USA v. Yamango Jiles
Filed Nonprecedential Disposition PER CURIAM. Counsel's motion to withdraw is GRANTED, and the appeal is DISMISSED. Frank H. Easterbrook, Circuit Judge; Ann Claire Williams, Circuit Judge and David F. Hamilton, Circuit Judge. [6810932-1]  [16-3030]
To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted January 11, 2017
Decided January 11, 2017
FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge
ANN CLAIRE WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge
DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Illinois.
Staci M. Yandle,
O R D E R
In 1997 a jury found Yamango Jiles guilty of conspiracy to possess with intent to
distribute crack cocaine, 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(a)(1). Jiles was sentenced to 282 months’
imprisonment and 5 years’ supervised release. Four and a half years after he was
released from prison, the government sought revocation of his supervised release. The
government alleged that Jiles had possessed marijuana and cocaine, failed to pay child
support, skipped drug‐abuse treatment, changed residences without telling his
probation oﬃcer, and failed to report to the probation oﬃcer as directed. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 3583(e), (g). At a hearing on the government’s motion, Jiles admitted the allegations.
The district court revoked his supervised release and imposed a prison term of
10 months. Jiles ﬁled a notice of appeal, but his appointed attorney asserts that the
appeal is frivolous and seeks to withdraw under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967).
A defendant facing revocation of supervised release does not have a
constitutional right to counsel unless he challenges the appropriateness of revocation or
asserts substantial and complex grounds in mitigation. See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S.
778, 790–91 (1973); United States v. Boultinghouse, 784 F.3d 1163, 1171–72 (7th Cir. 2015);
United States v. Eskridge, 445 F.3d 930, 932–33 (7th Cir. 2006). Jiles did not do either, so
the Anders safeguards do not govern our review of counsel’s motion to withdraw.
See Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 554–55 (1987); Eskridge, 445 F.3d at 933. That said,
we invited Jiles to comment on counsel’s submission, see CIR. R. 51(b), but he did not.
We evaluate counsel’s submission to assure that any potential issues have been vetted.
See United States v. Brown, 823 F.3d 392, 394 (7th Cir. 2016); United States v. Wheeler,
814 F.3d 856, 857 (7th Cir. 2016). Counsel’s brief explains the nature of the case and
considers issues that an appeal of this kind might be expected to involve. The analysis
appears thorough, so we focus our review on the subjects he discusses. See United States
v. Bey, 748 F.3d 774, 776 (7th Cir. 2014); United States v. Wagner, 103 F.3d 551, 553
(7th Cir. 1996).
Counsel ﬁrst assesses whether Jiles could argue that the district court abused its
discretion in revoking his supervised release. We agree with counsel that a challenge to
the revocation would be frivolous because Jiles admitted the alleged violations and does
not seek to retract those admissions. And since he admitted possessing controlled
substances, revocation of his supervised release was mandated by statute. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 3583(g)(1); United States v. Jones, 774 F.3d 399, 403–04 (7th Cir. 2014).
Counsel next questions whether Jiles could challenge the calculation of his
reimprisonment range. The probation oﬃcer applied the Chapter 7 policy statements to
calculate a range of 4 to 10 months using Jiles’s original criminal history category of I
and his drug possession—at Grade B, the most‐serious violation of his conditions of
release. See U.S.S.G. §§ 7B1.1(b), 7B1.4. The district court accepted that calculation
without objection from Jiles, thus limiting our review to plain error. See Wheeler,
814 F.3d at 857; United States v. Pitre, 504 F.3d 657, 661 (7th Cir. 2007). We cannot ﬁnd
any fault with the calculated range, making any claim of error frivolous.
Counsel also discusses, but rightly rejects as frivolous, an argument that the new
term of imprisonment is unlawful or unreasonable. The term imposed is within the
policy‐statement range and less than the statutory maximum (which is 5 years because
Jiles’s drug conspiracy was a Class A felony when he committed that oﬀense).
See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3559(a)(1), 3583(b)(1), (e)(3). The district court took into account the
factors in § 3583(e) and § 3553(a), including Jiles’s repeated and escalating
noncompliance with the terms of his supervision and the need to promote respect for
the law. Jiles had argued in mitigation that a short prison term would enable him to
seek drug and mental‐health treatment. But the court was unpersuaded by that
argument because Jiles had not taken advantage of the substance‐abuse resources the
court discussed with him a year earlier when denying his motion to terminate
supervised release early. We would not ﬁnd the new term of imprisonment to be plainly
unreasonable. See United States v. Kizeart, 505 F.3d 672, 674 (7th Cir. 2007) (noting that
term of reimprisonment imposed on revocation of supervised release will be upheld
unless plainly unreasonable).
Last, counsel discusses whether Jiles could claim that his lawyer’s representation
during the revocation proceedings was constitutionally deﬁcient. As explained above,
Jiles admitted the violations and did not present substantial grounds in mitigation.
Thus, he did not have a constitutional right to counsel in the revocation proceedings.
See Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 790–91; Eskridge, 445 F.3d at 932–33. More importantly, a claim of
ineﬀective assistance must start with a speciﬁc allegation of deﬁcient performance,
Johnson v. Thurmer, 624 F.3d 786, 792 (7th Cir. 2010), yet in her submission counsel does
not say on what basis Jiles might argue that her performance was substandard. And if
Jiles does have reason to criticize counsel’s performance, any claim must wait for
collateral review when he can develop the record and is not represented by the very
lawyer whose performance is questioned. See Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 504–
05 (2003); United States v. Flores, 739 F.3d 337, 340–41 (7th Cir. 2014); United States v.
Rezin, 322 F.3d 443, 445 (7th Cir. 2003).
Counsel’s motion to withdraw is GRANTED, and the appeal is DISMISSED.
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