,
University of Illinois at Chicago Chancellor Paula Allen‐
Meares, Associate Dean Hall, Dr. Kehl, Dr. Wozniak, and
other unknown defendants. He claimed that his dismissal
violated his Fourteenth Amendment due process and equal
protection rights. He also brought state‐law breach of con‐
tract and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims.
Case: 13-2081
Document: 27
Filed: 12/20/2013
4
Pages: 15
No. 13‐2081
Charleston asked for money damages and an injunction re‐
quiring the defendants “to cease all unlawful and unconsti‐
tutional acts that they currently engage in.”
The defendants moved to dismiss for failure to state a
claim. Charleston opposed the motion, and asked in the al‐
ternative for leave to amend his complaint. The district court
granted the motion and dismissed all of Charleston’s federal
claims with prejudice;1 the court declined to exercise sup‐
plemental jurisdiction over the state‐law claims. It did not
address Charleston’s request to amend his complaint.
Charleston appeals.
II. Discussion
We review the district court’s Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal de
novo. To state a claim for relief, a complaint must provide
more than “abstract recitations of the elements of a cause of
action or conclusory legal statements.” Brooks v. Ross, 578
F.3d 574, 581 (7th Cir. 2009). Instead, a plausible claim must
include “factual content” sufficient to allow the court “to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for
the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009). We can draw no such inferences from the facts in‐
cluded in Charleston’s complaint.
1
The district court ruled that Charleston’s federal claims for money
damages against the board and the university officials in their official
capacities were barred by state sovereign immunity. It also found, as an
alternate ground for its decision on his substantive due process claim,
that qualified immunity barred Charleston’s suit on that claim against
the university officials in their individual capacities. (Charleston had not
asked for an injunction as a remedy for that particular claim.) As we ul‐
timately dismiss each of Charleston’s claims on the pleadings, we do not
reach the district court’s immunity determinations.
Case: 13-2081
Document: 27
No. 13‐2081
Filed: 12/20/2013
Pages: 15
5
A. Due process claims
First, Charleston alleges a procedural due process claim
based on the process by which the medical school dismissed
him. There are two steps to any procedural due process
analysis. First, the court must identify the protected property
or liberty interest at stake. Second, it must determine what
process is due under the circumstances. Omosegbon v. Wells,
335 F.3d 668, 674 (7th Cir. 2003). The district court found that
Charleston’s claim failed at the first step. We agree.
Charleston insists that he has a protected property inter‐
est in his continued education at the University of Illinois
College of Medicine. However, our circuit has rejected the
proposition that an individual has a stand‐alone property
interest in an education at a state university, including a
graduate education. See Bissessur v. Ind. Univ. Bd. of Trs., 581
F.3d 599, 601 (7th Cir. 2009); Williams v. Wendler, 530 F.3d
584, 589 (7th Cir. 2008).2 It cannot be the case, we have rea‐
soned, “that any student who is suspended from college has
suffered a deprivation of constitutional property,” in part
2 Charleston argues that the Supreme Court’s decision in Goss v. Lopez,
419 U.S. 565 (1975), recognized a student’s protected interest in his or her
public education. But he misreads Goss. The Supreme Court found that
the Ohio high school students in that case “plainly had legitimate claims
of entitlement to a public education” only because an Ohio state statute
promised its young residents that education. Id. at 573 (citing the Ohio
code, which required local authorities to provide a free education to all
residents between five and twenty‐one). “Having chosen to extend the
right to an education to [high school students] generally,” Ohio could
not then deprive students of that right without due process. Id. at 574.
Here, Charleston’s complaint does not point to an Illinois statute that
promises him an education at a state medical school. Thus, Goss is inap‐
posite.
Case: 13-2081
6
Document: 27
Filed: 12/20/2013
Pages: 15
No. 13‐2081
because this “would imply that a student who flunked out
would have a right to a trial‐type hearing on whether his
tests and papers were graded correctly and a student who
was not admitted would have a right to a hearing on why he
was not admitted.” Williams, 530 F.3d at 589. But see Gorman
v. Univ. of R.I., 837 F.2d 7, 12 (1st Cir. 1988) (recognizing a
general “interest in pursuing an education,” including a
university education); Flaim v. Med. Coll. of Ohio, 418 F.3d
629, 633 (6th Cir. 2005) (affirming that the Due Process
Clause is “implicated” by university disciplinary decisions).
Instead of accepting a stand‐alone interest, we ask
whether the student has shown that he has a legally protected
entitlement to his continued education at the university. Bis‐
sessur, 581 F.3d at 601–02; Williams, 530 F.3d at 589–90.
Charleston could establish that he has this legitimate enti‐
tlement by pleading the existence of an express or implied
contract with the medical school. See Bissessur, 581 F.3d at
601. For instance, Charleston could point to an agreement
between himself and the school that he would be dismissed
only for good cause. Id. But as we held in Bissessur, it is not
enough for a student to merely state that such an implied
contract existed. Id. at 603. Instead, the student’s complaint
must be specific about the source of this implied contract,
the exact promises the university made to the student, and
the promises the student made in return. See id. at 603–04.
Charleston maintains that he met this standard. Having
reviewed his complaint closely, we disagree. All that his
complaint alleges is that Charleston’s dismissal was in viola‐
tion of the university’s “Student Disciplinary Policy” and
“University Statutes.” Charleston does not describe the spe‐
cific promises that the university made to him through its
Case: 13-2081
No. 13‐2081
Document: 27
Filed: 12/20/2013
Pages: 15
7
disciplinary policy, nor does he identify these “University
Statutes” and their contents.
Rather, Charleston seems to be claiming that the school
promised him the procedures set out in the university’s disci‐
plinary policy. See Complaint, ¶ 33 (“Defendant failed to
comply with its own policies and due process protections set
forth in its Student Disciplinary Policy by forwarding a
complaint of academic dishonesty, i.e., plagiarism to the
[Student Progress Committee] without intermediate review
of a Student Discipline Subcommittee.”); Complaint, ¶ 34
(“Defendant failed to comply with its own policies and due
process protections set forth in its Student Disciplinary Poli‐
cy by failing to allow Plaintiff a hearing, to be present and
defend himself from the allegations against him, to confront
the witnesses against him or to address any of the evidence
presented against him.”). We have rejected similar claims of
an “interest in contractually‐guaranteed university process”
many times, see, e.g., Park v. Indiana University School of Den‐
tistry, 692 F.3d 828, 832 (7th Cir. 2012), but we will be clear
once more: a plaintiff does not have a federal constitutional
right to state‐mandated process. See Olim v. Wakinekona, 461
U.S. 238, 250–51 (1983) (“Process is not an end in it‐
self. … The State may choose to require procedures … but in
making that choice the State does not create an independent
substantive right.”); Osteen v. Henley, 13 F.3d 221, 225 (7th
Cir. 1993) (“As we tirelessly but unavailingly remind counsel
in this court, a violation of state law (for purposes of this
case the student judicial code may be treated as a state law)
is not a denial of due process, even if the state law confers a
procedural right.”). Like other student‐plaintiffs before him,
all that Charleston alleges is that the medical school con‐
ferred on him certain procedural rights. It may have been
Case: 13-2081
8
Document: 27
Filed: 12/20/2013
Pages: 15
No. 13‐2081
unfair for the university not to follow its own procedures in
Charleston’s case, but it was not unconstitutional.
That does not conclude the matter, though. In his reply
brief, Charleston introduces a new account of where his im‐
plied contract with the university came from: the decision by
the first committee that reviewed the complaints against him
that Charleston remain in the medical school and only re‐
ceive a mentor. His new theory is that when the Student
Progress Committee issued this sanction, and Charleston
“accepted” it, an agreement formed between the medical
school and Charleston that he would not be dismissed.
When the medical school nonetheless moved forward with
the preceptors’ complaints and the new allegation from As‐
sociate Dean Hall, Charleston says, the university
“breached” their “original agreement.” Needless to say, this
theory of his implied contract does not come across on the
face of his complaint; nor did he advance it below. But waiv‐
er aside, the complaint’s allegations (and Charleston’s brief‐
ing on appeal) repeatedly describe the Student Progress
Committee’s decision as a “recommendation” only. A rec‐
ommendation can hardly be the basis for a binding contract
between parties.
We therefore find that Charleston failed to identify a
property interest at stake. As such, there is no need for us to
proceed to the second step of the procedural due process
analysis.
For similar reasons, we may dispose of Charleston’s sub‐
stantive due process claim. “Unless a governmental practice
encroaches on a fundamental right, substantive due process
requires only that the practice be rationally related to a legit‐
imate government interest, or alternatively phrased, that the
Case: 13-2081
Document: 27
No. 13‐2081
Filed: 12/20/2013
Pages: 15
9
practice be neither arbitrary nor irrational.” Lee v. City of Chi.,
330 F.3d 456, 467 (7th Cir. 2003). But this rational‐basis anal‐
ysis presupposes that the individual has a property interest
that the state can deprive him of. See Bissessur, 581 F.3d at
603 (dismissing the student’s procedural and substantive due
process claims when the student failed to plead the existence
of an implied contract, as the student’s “constitutional claims
are derivative of the rights he alleges were promised to
him”).
Nor has Charleston pled a substantive due process claim
based on a fundamental right. See Washington v. Glucksberg,
521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997) (holding that the Due Process Clause
“provides heightened protection against government inter‐
ference with certain fundamental rights and liberty inter‐
ests”). Charleston claims that he has a fundamental right to
“all benefits and privileges of a public higher education.”3
He has no such thing. For one, the Supreme Court has dis‐
claimed the existence of a fundamental right to an education
generally, see San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodri‐
guez, 411 U.S. 1, 35–37 (1973); and accordingly, our circuit
has disclaimed the existence of a fundamental right to a
graduate education specifically, see Galdikas v. Fagan, 342
F.3d 684, 688–89 (7th Cir. 2003), abrogated on other grounds by
Spiegla v. Hull, 371 F.3d 928 (7th Cir. 2004). Charleston offers
no reason to reconsider either our interpretation of San An‐
tonio or our own precedent. Nor can he claim a fundamental
right to pursue the profession of his choosing. See Park, 692
F.3d at 832 (no right to follow a particular career). Thus, we
3 Actually, the substantive due process portion of Charleston’s complaint
states only that he has a “clearly established” right to this education, but
his brief on appeal indicates that he meant “fundamental.”
Case: 13-2081
Document: 27
Filed: 12/20/2013
10
Pages: 15
No. 13‐2081
affirm the dismissal of Charleston’s substantive due process
claim as well.
B. Equal protection “class of one” claim
We come now to Charleston’s third constitutional claim:
the university’s violation of his rights under the Equal Pro‐
tection Clause. Charleston does not assert that the university
dismissed him based on his membership in a protected
group; instead, he advances an equal protection “class of
one” claim. His complaint alleges that “the actions of De‐
fendants were the result of personal animus against the
Plaintiff, and said actions and denials were taken without
any rational basis.”
Our circuit has not settled on a standard for “class of
one” claims—that is, claims that a state official denied an in‐
dividual the equal protection of the laws simply by singling
the individual out for special treatment. See Del Marcelle v.
Brown Cnty. Corp., 680 F.3d 887 (7th Cir. 2012) (en banc). We
need not return to that debate in this case, however, because
Charleston cannot satisfy the even least demanding standard
that could apply. See Park, 692 F.3d at 833 (applying the two
standards derived from the lead and dissenting opinions in
Del Marcelle). The Del Marcelle dissenters would require a
showing that the “plaintiff was the victim of intentional dis‐
crimination … at the hands of a state actor,” and that “the
state actor lacked a rational basis for so singling out the
plaintiff.” Del Marcelle, 680 F.3d at 913 (Wood, J., dissenting);
see also Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000)
Case: 13-2081
Document: 27
No. 13‐2081
Filed: 12/20/2013
Pages: 15
11
(per curiam).4 Charleston has not properly pled either of these
elements.
One way to allege intentional discrimination is to show
that the state treated similarly situated individuals more fa‐
vorably. Park, 692 F.3d at 833; see also Olech, 528 U.S. at 564.
That seemed to be Charleston’s chosen method (we use the
past tense because this too will change, see below). His com‐
plaint alleges that he was “retaliated against, harassed, dis‐
ciplined against, intimidated, and dismissed from the medi‐
cal school, all … differently than those similarly situated
medical students subjected to the [Student Progress Com‐
mittee] review process.” But saying the magic words is not
enough: Charleston must offer “further factual enhance‐
ment.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. And his complaint tells us noth‐
ing about these “similarly situated medical students.”
On appeal, Charleston offers a “Dr. Li” who he claims al‐
so failed to turn in the required quizzes for their OB/GYN
4 We call the Del Marcelle dissenting opinion’s standard the least de‐
manding because it does not require the plaintiff to plead facts establish‐
ing the state actor’s illegitimate motive or subjective ill will toward the
plaintiff. Compare Del Marcelle, 680 F.3d at 889 (Posner, J., lead opinion)
(requiring the plaintiff to show that “he was the victim of discrimination
intentionally visited on him by state actors who knew or should have
known that they had no justification, based on their public duties, for
singling him out for unfavorable treatment” (emphasis omitted)); Hilton
v. City of Wheeling, 209 F.3d 1005, 1008 (7th Cir. 2000). If Charleston were
required to plead an illegitimate motive, however, he has not done so.
His complaint contains only a naked assertion that the university offi‐
cials’ actions “were the result of personal animus” toward him—he of‐
fers nothing, other than the mere fact of Hall’s writing the letter and the
university’s reacting to it, to establish that the officials harbored some
personal hostility toward him.
Case: 13-2081
12
Document: 27
Filed: 12/20/2013
Pages: 15
No. 13‐2081
rotation on time, but who nonetheless escaped sanction. Of
course, Charleston needed to mention this Dr. Li in his actu‐
al complaint. But it would not have made a difference if he
had, because the accusations against Charleston did not sole‐
ly concern his quizzes. Charleston was also accused of com‐
mitting plagiarism in his patient paperwork, failing to obtain
physician signatures for his case log, spending four weeks of
the rotation without a preceptor, and not performing well
enough in the rotation to pass. Moreover, he was accused of
acting unprofessionally as a teaching assistant. See Park, 692
F.3d at 833 (finding “no reason to suppose” that other dental
students were “comparable” to the plaintiff where the plain‐
tiff was accused of significantly more academic and profes‐
sional misconduct). As was the case in Park, the difference in
Charleston’s and Dr. Li’s alleged culpability defeats a plau‐
sible inference that the school intentionally discriminated
against the former. It also defeats an inference that the
school’s disparate treatment of the two students was irra‐
tional.
Once again, however, Charleston has proposed a new
theory of the defendants’ liability in his reply brief. Aban‐
doning Dr. Li and the “similarly situated students” angle, he
now maintains that he can plead his class‐of‐one claim by
alleging that, because the Student Progress Committee had
already addressed Dr. Kehl and Dr. Wozniak’s complaint
about Charleston’s performance during the rotation, the Ex‐
ecutive Committee’s subsequent dismissal of Charleston
lacked a rational basis. Charleston has waived this argument
by failing to embrace it in his opposition to the motion to
dismiss or in his initial brief. But even if we overlooked this,
his new theory still does not state a viable equal protection
claim. Assuming that the Student Progress Committee’s de‐
Case: 13-2081
Document: 27
Filed: 12/20/2013
No. 13‐2081
Pages: 15
13
cision conclusively settled the university’s response to the
preceptors’ allegations—and again, Charleston’s consistent
use of the term “recommendation” to describe the commit‐
tee’s decision suggests that we should assume no such
thing—we still have Associate Dean Hall’s allegation that
Charleston acted unprofessionally as a teaching assistant.
The fact that the disciplinary committees responded more
harshly upon receiving this new complaint does not show
that the administrators reacted irrationally. True, Charleston
maintains that Hall’s allegation was false (an assertion that
we must credit at this stage), but he does not plead that the
administrators knew that it was false and nonetheless dis‐
missed him on that basis. Charleston’s allegations amount to
a claim that the university had poor reasons for dismissing
him—but poor is not the same as irrational. Rather, “[i]t is
entirely rational … to permit state actors to make individual‐
ized decisions when the very nature of their job is to take a
wide variety of considerations into account.” Del Marcelle,
680 F.3d at 913 (Wood, J., dissenting).
Thus, we affirm the dismissal of Charleston’s equal pro‐
tection claim.
C. Denial of leave to amend the complaint
Finally, Charleston argues that the district court should
have granted him leave to amend his complaint. Charleston
requested leave to amend in his opposition to the defend‐
ants’ 12(b)(6) motion; the district court did not address his
request in its order.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15 provides that leave to
amend should be “freely” given “when justice so requires.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). However, “district courts have broad
Case: 13-2081
14
Document: 27
Filed: 12/20/2013
Pages: 15
No. 13‐2081
discretion to deny leave to amend” where “the amendment
would be futile.” Arreola v. Godinez, 546 F.3d 788, 796 (7th
Cir. 2008). We will only reverse a denial if the court abused
this discretion. Stanard v. Nygren, 658 F.3d 792, 797 (7th Cir.
2011).
Preferably, the district court would have addressed its
reasons for not granting leave to amend on the record. Re‐
gardless, in making his request, Charleston offered no sug‐
gestions at all about how he would cure the complaint’s de‐
ficiencies. Under these circumstances, the district court did
not abuse its discretion in denying Charleston a second
chance. See Indep. Trust Corp. v. Stewart Info. Servs. Corp., 665
F.3d 930, 943–44 (7th Cir. 2012) (finding no abuse of discre‐
tion where the plaintiff “did not offer any meaningful indi‐
cation of how it would plead differently” in its motion to
amend).
If there were any doubt on this score, Charleston has
eliminated it on appeal. In explaining (in his reply brief) how
he would amend his allegations if given the chance, Charles‐
ton has offered that he would plead the complaint “more
succinctly” to show that he was dismissed on the basis of the
letter from Associate Dean Hall, that Hall’s allegation was
both vague and false, that Charleston never had the oppor‐
tunity to address the letter’s allegations or confront Hall,
that Charleston had already been sanctioned by the Student
Progress Committee, that Charleston’s acceptance of those
sanctions had concluded the matter, and that Charleston’s
dismissal had no rational basis. Virtually all of that infor‐
mation was already in his complaint, however. And none of
it sustains his constitutional claims. If Charleston only pro‐
Case: 13-2081
Document: 27
Filed: 12/20/2013
No. 13‐2081
Pages: 15
15
poses to rehash his original allegations, we find no abuse of
discretion by the district court.
III. Conclusion
We AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?