Scott Cunningham, et al v. UAL, et al
Filing
Filed opinion of the court by Judge Easterbrook. AFFIRMED. Diane P. Wood, Chief Judge; Frank H. Easterbrook, Circuit Judge and Diane S. Sykes, Circuit Judge. [6611433-1] [6611433]--[14-1453]
<![CDATA[
Case: 14-1453
Document: 41
Filed: 10/08/2014
Pages: 6
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 14-‐‑1453
SCOTT CUNNINGHAM and ANDREW HOLZMANN,
Plaintiffs-‐‑Appellants,
v.
AIR LINE PILOTS ASSOCIATION, INTERNATIONAL,
Defendant-‐‑Appellee.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 13 C 5522 — James F. Holderman, Judge.
____________________
ARGUED SEPTEMBER 22, 2014 — DECIDED OCTOBER 8, 2014
____________________
Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and EASTERBROOK and SYKES,
Circuit Judges.
EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge. After United Air Lines and
Continental Airlines merged, forming a new United Airlines,
they needed to produce unified seniority and longevity ros-‐‑
ters for pilots. The process was contentious; any improve-‐‑
ment in the position of one carrier’s pilots meant a relative
demotion for pilots coming from the other carrier. A single
Case: 14-1453
2
Document: 41
Filed: 10/08/2014
Pages: 6
No. 14-‐‑1453
union, the Air Line Pilots Association, represents all of the
pilots and had to work out many contests internally.
In December 2012 United and the Union reached a collec-‐‑
tive bargaining agreement that sets each pilot’s pay based on
three principal factors: a pilot’s rank (captain vs. first of-‐‑
ficer), type of aircraft flown (more pay goes with larger
planes, such as the Boeing 747), and longevity. The greater a
pilot’s longevity, other things equal, the higher the pay—
though longevity exceeding 12 years does not add to com-‐‑
pensation. Seniority and longevity are distinct under the
agreement; this case concerns longevity, a term that the
agreement defines as all time since the date a pilot was
hired, including time spent on furlough. This is a change
from the pre-‐‑merger situation, in which pilots on furlough
accrued seniority but not longevity.
Along with this main agreement, United and the Union
forged a number of ancillary agreements that specified pi-‐‑
lots’ starting positions when the main agreement went into
force. This suit concerns what the parties call “Letter of
Agreement 25” (“Agreement 25” for short). Paragraph 4 of
this side agreement provides that any pilot whose longevity
is less than that of other pilots hired on or before May 6,
2008, is entitled to longevity credit for furlough time “only to
the extent that such credit does not provide a pay longevity
date prior to May 7, 2008.” In other words, furlough time for
this group of pilots cannot be used to produce more than
four years and seven months of longevity (as of December
2012) when added to time on the job. Pilots in active service
longer than four years and seven months thus receive no
credit for time on furlough (but full credit for time worked);
pilots who had four years and six months on the job could
Case: 14-1453
No. 14-‐‑1453
Document: 41
Filed: 10/08/2014
Pages: 6
3
benefit from only one month of furlough time; and so on.
The two plaintiffs, who worked for the pre-‐‑merger United,
contend that the effect of Agreement 25 is to slot approxi-‐‑
mately 475 former United pilots into the longevity table be-‐‑
hind a group of former Continental pilots who were hired
before May 6, 2008. Another part of Agreement 25 provides
that, once an integrated seniority list has been established,
the former United pilots may receive additional longevity
credit for any furlough time not credited at the first stage,
provided that the application of additional credit does not
result in any former United pilot having more longevity than
the next most senior former Continental pilot.
This suit began as a hybrid contract / duty-‐‑of-‐‑fair-‐‑
representation claim against United and the Union. See Vaca
v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967). Plaintiffs accused United of not
giving them longevity credit for all time they had spent on
furlough, as they believe the main agreement requires, and
accused the Union of not adequately representing their in-‐‑
terests by letting United get away with this. United and the
Union replied that the main agreement governs only the fu-‐‑
ture, after Agreement 25 (and a host of other side agree-‐‑
ments) determine the starting position for the post-‐‑merger
seniority and longevity rosters. United asked the district
judge to dismiss it as a party, observing that disputes about
the meaning of a collective bargaining agreement in the air-‐‑
line industry are within the exclusive authority of an ad-‐‑
justment board under §2 Sixth and §204 of the Railway La-‐‑
bor Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 152 Sixth, 184. The judge agreed and
dismissed the suit against United. 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13414
at *8–28 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 4, 2014).
Case: 14-1453
4
Document: 41
Filed: 10/08/2014
Pages: 6
No. 14-‐‑1453
That left plaintiffs up the creek, because success in a hy-‐‑
brid contract/DFR suit depends on showing both that the
employer violated the contract and that the union did not
represent the workers fairly. Vaca, 386 U.S. at 187; DelCostello
v. Teamsters Union, 462 U.S. 151, 164–65 (1983). Without a fa-‐‑
vorable decision from an adjustment board, which has ex-‐‑
clusive authority over a breach-‐‑of-‐‑contract claim, the stand-‐‑
ard of Vaca cannot be met. That led plaintiffs to contend that
the Union violated its duty of fair representation not (neces-‐‑
sarily) by letting United get away with a breach of contract,
but by negotiating a bad contract (Agreement 25) that fa-‐‑
vored a group of pre-‐‑merger Continental pilots over a group
of pre-‐‑merger United pilots. The Supreme Court held in Air
Line Pilots Association, International v. O’Neill, 499 U.S. 65, 67,
77–78 (1991), that a union can be held liable for negotiating
an irrational agreement with an employer. But the district
court concluded that Agreement 25 is not irrational, so the
Union prevailed. 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13414 at *28–36. An-‐‑
other district court reached the same conclusion in dismiss-‐‑
ing a challenge by other pilots to Agreement 26. Gullaksen v.
United Air Lines, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131213 (D. D.C. Sept.
17, 2014). Plaintiffs have appealed the judgment in favor of
the Union but do not contest the ruling in United’s favor.
O’Neill holds that the approach of Vaca—under which a
union violates the duty of fair representation by action that
is “arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith”, 386 U.S. at
190—applies to negotiating collective bargaining agreements
as well as to enforcing them. A union would act in bad faith
if, for example, it disfavored members who supported a los-‐‑
ing candidate for union office. Plaintiffs do not accuse the
Union of doing that. A union would act discriminatorily if,
for example, it favored members of one race over members
Case: 14-1453
No. 14-‐‑1453
Document: 41
Filed: 10/08/2014
Pages: 6
5
of a different race. Plaintiffs do not contend that race or any
other prohibited characteristic played a role in the Union’s
negotiations, though plaintiffs do insist that the Union dis-‐‑
criminated in favor of pilots from pre-‐‑merger Continental.
If the Union’s leadership did that systematically, it would
be political suicide; pre-‐‑merger United was the larger carrier,
and its pilots would not allow the union to subordinate their
interests. Anyway, this is not the sort of “discrimination”
that O’Neill (another case arising from how the Air Line Pi-‐‑
lots Association treated some pilots at Continental) envisag-‐‑
es as problematic. The plaintiffs in O’Neill made an argu-‐‑
ment similar to the one our plaintiffs advance, and the Court
gave a brusque reply, noting that “some form of allocation
[between competing groups of pilots] was inevitable. A ra-‐‑
tional compromise on the initial allocation was not invidious
‘discrimination’ of the kind prohibited by the duty of fair
representation.” 499 U.S. at 81.
Just so in this case. If plaintiffs were arguing that pilots
who came from Continental won all the battles, or even the
lion’s share of them, they might have a point. But plaintiffs
have never argued that the Union disregarded the interests
of pilots from pre-‐‑merger United, or that Agreement 25 re-‐‑
duced their benefits (recall that the collective bargaining
agreement at pre-‐‑merger United had not afforded longevity
credit during furlough time). All Agreement 25 does is limit
the extent to which the credit-‐‑on-‐‑furlough provisions of the
2012 agreement apply retroactively. Because the suit was
dismissed on the pleadings, we cannot tell why the Union
and United struck the precise bargain they did, but allega-‐‑
tions of the complaint, plus terms of the agreements, are
enough in themselves to defeat a claim of discrimination.
Case: 14-1453
6
Document: 41
Filed: 10/08/2014
Pages: 6
No. 14-‐‑1453
This leaves the question whether the Union acted “arbi-‐‑
trarily.” The Court had this to say in O’Neill, 499 U.S. at 78
(citations omitted):
Any substantive examination of a union’s performance, there-‐‑
fore, must be highly deferential, recognizing the wide latitude
that negotiators need for the effective performance of their bar-‐‑
gaining responsibilities. For that reason, the final product of the
bargaining process may constitute evidence of a breach of duty
only if it can be fairly characterized as so far outside a “wide
range of reasonableness,” that it is wholly “irrational” or “arbi-‐‑
trary.” The [contrary] approach of the Court of Appeals is par-‐‑
ticularly flawed because it fails to take into account … the strong
policy favoring the peaceful settlement of labor disputes[.]
The Court in O’Neill found the union’s decision not discrim-‐‑
inatory because, with different pilots on different sides of a
strike, a strike-‐‑ending compromise that favored some over
others was inevitable. The Justices saw the union’s negotiat-‐‑
ing position as rational (= not arbitrary) for essentially the
same reason, adding that a different position (the one fa-‐‑
vored by the court of appeals) would have jeopardized labor
peace and dropped the striking pilots into a lawsuit that
they might well have lost outright to the pilots who crossed
the picket lines. Likewise there was need of compromise
here. Combining work forces following an airline merger is
not for the faint-‐‑hearted. The Union and United worked out
a series of deals, large and small, that have enabled two
groups of pilots to work as one without undue friction.
That’s a significant accomplishment, not a source of legal li-‐‑
ability.
AFFIRMED
]]>
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?
