USA v. Timmothy William
Filed Nonprecedential Disposition PER CURIAM. We GRANT counsel's motion to withdraw and DISMISS the appeal. Frank H. Easterbrook, Circuit Judge; Ann Claire Williams, Circuit Judge and David F. Hamilton, Circuit Judge. [6742209-2] [6810951-1]  [16-1446]
To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted January 11, 2017
Decided January 11, 2017
FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge
ANN CLAIRE WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge
DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appeal from the United States
District Court for the Northern District
of Indiana, Hammond Division.
Philip P. Simon,
O R D E R
Five years ago Timmothy Williams pleaded guilty to misusing social security
numbers, 42 U.S.C. § 408(a)(7)(B); identity theft, 18 U.S.C. § 1028(a)(7); aggravated
identity theft, id. § 1028A(a)(1); and making a false statement to the IRS, id. § 1001(a)(2).
Underlying the charged counts, Williams had used identifying information, including
social security numbers, to obtain state identification cards in the names of six victims,
which he then used to withdraw money from their bank accounts. He also used one of
the victim’s identifying information to obtain a credit card and another victim’s
identifiers to obtain a tax transcript from the IRS. The district court sentenced Williams
to a total of 80 months’ imprisonment, but twice we remanded for resentencing. The first
time we concluded that the district court had erred in applying the current version of the
sentencing guidelines rather than the more‐favorable version applicable when Williams
committed the crimes. United States v. Williams, 742 F.3d 304 (7th Cir. 2014). Then after
the district court had reimposed the same sentence (as before, a variance above the
guidelines range), we granted the parties’ joint motion for resentencing in light of
United States v. Thompson, 777 F.3d 368 (7th Cir. 2015), because of problematic conditions
of supervised release. United States v. Williams, No. 14‐2916 (7th Cir. Mar. 4, 2015). On
remand the district court revised the conditions of supervised release but again
sentenced Williams to a total of 80 months’ imprisonment.
Williams filed a notice of appeal, but his appointed lawyer asserts that the appeal
is frivolous and moves to withdraw under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967).
Williams has not accepted our invitation to respond to counsel’s motion. See CIR.
R. 51(b). Counsel has submitted a brief that explains the nature of the case and addresses
issues that a case of this kind might be expected to involve. Because the analysis in the
brief appears to be thorough, we limit our review to the potential issues that counsel
discusses. See United States v. Bey, 748 F.3d 774, 776 (7th Cir. 2014); United States v.
Wagner, 103 F.3d 551, 553 (7th Cir. 1996). We agree with counsel that this third appeal is
Counsel first considers whether Williams could argue that the district court
miscalculated the loss amount under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(1). Over Williams’ objection, the
court adopted the probation officer’s loss calculation of roughly $74,000. That amount
includes $22,000 that Williams withdrew from his victims’ bank accounts,
approximately $40,000 in other cash and merchandise he admittedly obtained through
the same scheme, and another $12,000 he tried to get by submitting fraudulent
applications for a tax refund and a refund anticipation loan.
In calculating loss a district court must take the greater of the actual or intended
loss. See U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 cmt. n.3(A); United States v. Pu, 814 F.3d 818, 824 (7th Cir. 2016).
Actual loss “means the reasonably foreseeable pecuniary harm that resulted from the
offense,” while intended loss means “the pecuniary harm that the defendant purposely
sought to inflict” and “includes intended pecuniary harm that would have been
impossible or unlikely to occur.” U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 cmt. n.3(A)(i)‐(ii). Here, the greater of
the two amounts was the intended loss (everything that Williams tried to obtain, whether
successful or not). That is the figure the district court used, making any claim about the
loss calculation frivolous.
Counsel next considers, but rejects as frivolous, an appellate challenge to the
reasonableness of Williams’ above‐guidelines sentence. We agree that this argument
would be frivolous. We will uphold a sentence if the district court properly calculated
the guidelines range, reasonably applied the factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), and
satisfactorily explained the chosen penalty. See United States v. Hill, 645 F.3d 900, 911
(7th Cir. 2011); United States v. Vaughn, 614 F.3d 412, 414 (7th Cir. 2010). In this case the
district court calculated a total imprisonment range of 54 to 61 months and then
concluded that a higher sentence was necessary to account for the emotional stress
unaddressed by the guidelines as well as the substantial inconvenience that Williams
had caused his victims, since each spent time and money unwinding fraudulent
transactions, repairing credit records, and changing bank account information. The
above‐guidelines sentence also was necessary, the court explained, to take into account
Williams’ lofty criminal history, which at Category VI still underrepresents his
continuous criminal activity and omits criminal history points for some convictions that
were grouped rather than counted separately. See U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3(a)(2)(A). And these
concerns were not offset, the court reasoned, by Williams’ plea for a lower sentence
because of degenerative knee impairments and his troubled upbringing, which included
the murder of his mother, sexual abuse, and a multitude of residential placements with
relatives or in group homes or foster care. Williams is receiving appropriate medical care
in prison, the court reasoned, and also the need for punishment and to protect the public
outweighs his tumultuous upbringing. That explanation sufficiently justifies the
Accordingly, we GRANT counsel’s motion to withdraw and DISMISS the appeal.
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