USA v. Daniel Voican
Filed Nonprecedential Disposition PER CURIAM. We GRANT counsel s motion and DISMISS the appeal. Michael S. Kanne, Circuit Judge; Ilana Diamond Rovner, Circuit Judge and David F. Hamilton, Circuit Judge. [6831821-2] [6870731-1]  [16-3063]
To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted September 20, 2017
Decided September 21, 2017
MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge
ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge
DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois,
No. 14 CR 217‐3
Ronald A. Guzmán,
O R D E R
Daniel Voican pleaded guilty to one count of wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1343 and one count of aggravated identity theft in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1)
and was sentenced to 42 months’ imprisonment and one year of supervised release. His
written plea agreement included express waivers of his rights to appeal his conviction
and sentence. He nonetheless filed a notice of appeal. His appellate counsel now seeks
to withdraw under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), because she believes that
any appeal would be frivolous. We gave Voican an opportunity to respond to counsel’s
motion, see CIR. R. 51(b), but he has not done so. Counsel’s Anders brief is facially
adequate, so we limit our review of the record to the potential issues that counsel
discusses. See United States v. Cano‐Rodriguez, 552 F.3d 637, 638 (7th Cir. 2009).
Counsel first considers whether Voican could argue that his guilty plea was not
knowing and voluntary. Counsel informs us, however, that Voican did not move to
withdraw his guilty plea in the district court and does not wish to do so on appeal. A
challenge to the plea therefore should neither be raised on appeal nor explored in an
Anders submission. See United States v. Knox, 287 F.3d 667, 671 (7th Cir. 2002).
Counsel next evaluates whether a challenge to the sentence would provide a
basis for appeal. Counsel notes that Voican explicitly waived his right to appeal his
sentence, but potentially could argue that (1) the court relied on an impermissible factor
such as race when sentencing him; (2) his sentence exceeds the statutory maximum; or
(3) his waiver was involuntary. See Jones v. United States, 167 F.3d 1142, 1144 (7th Cir.
1999). But counsel correctly concludes that there is no evidence in the record that the
court relied on any impermissible factors when sentencing Voican and that his sentence
of 42 months’ imprisonment falls far below the statutory maximum of 22 years’
imprisonment, see 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343, 1028A(a)(1). Regarding a challenge to the
voluntariness of the waiver, counsel accurately states that, when a plea agreement and
guilty plea are voluntary, the attendant waivers of the defendants’ rights are also
voluntary. See United States v. Wenger, 58 F.3d 280, 282 (7th Cir. 1995). Because Voican
does not wish to challenge the voluntariness of his plea, it would be frivolous to contest
his waiver of the right to appeal the sentence.
Accordingly, we GRANT counsel’s motion and DISMISS the appeal.
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?