National Organization for Wome, et al v. Joseph Scheidler, et al
Filing
Filed opinion of the court by Judge Easterbrook. AFFIRMED. William J. Bauer, Circuit Judge; Frank H. Easterbrook, Circuit Judge and David F. Hamilton, Circuit Judge. [6571787-1] [6571787] [13-2197]
Case: 13-2197
Document: 49
Filed: 04/29/2014
Pages: 7
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 13-‐‑2197
NATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR WOMEN, INC., et al.,
Plaintiffs-‐‑Appellants,
v.
JOSEPH M. SCHEIDLER, et al.,
Defendants-‐‑Appellees.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 86 C 7888 — Charles R. Norgle, Judge.
____________________
ARGUED APRIL 18, 2014 — DECIDED APRIL 29, 2014
____________________
Before BAUER, EASTERBROOK, and HAMILTON, Circuit
Judges.
EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge. This suit began 28 years ago
and has been to the Supreme Court three times. National Or-‐‑
ganization for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249 (1994);
Scheidler v. National Organization for Women, Inc., 537 U.S. 393
(2003); Scheidler v. National Organization for Women, Inc., 547
U.S. 9 (2006). All defendants who stuck it out to the end
(some settled) prevailed across the board. They applied for
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costs under 28 U.S.C. §1920 and were awarded most of what
they sought—but not until District Judge Coar held the re-‐‑
quest under advisement for three years and then retired, af-‐‑
ter which the case was transferred to District Judge Norgle.
He awarded a total $63,391.45, modest for a suit that entailed
discovery, a long trial, many motions in the district court,
and appellate proceedings that span a generation. The costs
amount to less than $2,300 per year of litigation.
Plaintiffs dispute some of the district judge’s decisions
about particular items, but we do not perceive either a clear
error of fact or an abuse of discretion and have no more to
say about those matters. Plaintiffs also offer three reasons
why defendants should get nothing: (1) they took too long to
request costs; (2) they did not establish that the transcripts
and copies were “necessarily obtained for use in the case” as
§1920 requires; and (3) they did not nudge Judge Coar to
rule before he retired. We consider these in turn.
1. Final judgment was entered on May 14, 2007. Defend-‐‑
ants filed a timely motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59 to amend
the judgment; they also asked for more time to file a bill of
costs, telling the judge that the length and complexity of the
case, and the need to coordinate among the many defend-‐‑
ants, justified additional time. Judge Coar did not act on that
motion. Defendants then filed a bill of costs on July 14—one
day late, unless the Rule 59 motion itself extended the time.
Instead of deciding what effect the Rule 59 motion had,
Judge Coar entered an order on July 19 accepting the belated
filing. N.D. Ill. Local Rule 54.3 requires parties seeking costs
to follow up by conferring with other litigants to see what
disputes can be resolved without judicial action. Defendants
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asked for extensions; the last of these ran through October 1,
and defendants filed the Local Rule 54.3 statement that day.
Judge Norgle concluded that these events entitle defend-‐‑
ants to a ruling. A district judge may accept untimely fil-‐‑
ings—Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d), which governs costs, is not
among the few that create non-‐‑extendable time limits—and
appellate review is deferential. See, e.g., Pioneer Investment
Services Co. v. Brunswick Associates L.P., 507 U.S. 380 (1993).
Not that an extension was necessary. A timely motion under
Rule 59 suspends the judgment’s finality, see Fed. R. App. P.
4(a)(4), which means that the time to file the bill of costs did
not begin to run until the district judge resolved the Rule 59
motion. Judge Coar did not do that until August 22, 2007,
when he granted defendants’ motion and fixed the problems
in the initial judgment. The bill of costs filed on July 14 was
early, not late. And the Local Rule 54.3 statement was timely.
2. Plaintiffs contend that defendants did not adequately
prove what costs they had incurred. Although §1920 refers
to papers “necessarily obtained for use in the case”, it does
not define “necessarily”. Nor does Rule 54(d), which creates
an informal process under which the clerk of court awards
costs, subject to judicial review by a dissatisfied party. But 28
U.S.C. §1924 provides that the party seeking costs must veri-‐‑
fy the claim by “an affidavit, made by himself or by his duly
authorized attorney or agent having knowledge of the facts,
that such item is correct and has been necessarily incurred in
the case and that the services for which fees have been
charged were actually and necessarily performed.” Defend-‐‑
ants did exactly that, using the statutory formula. Plaintiffs
insist that this is not enough.
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Why not? No statute or rule requires more. Parts of
plaintiffs’ brief propose that the affidavit go through the rec-‐‑
ord to demonstrate why each transcript, and perhaps even
each copy of any document, was necessary. That would be
preposterous. Copies are made for pennies a page. Having a
lawyer devote the time necessary to demonstrate the necessi-‐‑
ty of each transcript and every copy of a document would be
far more costly than the copying itself. No sensible legal sys-‐‑
tem requires parties to waste $60 of lawyers’ time to explain
spending $6 on making a copy of something. At oral argu-‐‑
ment plaintiffs denied that they are arguing for a document-‐‑
by-‐‑document demonstration of necessity, but they did not
supply an intermediate position between the general §1924
affidavit and a document-‐‑specific explanation.
If by “necessarily” §1920 meant something like “indis-‐‑
pensably,” then perhaps there would be no alternative to a
document-‐‑specific inquiry. But in law the word “necessary”
often does not live up to the impression it conveys to lay
readers. See, e.g., McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316 (1819)
(discussing the Constitution’s “necessary and proper”
clause). We have understood §1920 as requiring no more
than that the transcripts or copies be reasonably and pru-‐‑
dently obtained—which depends on how things seemed
when the expenditures were made, without the benefit of
hindsight. See, e.g., Majeske v. Chicago, 218 F.3d 815, 825 (7th
Cir. 2000); Hudson v. Nabisco Brands, Inc., 758 F.2d 1237,
1243–44 (7th Cir. 1985). When our litigants ordered tran-‐‑
scripts and made copies, they were defending against a
claim for treble damages under RICO plus a demand for a
sweeping injunction. And they verified the reasonableness
of these outlays by paying themselves, knowing that they
would have to bear every penny unless they won in the end.
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Hindsight tells us that the defendants could have won with-‐‑
out much of the evidence they produced, because the Su-‐‑
preme Court eventually deemed plaintiffs’ legal theories to
be deficient. But this circuit had held otherwise; the Supreme
Court reversed us three times. The initial reversal set aside
an order in defendants’ favor. That decision was followed by
discovery, a seven-‐‑week jury trial ending in damages plus a
nationwide injunction, two appellate victories by plaintiffs,
and two more reversals by the Supreme Court. A legal theo-‐‑
ry strong enough to win in the court of appeals is more than
enough to justify prudent defense expenditures, no matter
what happens in the Supreme Court.
3. By October 12, 2007, the bill of costs and Local Rule
54.3 statement had been submitted, and briefs had been ex-‐‑
changed. The matter was ripe for decision. Nothing hap-‐‑
pened until December 3, 2008, when the district court en-‐‑
tered a mysterious order dismissing “as moot” defendants’
request for extra time to file the Local Rule 54.3 statement.
The order was a mystery because the statement was already
on file, and more than a year earlier Judge Coar had granted
this very motion. On September 24, 2009, the clerk’s office
noted on the docket that the case was closed. This is a se-‐‑
cond mystery, because the case had been terminated by final
judgment in May 2007, and that judgment had been amend-‐‑
ed (and thus became final with finality) in August 2007. Ap-‐‑
parently the clerk’s office did not send anyone a document
corresponding to the docket entry, which just memorialized
something that had occurred 25 months earlier.
Judge Coar retired on December 31, 2010, without acting
on the long-‐‑pending bill of costs. Four months later, defend-‐‑
ants used a procedure established by N.D. Ill. Local Rule
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78.5 and called the matter to the court’s attention. Plaintiffs
responded by asserting that defendants’ failure to file such a
notice before Judge Coar’s retirement forfeited their oppor-‐‑
tunity to receive a decision. In March 2012 Judge Norgle re-‐‑
jected that contention, and in May 2013 he awarded most of
the costs defendants had requested—after they had waited
5½ years for judicial action.
Plaintiffs say that equity required defendants to give
Judge Coar a heads up so that the judicial officer with the
most knowledge about the case could resolve the dispute.
Judge Coar undoubtedly was best situated to tackle this, and
he should have done so in fall 2007 rather than letting the
matter slide. But judicial delay does not wipe out a litigant’s
rights. Plaintiffs suspect that defendants thought that Judge
Coar would rule against them and were happy to wait until
the request landed in a different judge’s lap. So what? No
statute, rule, or decision of which we are aware requires liti-‐‑
gants to pester judges for rulings on pain of forfeiture. Local
Rule 78.5 is permissive; it says that parties “may on notice …
call a motion to the attention of the court for decision” (em-‐‑
phasis added). If plaintiffs thought that they had their best
prospects with Judge Coar, they could have used Local Rule
78.5 to ask him for a ruling. He took senior status in August
2009, and his plan to retire at the end of 2010 was public
knowledge. The two sides had equal information and were
equally passive. Neither should gain from silence, or judicial
delay, at the expense of the other.
Nagging judges to act on motions under advisement is
not essential to preserving one’s rights. The court’s docket-‐‑
tracking software, and each judge’s duty to report every six
months on all motions under advisement, are designed to
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keep matters moving without the need for litigants to com-‐‑
municate impatience. Their shortcomings do not oblige liti-‐‑
gants to supplement them with ticklers. The decisions on
which plaintiffs rely, such as In re Plunkett, 82 F.3d 738, 742
(7th Cir. 1996), and Zelazny v. Lyng, 853 F.2d 540 (7th Cir.
1988), deal with delay in filing suits or motions, not with lit-‐‑
igants’ silence after matters are under advisement. At oral
argument, plaintiffs’ lawyer candidly admitted that she did
not know of any decision, by any court, creating a badger-‐‑
the-‐‑judge-‐‑or-‐‑forfeit-‐‑the-‐‑motion requirement; our search did
not turn one up. We will not be the first. The obligation to
render timely rulings rests on the judiciary, not the parties.
This litigation has lasted far too long. At last it is over.
AFFIRMED
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