Suzan Gienapp v. Harbor Crest, et al
Filing
Filed opinion of the court by Judge Easterbrook. REVERSED and REMANDED. Richard A. Posner, Circuit Judge; Frank H. Easterbrook, Circuit Judge and David F. Hamilton, Circuit Judge. [6585250-1] [6585250] [14-1053]
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In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 14-‐‑1053
SUZAN GIENAPP,
Plaintiff-‐‑Appellant,
v.
HARBOR CREST, a not-‐‑for-‐‑profit corporation, and MYRA
CHATTIC,
Defendants-‐‑Appellees.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, Western Division.
No. 11 C 50325 — Frederick J. Kapala, Judge.
____________________
ARGUED MAY 27, 2014 — DECIDED JUNE 24, 2014
____________________
Before POSNER, EASTERBROOK, and HAMILTON, Circuit
Judges.
EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge. Suzan Gienapp worked at
Harbor Crest, a residential nursing care facility in Fulton,
Illinois. In January 2011 she told Myra Chattic, its top man-‐‑
ager, that she needed time off to care for her daughter, who
was undergoing treatment for thyroid cancer. Chattic grant-‐‑
ed leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act. Employ-‐‑
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ees are entitled to as much as 12 weeks’ unpaid leave annu-‐‑
ally to care for children with serious health conditions. 29
U.S.C. §2612(a)(1). Harbor Crest acknowledges that Gie-‐‑
napp’s daughter had a serious health condition, a term de-‐‑
fined in §2611(11). While on leave, Gienapp mailed in an
FMLA form, leaving blank a question about the leave’s ex-‐‑
pected duration.
Harbor Crest did not ask her to fill in the blank on the
form, nor did it pose written questions as the 12-‐‑week period
progressed. (The parties debate whether Harbor Crest asked
for a return date by phone or through Gienapp’s sister; for
current purposes, we must accept Gienapp’s position that it
did not. The absence of a written request is undisputed.) A
physician’s statement on the form said that the daughter’s
recovery was uncertain, and that if she did recover she
would require assistance at least through July 2011. Chattic
inferred from this that Gienapp would not return by April 1,
her leave’s outer limit, and in mid-‐‑February Chattic hired
someone else in her stead. When Gienapp reported for work
on March 29, Chattic told her that she no longer had a job.
After the exhaustion of administrative remedies, this litiga-‐‑
tion followed. The district court granted defendants’ motion
for summary judgment, ruling that Gienapp had forfeited
her rights under the FMLA by not telling Harbor Crest ex-‐‑
actly how much leave she would take.
The statute requires notice to the employer of the need
for leave. Gienapp gave notice; Chattic granted leave; Har-‐‑
bor Crest knew that it was governed by the FMLA. What
Gienapp did not do was provide a date when she expected
to return to work, though the form called for that infor-‐‑
mation.
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Because her daughter’s status was changeable, Gienapp
could not have given a firm date; the Department of Labor’s
regulations call her situation “unforeseeable” leave. The
daughter might die soon, and then Gienapp could return to
work; or she might live longer (as she did; her cancer is in
remission) but need more care than other members of the
family could provide. If that occurred, the family might or
might not hire a live-‐‑in nurse to handle the daughter’s
needs. The date on which a medical professional would re-‐‑
place Gienapp’s assistance, or care might become unneces-‐‑
sary, could not be known in January 2011.
That left two possibilities: Gienapp might have said
something like “I will return no later than April 1, and earli-‐‑
er if possible” or something like “I will stay with my daugh-‐‑
ter as long as necessary, even if that means giving up my job,
but will return by April 1 if things work out.” As we under-‐‑
stand Harbor Crest’s position, putting either of these state-‐‑
ments on the form would have complied with the FMLA’s
notice requirement and thus held Gienapp’s job open. Yet
neither of these statements would have given Harbor Crest
materially more information than the blank box, plus the
physician’s statement describing the daughter’s medical sta-‐‑
tus. It is hard to see why omitting something obvious should
have such a striking legal effect—certainly not when Harbor
Crest could and should have asked.
Foreseeable leave is governed by 29 C.F.R. §825.302,
which directs employees to tell their employers how much
leave they need and adds that an employer must inquire fur-‐‑
ther if an employee’s statement is inadequate. 29 C.F.R.
§825.302(c). We discuss the notice system of §825.302 in Righi
v. SMC Corp., 632 F.3d 404 (7th Cir. 2011). (To be more pre-‐‑
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cise, Righi discusses the 2006 version. Section 825.302 and
related regulations have since been amended. The 2009 ver-‐‑
sion applies to Gienapp and the 2013 version to current ap-‐‑
plications. These amended regulations supersede Righi to the
extent of any differences.) But Gienapp’s application is cov-‐‑
ered by §825.303, which deals with unforeseeable leave. And
§825.303, unlike §825.302, does not require employees to tell
employers how much leave they need, if they do not know
yet themselves.
Instead of requiring notice at the outset, §825.303(c) tells
workers to comply with employers’ policies. Employers
may, for example, require updated estimates about how long
leave will last. The employee in Righi lost after turning off
his cell phone and not responding to his employer’s repeat-‐‑
ed requests for information. Harbor Crest told Gienapp to
call in monthly, and it is conceded that she did so. If Harbor
Crest asked for any extra information during those calls, the
record does not reflect undisputed details; we assume there-‐‑
fore that Gienapp complied with Harbor Crest’s policies. We
have already explained why we must assume that Harbor
Crest’s professed attempts to reach Gienapp by phone, or
though her sister, either never occurred or were unsuccess-‐‑
ful. On the summary judgment record, therefore, it is not
possible to conclude that Gienapp fell short under
§825.303(c). What seems to have happened instead is that
Chattic drew an unwarranted inference from the physician’s
statement in the original form and confused the anticipated
duration of the daughter’s need for care with the anticipated
duration of Gienapp’s absence from work, even though the-‐‑
se are logically distinct. Harbor Crest is not entitled to sum-‐‑
mary judgment on a theory that Gienapp failed to provide
essential information.
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Harbor Crest offers two other arguments in support of its
judgment. It is entitled to do this, without the need to file a
cross-‐‑appeal, even though the district court did not consider
them. See, e.g., Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co. v.
Ludwig, 426 U.S. 479 (1976). Both lines of argument maintain
that Gienapp did not qualify for any FMLA leave. If so, the
date-‐‑of-‐‑return issue becomes irrelevant.
Section 2612(a)(1)(C) provides that an employee may take
time off “[i]n order to care for the spouse, or a son, daughter,
or parent, of the employee, if such spouse, son, daughter, or
parent has a serious health condition.” No one doubts that
Gienapp took leave as a result of the illness of her “daugh-‐‑
ter” as ordinary people understand that word: Trish Hoff is
Gienapp’s biological child.
Harbor Crest observes that Hoff was emancipated, an
adult, and married; it contends that such a person does not
count as a “daughter” no matter how normal people use that
word. “Son or daughter” is a defined phrase. It means:
a biological, adopted, or foster child, a stepchild, a legal ward, or
a child of a person standing in loco parentis, who is—
(A) under 18 years of age; or
(B) 18 years of age or older and incapable of self-‐‑care be-‐‑
cause of a mental or physical disability.
29 U.S.C. §2611(12). Trish Hoff is over 18 but in 2011 was
“incapable of self-‐‑care because of a … physical disability.”
She meets the definition of a “daughter”. But Harbor Crest
does not want us to apply the full statutory definition. It
contends instead that Hoff does not count as a “daughter”
because she was married and Gienapp was no longer
“standing in loco parentis”. That snippet of the statute is not
the sole means of qualifying a person as a child, however.
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Any biological child is treated as a “son or daughter” if ei-‐‑
ther the age condition or the disability condition is satisfied.
The “in loco parentis” language is preceded by “or”. That is
to say, a biological child or an adopted child or a foster child
or a stepchild or a legal ward or a person over whom the em-‐‑
ployee is acting in loco parentis can be a statutory “son or
daughter”; it is unnecessary to satisfy all of these possibili-‐‑
ties. That Gienapp is no longer in loco parentis to Trish Hoff
does not make her less Gienapp’s biological child (or more
capable of self-‐‑care).
Just a few months ago, we rejected an invitation to re-‐‑
strict the FMLA’s definition of “care” by selective omission
of statutory terms. Ballard v. Chicago Park District, 741 F.3d
838 (7th Cir. 2014). It is no more appropriate to limit the
FMLA’s definition of son or daughter. The United States
Code is enormous and contains many commands or limita-‐‑
tions that might not be reenacted if Congress focused on
how the language would work in practice. Our job is to en-‐‑
force the text on the books, not to add or subtract qualifiers
that a litigant thinks would make the statute more sensible.
See, e.g., Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Community, 134 S. Ct.
2024, 2033–34 (2014). (Whether defendants’ position would
make the statute more sensible is not a subject on which we
express any view.)
Harbor Crest’s other theme is that Gienapp did not sup-‐‑
ply “care” for Trish Hoff at all. As Harbor Crest sees things,
physicians and Hoff’s husband did that. According to Har-‐‑
bor Crest, what Gienapp did was care for her grandchildren,
reducing the burdens on those who were caring for her
daughter. The FMLA allows leave to care for children and
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parents, but not grandchildren and grandparents. That dis-‐‑
qualifies Gienapp, the argument wraps up.
To the extent Harbor Crest maintains that Gienapp was
not entitled to leave because she was not Hoff’s “primary”
caregiver, the argument lacks support in the statute. Em-‐‑
ployees are entitled to leave to provide “care” for their chil-‐‑
dren, 29 U.S.C. §2612(a)(1)(C); the word “primary” is just not
there, and we can’t add it, for reasons explained above and
in Ballard. But to the extent Harbor Crest contends that
Gienapp provided care exclusively for her grandchildren, the
argument has a statutory basis. What it lacks is a basis in
undisputed fact. Gienapp contends that she provided care
for both her child and her child’s children. That position
cannot be rejected on summary judgment. Nor could we re-‐‑
ject as a matter of law an argument that taking care of Hoff’s
children supplied some “care” to Hoff herself; that depends
on what Gienapp did and whether caring for the grandchil-‐‑
dren had a potential benefit for the daughter’s health.
We have so far identified three issues on which material
disputes of fact could prevent summary judgment: (1) did
Harbor Crest ask Gienapp in February 2011 (before hiring
her replacement) to supply an estimated date for her return
to work?; (2) did Gienapp ever tell Harbor Crest that she
would not return on or before April 1?; (3) did Gienapp pro-‐‑
vide care for her daughter as well as for her grandchildren?
It remains to decide whether Harbor Crest has done what is
necessary to preserve these questions for further proceed-‐‑
ings in the district court.
The first and second issues were put into dispute by
Chattic, who testified by deposition that Gienapp told her by
phone during February 2011 that she planned to stay home
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as long as Hoff needed care, which could be July 2011 or lat-‐‑
er. Gienapp has denied that she said any such thing. But al-‐‑
though there was a material dispute in the district court,
Harbor Crest’s appellate brief lets the matter drop. Its state-‐‑
ment of facts asserts that “the only information regarding the
expected duration of leave [with] which Chattic was ever
provided was the verification form itself” (emphasis in orig-‐‑
inal). The brief contains several similar assertions. Although
it also relies on Chattic’s deposition, it does so only to sup-‐‑
port the proposition we have just quoted. Harbor Crest has
thus waived on appeal any contention that Gienapp told
Chattic in February 2011, or at any other time, that she
would not return by the April 1 deadline.
On the third issue, by contrast, Harbor Crest preserved
its position in its appellate brief. Its statement of facts asserts
that “Gienapp had never been at her daughter’s bedside car-‐‑
ing for her daily needs but, instead, staying at Hoff’s home,
freeing her son-‐‑in-‐‑law to go to work, and taking care of her
grandchildren.” This is consistent with Chattic’s deposition.
She testified that Gienapp “led me to believe … that she was
taking care of her grandkids” rather than her daughter. Har-‐‑
bor Crest asserted in its motion for summary judgment that
Gienapp was not providing any care to Hoff.
Now “led me to believe” may be inadequate; it matters
what Gienapp said, rather than just what impression Chattic
took away. More important, Harbor Crest conceded in the
district court that Gienapp provided some care to her daugh-‐‑
ter. It accepted her submission that “[w]hile on leave and car-‐‑
ing for her daughter, Gienapp also found herself in a position
to help care for her daughter’s children” (emphasis added).
The FMLA does not treat care of grandchildren as disquali-‐‑
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fying, if the employee also cares for an eligible relative such
as a daughter.
Harbor Crest’s concession in the district court requires us
to frame the issue as whether a combination of assistance to
one’s daughter, plus care of grandchildren that could take a
load off the daughter’s mind and feet, counts as “care” un-‐‑
der the Act. To this the answer must be yes. Ballard explains
that care includes psychological as well as physical assis-‐‑
tance to a covered family member. See also 29 C.F.R.
§825.116 (defining “care”). Harbor Crest has never contend-‐‑
ed that Gienapp’s assistance to other members of the family
could not have given her daughter a mental boost. A person
who knows that her family is well looked-‐‑after has an im-‐‑
portant resource in trying to recover from a medical chal-‐‑
lenge. Doubtless some forms of familial assistance are too
tangential to hold out a prospect of psychological benefits to
a covered relative, but Harbor Crest does not contend that
Gienapp’s aid was too slight to qualify. Given its concession
in the district court, Harbor Crest must stake its all on the
proposition that devoting any time to the care of grandchil-‐‑
dren disqualifies a person from FMLA leave. That’s wrong.
It follows that no material dispute of fact remains for res-‐‑
olution in the district court. Gienapp is entitled to summary
judgment in her favor. The judgment of the district court is
reversed, and the case is remanded with instructions to craft
an appropriate remedy.
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